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ABSTRACT 
 
GREAT IDEA, NOW WHAT? THREE ESSAYS EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
John Eklund 
Rahul Kapoor 
 
Innovation is a key driver of a firm’s overall performance. Within an organization, 
innovation involves multiple actors transforming a firm’s knowledge into a final market 
offering. How an organization is designed can shape this transformation by influencing 
actors’ behaviors and interactions. However, despite prior studies, our understanding of the 
relationship between organization design and innovation is somewhat limited. 
In this dissertation, I offer a framework in which I conceptualize innovation as a process 
consisting of upstream tasks around invention, and downstream tasks around product 
development and commercialization. This enables me to combine both knowledge- and 
incentives- based views of the firm to develop a more complete theoretical understanding 
of the relationship between organization design and innovation. The design attribute I focus 
upon is the degree of organizational centralization. On the one hand, more centralized 
designs are associated with enhanced intra-organizational knowledge flows, which can 
enhance innovation. On the other hand, more decentralized designs are associated with 
higher observability of effort and facilitate the more effective use of incentives, which can 
increase innovation efforts.   
I empirically examine this trade-off in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. I use a 
unique dataset of firms’ patents, clinical trials, sales and organization structures 
supplemented by 61 interviews with senior managers from 28 of my sample firms. I find 
that greater decentralization while yielding higher numbers of inventions is associated with 
vi 
 
less original inventions, and fewer inventions progressing through the earlier stages of 
development. However, greater decentralization is associated with more inventions 
progressing through the later stages of development and greater sales of new products as a 
proportion of total sales. Further, I find that firms with decentralized Research & 
Development units are associated with a higher proportion of externally sourced inventions 
primarily driven by licensing.  
This dissertation contributes to the organization design and innovation literatures by 
highlighting where (in the organization) and when (in the innovation process) design 
choices can impact both how firms innovate as well as their innovation outcomes. 
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1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Organization Design and Innovation: Old Hat or Perpetual Problem? 
“We think we have the right architecture not just in silicon but in our organization 
to build these kinds of products.” Steve Jobs, Former CEO Apple (2011) 
“You have to combine both things: invention and innovation focus, plus the 
company that can commercialize things and get them to people,” Larry Page, CEO 
Alphabet (2014) 
“Structure is super important,” Satya Nadella, CEO Microsoft (2018) 
“It occurred to me that building a company was the best way to align a group of 
people towards building something great. And it’s really... it's a good 
organizational structure where you can really reward people,” Mark Zuckerberg, 
CEO Facebook (2010) 
 
These quotes by the CEOs of some of the most innovative companies of the twenty-
first century serve to highlight that senior managers pay a great deal of attention to 
organization design. This is not surprising because within an organization, innovation 
involves multiple actors transforming a firm’s knowledge into a final market offering. 
These actors can include scientists within Research and Development (R&D) who create 
the initial idea, engineers in manufacturing that ensure the idea can be created at scale and 
marketers who identify the appropriate target markets and define plans to launch the idea 
into the market. Innovation involves broad swathes of an organization, it is not just an R&D 
thing! How an organization is designed can thus shape the transformation of knowledge 
into a final offering by influencing actors’ behaviors and interactions.  
Yet, despite the clear importance of understanding the relationship between 
organization design and different facets of organizational performance such as innovation, 
scholars turned away from the study of organization design in the late 1980s. This was 
driven by multiple challenges associated with examining the topic such as obtaining 
accurate data on firms’ structures (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). However, recently the 
study of organization design has gone through a renaissance driven by multiple scholars 
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(e.g., Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014; Csaszar, 2012; Joseph, Klingebiel, & Wilson, 2016; 
Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2014; Zhou, 2013).  
Despite this hiatus, the relationship between organization design and innovation 
has been touched upon in multiple literatures within the strategic management domain. 
However no clear, coherent picture emerges of the relationship between organization 
design and innovation.  
 
Figure 1: Brief overview of the variety of literatures examining the relationship 
between organization design and innovation. 
 
 
These studies have examined a variety of facets of organization design and 
innovation as illustrated in Figure 1. As can be seen, these studies have tended to focus on 
the creation of inventions (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 2014), the 
development of inventions into new products or internal adoption of new innovations (e.g., 
Damanpour, 1991; Damanpour & Aravind, 2012) and the commercialization of new 
products (e.g., Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, & O’Reilly, 2010) in isolation. Thus 
this prior work has examined different stages of the innovation process separately 
providing a disjointed picture of how design and various facets of innovation are related as 
Invention Development
Commer-
cialization
R&D Design
Overall Design
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very different innovation outcomes are examined (Garud, Tuertscher, & Van de Ven, 
2013). These outcomes range from patent outputs (e.g., Arora et al., 2014) to product 
launches (e.g., Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006) and overall performance (e.g., Siggelkow 
& Rivkin, 2006). These studies have also examined design at a corporate or overall 
organization level (e.g., Damanpour, 1991) and at a functional unit level such as R&D (e.g., 
Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Further, design has been examined from a horizontal 
perspective (e.g., Tushman et al., 2010), in which an organization is divided into more 
units, and a vertical perspective, in which authority is delegated down the organization 
(e.g., Keum & See, 2017). Thus, despite this existing body of work, a “joined-up” 
perspective of how different facets of organization design impact both how firms innovate 
as well as their innovation outcomes across the innovation process is needed. 
In organizing to innovate a key design feature is the degree to which firms 
centralize or decentralize their innovation activities in order to enable ample integration 
yet facilitate sufficient focus and clarity of roles and responsibilities (e.g., Galbraith, 1977; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2014). Much of the organization 
design literature suggests that increased decentralization is associated with enhanced 
innovation outcomes (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). In contrast, 
studies focused primarily on firms’ Research and Development (R&D) units suggest that 
greater decentralization of R&D is associated with reduced inventive productivity and less 
original and general inventions (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 2014; Ecker, 
van Triest, & Williams, 2013). However, as highlighted above these studies are looking at 
different stages of the innovation process and different facets of organization design 
making it difficult to compare outcomes and develop a holistic picture. Thus in this 
dissertation I aim to unpack the innovation process into its constituent stages and examine 
how decentralization at both an innovation unit (e.g. R&D) and an overall corporate level 
are related with a variety of innovation outcomes across the innovation process.  
Internal organization design can also impact how firms innovate as well as their 
innovation outcomes. Specifically, firms’ designs could shape their decision to create 
inventions internally or source them externally prior to developing them internally. 
However, despite significant attention being paid to the phenomenon of open innovation 
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(e.g., Chesbrough, 2006; Lichtenthaler, 2011; West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 
2014), our understanding of how internal design choices can shape this “make-buy” choice 
is limited. Recent studies have started to address this gap by illustrating that decentralized 
firms are more reliant on external knowledge (e.g., Arora et al., 2014) but this remains a 
nascent research domain with several unanswered questions. Further, existing research has 
considered this decision to take place at the firm-level and the logic for decision-making at 
the transaction-level (e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Bidwell, 2012). However, firms 
may decentralize such decisions within specific units, and decision-making might operate 
at the pipeline-level rather than at the individual transaction-level.  
This brief overview highlights that internal organization design can vary in its 
impact on firms’ innovation outcomes across the innovation process as well as shape 
whether firms undertake certain parts of the innovation process with the boundaries of the 
firm or externally. However, we do not have a coherent picture of how organization design 
is associated with both how firms innovate (i.e. undertake certain stages of the innovation 
process internally or externally) as well as their innovation outcomes across the innovation 
process. Thus the focal research question in my dissertation is:  
How are different facets of organizational decentralization (e.g. R&D, overall 
organization) associated with how firms innovate as well as their innovation 
outcomes across the innovation process spanning invention to ultimate 
commercialization? 
 
In answering this research question, I develop a theoretical framework that unpacks 
the innovation process into its key stages and on-going sets of activities. I conceptualize 
the innovation process as consisting of invention, development and commercialization 
stages (e.g., Garud et al., 2013). This enables me to juxtapose a knowledge-based with an 
incentive-based perspective in building my theoretical arguments. This builds on previous 
work which has called for scholars to use both theoretical lenses when examining firms’ 
pursuits (e.g., Argyres, Felin, Foss, & Zenger, 2012; Dosi, Levinthal, & Marengo, 2003; 
Foss, 1996; Kapoor & Lim, 2007).  
In the remainder of this introduction chapter I describe the three key components 
of my dissertation that I use to examine how firms’ organization designs and their 
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innovation outcomes as well as how they innovate are related. First, I describe the 
innovation process framework that I leverage in this dissertation and that links all three 
chapters of the dissertation. Second, I describe how I examine organization design in this 
dissertation. Third, I highlight the two primary theoretical lenses that I utilize to develop 
my unique theoretical argumentation and set of hypotheses. I then describe the empirical 
context for this dissertation. I conclude this chapter with an overview of the three 
dissertation papers and a brief statement about the novel elements of this dissertation. 
 
Examining Innovation as a Process  
Rather than viewing innovation as an outcome I view innovation as a process as 
illustrated in Figure 2. Clearly the framework simplifies and linearizes the conversion of 
knowledge into ultimate commercial outcomes. The crux of this framework revolves 
around distinguishing between invention, development and commercialization. In reality, 
innovation is unlikely to be such a linear process with firms moving back and forth between 
stages and potentially completely missing stages.  
 
Figure 2: The innovation process framework that I utilize in this dissertation  
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However, this simplified framework provides me a way to systematically unpack 
the major elements of firms’ innovation activities. Further, this framework helps me to 
compartmentalize specific research questions that will form the focus of each of my three 
dissertation chapters. I will now describe each of the three stages in this innovation process 
model. 
 
Stage 1: Invention  
The first stage involves the aggregation of a firm’s knowledge to develop an 
invention. Scholars have generally defined invention as the generation of new ideas and 
knowledge (e.g., Arora, Cohen, & Walsh, 2016; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Schumpeter, 
1939). However, other scholars indicate that the ideas generated must work and have a 
degree of usefulness above some threshold value (e.g., Fabrizio, 2009; Roberts, 1999) 
despite the fact that an invention in itself may provide little economic benefit (e.g., 
Schumpeter, 1939). For the purpose of this dissertation, I define an invention as an 
aggregation of a firm’s knowledge with the intention of serving a specific purpose.   
Invention tends to be primarily driven by firms’ Research and Development (R&D) 
organizations (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010; Wu, Levitas, 
& Priem, 2005) as the focus is largely on the creation of new knowledge and its 
recombination with existing knowledge. Invention has been described as a process of 
distant search (e.g., Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Schumpeter, 1939) where 
knowledge is recombined from multiple sources that are both new to and exist within the 
firm.  
The invention creation process with its focus on new knowledge generation or 
combination of different elements of existing knowledge is likely to involve the sharing of 
highly tacit knowledge (e.g., Grant, 1996). Invention involves the creation of new 
constructs and ideas for which no pre-existing codified or explicit knowledge may exist. 
Thus in order to develop an invention, rich communication channels are required to ensure 
different parties involved in the recombination of existing and new knowledge have the 
same understanding of the knowledge being shared (Grant, 1996). The issues involved in 
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invention may be so complex that multiple iterations of knowledge sharing may be required 
further accentuating the need for rich communication channels and strong intra-
organizational knowledge flows. Invention is not a process with clearly defined routines as 
ex ante the solution to a specific inventive problem is not obvious requiring the broad 
search process described above. If fact scholars have suggested that over-reliance on 
routines can harm this creative process (e.g., Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). 
 
Stage 2: Development 
The second stage of the innovation process involves the development of inventions 
into final market offerings (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Nixon, 1993; Katila & Shane, 2005). 
The process of development consists of multiple activities such as selecting the inventions 
to be commercialized, supplementing inventions with complementary knowledge to help 
build final offers, refining inventions so that they can be manufactured at scale and 
evaluating the potential commercial attractiveness of final offers (e.g., Mitchell & Singh, 
1996; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). Katila and Shane (2005) define development as “a process 
that begins with an invention, proceeds with the development of the invention, and results 
in the introduction of a new product, process or service to the marketplace.” For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I define development as the process of converting an invention 
into a marketed offering. 
The organizational scope for development is generally much broader than that for 
invention. Development encompasses a wide range of functions ranging from R&D to 
marketing to manufacturing (e.g., Dougherty, 2001; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Stuart & 
Podolny, 1996). The development of inventions involves a sequence of specific decisions 
that may pertain to different organizational units thereby requiring specific localized 
knowledge such as, for example, knowledge of customer needs and specific manufacturing 
processes. Effectively, invention focuses on the “big picture” and development is primarily 
about the “details”.   
Development involves more localized as opposed to distant search (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002). Further, development is likely to involve more explicit knowledge based on, for 
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example, well-defined routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) such as documented processes. 
Development is effectively the fine-tuning of an invention and is focused on local search 
in the area designated by the more distant search processes of invention (e.g., Levinthal, 
1997). For example, drug R&D involves broad search in the inventive pre-clinical phase 
and requires combining the knowledge of chemists, biochemists, physiologists and several 
other scientific disciplines to develop patented, novel drug candidates and does not 
generally have a well-defined and documented process that a firm can follow. The 
development stage involves the clinical development of drugs and comprises smaller 
modifications to the favored drug target and trials that tend to follow well-documented 
process often prescribed by bodies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (e.g., 
Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Pisano, 2006).   
Due to the fact that the knowledge associated with development is more explicit 
than that associated with invention, the requirements for the rich communication channels 
described above are not as great. As a result, organizational interfaces are likely to have 
less of an adverse effect on the knowledge flows associated with development because of 
the ability to use explicit communication tools to ensure that a common language is being 
spoken across an organization (e.g., Grant, 1996).   
 
Stage 3: Commercialization 
The third stage of the innovation process involves commercialization. I define 
commercialization as the capture of value from firms’ newly developed marketed offerings. 
Despite the importance of understanding what shapes firms’ ability to commercialize their 
new products this stream of research is a relatively “fragmented field of study” (Kirkegaard 
Sløk-Madsen, Ritter, & Sornn-Friese, 2017) and “remains poorly understood” (Datta, 
Mukherjee, & Jessup, 2015). However, some existing strands of work provide some insight 
into how firms’ organization design attributes could impact their ability to capture value 
from their new offerings. 
Based on the classic work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Burns and Stalker 
(1961) and more recent simulation-based work undertaken by scholars such as Rivkin and 
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Siggelkow (2003), organizations need to have a good fit between their designs and the 
external environment if they are to receive a more positive response to their new offerings. 
Similarly, Matthyssens, Philippe Gosselin, and André Bauwen (2006) highlight the 
importance of alignment between organizations’ customer management structures and 
customers’ own structures for successful delivery of new offerings.  
Christensen and Bower (1996) illustrate that existing customers may limit firms’ 
ability to successfully commercialize their new offerings, opening up opportunities for new 
entrants to serve smaller, less initially attractive, segments with the relevant marketed offer. 
However, if firms created stand-alone units they tended to have more success in being able 
to launch their inventions to the relevant market place as they are less encumbered by 
current customer needs (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman et al., 2010). The 
findings from this work are consistent with studies that have illustrated that firms may 
struggle to commercialize new offerings that are inconsistent with their current business 
models (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). For example, Xerox has an illustrious history of 
developing ground-breaking inventions but not successfully commercializing them 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Ultimately, Xerox sought to capture value from new 
technologies that did not align with their primary business model of leasing printing and 
copying equipment to corporate clients by spinning-off separate companies. Thus rather 
that changing or adapting their internal design, Xerox simply created new companies for 
inventions that did not align with their existing business.  
These studies serve to highlight that firms’ ability to capture value from their 
inventions can be influenced by how they are structured. However, this stream of literature 
is relatively under-developed and offers exciting opportunities for future research. 
 
Organization Design: Definition and Key Elements 
How have organization design and structure been defined and described? 
 Based on the seminal work of Simon (1950), organization design relates to the 
management of communications and relationships between actors within a firm so that 
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effective decisions can be made and implemented. Building on this description, scholars 
have emphasized the role of organization design in enabling actors within organizations to 
make effective decisions through access to relevant information provided through good 
communication flows (e.g., March & Simon, 1958; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005).  
Organization design thus relates to allocation of decision rights and the means by which 
communications are channeled through an organization. In terms of implementing 
decisions and in the neo-classical economic spirit, other scholars describe organization 
design as the means by which the efforts of actors across a firm can be effectively 
coordinated and aggregated to achieve specific goals (e.g., Child, 1984; Galbraith, 1977). 
Thus according to this view, organization design relates to the allocation of inter-dependent 
tasks, and ensuring the effective cooperation and coordination of actors undertaking these 
tasks (e.g., Puranam et al., 2014). Building on this perspective, Puranam, Raveendran, and 
Knudsen (2012) describe organization design “as a means to meet the information 
processing requirements generated by individuals and groupings of individuals 
undertaking interdependent activities.” Pulling these strands together and building on the 
definition of Simon (1950), organization design is a means by which organizations enable 
effective decision-making through appropriate allocation of decision rights and facilitation 
of communication flows to decision-right holders. Further, organization design is a means 
by which interdependent tasks are allocated, divided and coordinated such that these 
decisions can be effectively implemented.    
 A tangible manifestation of an organization’s design is its structure (e.g., Burton, 
Obel, & DeSanctis, 2011; Csaszar, 2013; Harris & Raviv, 2002). Building on the classic 
work of Chandler (1962), the structures of large firms can take multiple forms such as the 
functional form in which different organizational units undertaking related functional tasks 
(e.g. Human Resources, Research & Development) are grouped together or the divisional 
form in which the firm is divided along specific product/service lines in which cross-
functional teams work together to achieve organizational goals to name but two. Such 
structures relate to the formal aspects of organization design which form the focus of the 
work in this dissertation.  However, it should be recognized that recent scholastic attention 
has shifted to more informal elements of design and the creation of new organizational 
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forms (e.g., Baker, Nohria, & Eccles, 1992; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; 
Kotha & Srikanth, 2013; Tsai, 2002). Ultimately these new forms provide alternative 
solutions to the standard problems organization design is tasked to address (e.g., Puranam 
et al., 2012). However, formal design attributes are still of paramount importance to 
managers (e.g., Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). 
 Such formal structures include an array of design attributes that will ultimately 
impact how decisions are made and executed. These attributes provide a means of 
comparing structures across organizations - effectively providing a common currency. 
Foundational work examining organization structure describes an array of attributes such 
as centralization, formalization, specialization, standardization (e.g., Child, 1973; 
Damanpour, 1991). This can create a complex taxonomy of attributes relating to how 
structures are described. However, returning to the original description of organization 
design, this myriad of attributes ultimately describe features of the structure that relate to 
where decisions are made, mechanisms for facilitating communication flows, how tasks 
are divided and allocated and methods to integrate this activity.   
In the context of this dissertation the key structural attribute on which I focus is 
decentralization. Decentralization/centralization is generally defined as the extent to which 
decision-making autonomy is dispersed or concentrated in an organization (Pfeffer & 
Lammerding, 1981). Some scholars take a vertical perspective defining centralization as 
the degree to which decisions are made higher up the hierarchy within an organization and 
state it is inversely related to the degree of autonomy of more junior managers which 
involves greater decentralization (Russell & Russell, 1992; Sathe, 1978). Others take a 
more horizontal perspective and define the degree of decentralization in terms of whether 
a corporate function drives key decisions as opposed to strategic business units (see for 
example Hrebiniak (2013) and Arora et al. (2014)).  It is the latter attribute on which I 
focus in this dissertation. 
In addition, different parts of an organization can have higher or lower degrees of 
decentralization.  For example, some functions may be highly centralized (e.g. Finance, 
Human Resources) and under corporate control whereas others can be highly decentralized 
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and operate in relatively autonomous business units (e.g. sales and marketing). The 
ultimate manifestation of such attributes of some functions being centralized and others 
being decentralized is the classic Matrix-organization (e.g., Galbraith, 1971, 2008). In this 
dissertation I focus on decentralization of firms’ Research and Development (R&D) units 
as this is the focal unit for firms’ invention and development activities. I also examine 
overall organizational decentralization. By overall organizational decentralization I refer 
to firms that are more functionally (centralized) or divisionally (decentralized) aligned 
(Burton et al., 2011).   
 
A broader perspective on organization design 
 The description of organization design provided above focuses within the firm. 
However it is silent with respect to what activities and decisions are made within the firm 
as opposed to outside the firm. Taking the broad description of organization design as the 
means by which firms make and implement effective decisions, defining whether decisions 
are made and executed within or outside the focal firm would appear to be a key design 
choice. This design consideration has traditionally been under the purview of the 
“Boundaries of the Firm” literature (e.g., Teece, 1980, 1982; Williamson, 1979, 1985a, b) 
but can be argued to be a key aspect of organization design. 
As a result, in this dissertation I take a broader perspective on organization design 
in that I examine two different organization design choices. First, there are “Boundary 
Design” choices. Based upon the specific goals and strategies required to achieve these 
goals, what decisions and tasks should be undertaken within the focal firm and how is 
coordination and cooperation achieved between the entities undertaking these 
decisions/tasks (e.g., Puranam et al., 2014)? Second, there are “Internal Design” choices. 
These choices focus upon how decisions/tasks are divided and allocated within the focal 
firm and how coordination and cooperation is ensured across all these internal sub-units. 
These internal design features can ultimately influence firms’ innovation outcomes 
throughout the innovation process.   
 Chapters 2 and 4 focus exclusively on “internal design” attributes and how they are 
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related with a variety of innovation outcomes across the entire innovation process from 
invention to commercialization. In Chapter 3, I examine how firms’ internal design features 
can shape whether they undertake invention activities within the firm or externally through 
carefully-selected partners i.e. how firms invent or “boundary design” choices. This 
chapter serves to highlight that internal and boundary design choices are intricately linked 
and cannot be seen as two independent choices by managers within firms. 
 
Knowledge and Incentives: The Theoretical Underpinnings of this Dissertation 
To theoretically examine my two research questions I integrate both a knowledge-
based perspective (e.g., Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996) with a more organizational economics 
inspired incentives-based lens (e.g., Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). Although scholars have 
historically tended to see these theoretical perspectives as being in opposition, the debate 
has shifted to integrating these theories (e.g., Argyres, 2011; Argyres, Felin, Foss, & 
Zenger, 2012; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). However, this recent work has primarily focused on 
examining the boundaries of the firm with little attention being paid to firms’ internal 
design (e.g., Argyres & Zenger, 2012).  
The knowledge-based view of the firm describes the firm as a repository of 
knowledge (e.g., Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In this theoretical perspective, the 
firm is a problem-solver that attempts to recombine its employees’ knowledge to address 
complex technical problems (e.g., Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Karim & 
Kaul, 2015; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In addressing these problems it is important that the 
organization is designed such that it can optimize intra-organizational knowledge flows to 
facilitate the recombination of knowledge from across the organization (e.g., Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Karim & Kaul, 2015). This perspective ultimately provides insights into 
what firms are able to do. 
The incentives-based view of the firm sees the firm as a bundle of contracts (Hart 
& Moore, 1990; Hölmstrom, 1979). Based on this perspective, the firm needs to incentivize 
the actors within the firm appropriately to ensure effective coordination and cooperation 
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(e.g., Puranam et al., 2014; Zenger, 1992). In addressing these problems it is important that 
the organization is designed such that it can optimize the effectiveness of usage of 
incentives. Further, organization design can shape how resources are allocated across an 
organization through this incentives-based mechanism (e.g., Stein, 1997). This perspective 
ultimately provides insights into what firms choose to do. 
Organization design can influence intra-organizational knowledge flows and the 
effectiveness of the usage of incentives. For example, greater decentralization into smaller 
more autonomous units is associated with an increased ability to use higher-powered 
incentives more effectively (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Thus in developing my theoretical 
arguments I examine how different design elements impact both knowledge flows and 
incentives. 
Beyond their direct effects, incentives and knowledge flows influenced by 
organization design can also impact how resources are allocated within an organization. 
Resource allocation can subsequently impact both how firms innovate as well as their 
innovation outcomes. First, reduced incentives to invent internally driven by shorter-term 
focused business units can result in more invention being undertaken outside of the 
boundaries of the firm (Arora et al., 2014). Similarly, a reduced ability to recombine 
knowledge internally can result in more invention resources being allocated externally 
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017). This serves to highlight the point I make above that 
internal organization design is intricately linked to the boundaries of the firm. I examine 
this phenomenon in Chapter 3. Second, focusing within the firm, managerial incentives can 
shape how resources are allocated across different innovation-related projects within a firm 
(e.g., Stein, 1997). In more decentralized designs, unit managers may actively compete for 
resources as they are strongly incentivized to ensure their units perform effectively. This 
can result in good innovation projects not being funded (e.g., Bardolet, Lovallo, & Rumelt, 
2010). In contrast in more centralized designs, innovation projects will tend to be assessed 
at an individual level resulting in a more effective allocation of resources (Bardolet, Fox, 
& Lovallo, 2011). Effectively, resource allocators will tend to have better knowledge on 
all projects in a more centralized organization, whereas in the decentralized case unit 
managers may “play up” their projects potential to garner more resources. I examine this 
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phenomenon in Chapter 4.  
The relative importance of knowledge and incentives is likely to vary throughout 
the innovation process. During invention and early development more distant search may 
be required to address the challenging technical problems which are likely to necessitate 
access to a firm’s broader knowledge (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2006). In contrast, as an 
invention progresses through development, the type of problems that need to be addressed 
become less complex and the knowledge required to undertake development tasks becomes 
more routinized and explicit, thus local search may suffice (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). Incentives are therefore likely to play a greater role in shaping development 
outcomes as inventions progress through development as firms are likely to be able to 
access the knowledge they need to undertake later development activities locally or through 
more explicit communications. Further, prior studies investigating the role of incentives in 
R&D imply that creating effective incentive schemes for the highly uncertain stages of 
research and early development is much more challenging than for the more certain later 
stages of development (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Tirole, 1999). Thus higher-powered 
incentive schemes are likely to be more effective later in the development process. 
Thus by combining a process-based view of innovation and the examination of how 
different design parameters impact knowledge flows and incentives I am able to unpack 
different aspects of the relationship between organization design and firms’ innovation 
efforts. For example, the same design choice which may facilitate knowledge flows may 
results in enhanced innovation outcomes at some stages of the process but inferior 
outcomes at other stages. 
 
Empirical Context for Dissertation 
 The empirical context for this dissertation is the global pharmaceutical industry. I 
focus on a sample of 49 leading firms based on annual sales of prescription drugs. This 
industry provides a highly suitable context for testing my theoretically-driven hypotheses 
as it has a well-defined innovation process. Starting with drug discovery which corresponds 
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to invention, through clinical development and ultimate new drug sales, this context maps 
neatly onto the theoretical framework I propose for the innovation process. Further, there 
is significant heterogeneity in pharmaceutical firms’ organization designs driven by, for 
example, mergers, acquisitions and divestitures. This enables me to examine how different 
design elements can impact various facets of innovation. 
 A key challenge in investigating the impact of organization design on firms’ 
performance is that of omitted variable bias. Namely, firms select into their organization 
designs and there may be an unobserved factor that correlates with a specific design choice 
and firms’ innovation attributes resulting in misleading inferences as to the relationship 
between design and innovation. In order to address this issue I do four things. 
 First, I use propensity score matching to ensure that I am comparing like with like 
firms (based on observable variables) with different design attributes. This enables me to 
avoid extrapolating data such that I compare observations of very different firms using 
regular multiple regression techniques. Second, I undertake a variety of robustness tests to 
examine whether changes to model specifications impact the main results. These include 
coarsened exact matching (CEM) and the use of alternate variables. Third, I also execute a 
variety of supplementary analyses in which I examine the mechanisms through which 
organization design and various facets of innovation are related. Finally, I supplement my 
quantitative analyses with interviews with managers from within the pharmaceutical 
industry to reality test my observations derived from the quantitative analyses using 
archival data. 
 
Overview of Dissertation 
Summary of the three chapters 
 Error! Reference source not found. summarizes the key elements of each 
issertation chapter. In Chapter 2, I examine the invention and development stages of the 
innovation process (see Figure 2). My broad research question is “How does a firm’s 
organization design shape its innovation outcomes across invention and development?” 
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On the one hand, taking a knowledge-based view, more centralized designs are expected 
to be associated with enhanced intra-organizational knowledge flows, which can enhance 
innovation. On the other hand, taking an incentives-based perspective, more decentralized 
designs are associated with higher observability of effort and likely to facilitate the more 
effective use of incentives, which can increase innovation efforts. I find that greater 
centralization is associated with the creation of more original inventions and more of these 
inventions progressing through the earlier stages of development. In contrast, greater 
decentralization is associated with the creation of more inventions and with more 
inventions progressing through the later stages of development. These results illustrate that 
knowledge flows play a more important role further upstream and incentives play a greater 
relative role further downstream. This study provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding both where (in the organization) and when (in the innovation process) design 
choices can facilitate or hinder innovation outcomes, thereby helping to reconcile some of 
the extant literatures’ disparate findings. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on the development stage of the innovation process. My broad 
research question is “How does a firm’s organization design shape its propensity to source 
inventions internally or externally?” In their quest to sustain their innovativeness, firms 
pursue multiple inventions, with only a small proportion of them achieving fruition. In 
addition to the challenge of commercializing their inventions, firms also face the challenge 
of replenishing and maintaining the flow of inventions within their pipelines. This 
replenishment could be done via internally or externally sourced inventions through 
licensing, alliance or acquisition modes. Existing research has considered this decision to 
take place at the firm-level and the logic for decision-making at the transaction-level. In 
this paper the incentive- and knowledge-based views of the firm are integrated to offer a 
new theory to explain this decision. Within the theory, firms may decentralize such 
decisions within specific R&D units, and decision-making might operate at the pipeline-
level rather than at the individual transaction-level. Thus this study considers different 
sources of heterogeneity within firms’ decision-making processes, and how organization 
design can have significant implications for firms’ invention sourcing. Decentralized 
designs with multiple R&D units are associated with a higher proportion of externally 
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sourced inventions. This difference is primarily driven by differences in the propensity to 
license, and for inventions of moderate novelty. These findings highlight an important 
linkage between firms’ internal organization design and their sourcing of inventions, and 
in doing so, show how such decision-making is impacted by both managerial incentives 
and intra-organizational knowledge flows. 
 
Table 1: Summary of how each dissertation chapter aligns to overall dissertation 
framework and themes 
Chp. Key research 
question 
Steps of knowledge 
commercialization 
framework  
(Figure 2) 
Design Element  
 
Innovation 
Attributes 
Examined 
2 “How does a firm’s 
organization design 
shape its 
innovation 
outcomes across 
invention and 
development?” 
  
1. Invention 
2. Development 
 R&D 
Decentralization 
 Corporate 
Decentralization 
 Invention 
Quantity 
 Invention 
Originality 
 Progression of 
inventions 
through 
development 
process 
3 “How does a firm’s 
organization design 
shape its propensity 
to source 
inventions 
internally or 
externally?” 
2. Development  R&D 
Decentralization  
 Proportion of 
inventions 
externally 
sourced 
 Mode of 
sourcing 
externally 
4 “How does a firm’s 
organization design 
impact the 
commercialization 
of firms’ 
inventions?” 
3. Commercialization  Corporate 
Decentralization 
 Proportion of 
sales of new 
products at 
different levels 
of SG&A and 
concentration 
of existing 
product sales 
 
 In Chapter 4, I examine the commercialization stage of the innovation process. My 
broad research question is “How does a firm’s organization design impact the 
commercialization of firms’ inventions?” In many industries firms’ on-going livelihoods 
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are determined by the continuous commercialization of new products within their 
innovation pipelines. However, our understanding of what shapes a firm’s ability to 
commercialize its new products appears to be somewhat limited. In this paper, I examine 
the process of firms’ ongoing commercialization of new inventions emerging from their 
pipelines. I specifically evaluate how firms’ organization designs can shape the proportion 
of a firms’ product sales that come from new products. I argue that firms face a delicate 
balancing act. On the other hand, greater centralization enables more effective allocation 
of complementary resources which also aids commercialization. Complementary resources 
such as sales and marketing are critical in enabling firms to sell new offers. I argue that 
this balance of the benefits and costs of decentralization shifts with the level of 
complementary resources available and the degree of concentration of sales of firms’ 
existing products. I argue that this is because business units in decentralized firms will tend 
to over-inflate the opportunities associated with their suite of products to garner more 
resources or focus such resources on prominent existing products on which they are highly 
dependent. This results in a less effective resource allocation in decentralized firms across 
products potentially starving new products of vital supporting resources.  
Appendix 1 summarizes the eight hypotheses I test in this dissertation. 
 
Novelty of dissertation 
 By breaking down the innovation process into more granular stages (e.g., Kapoor 
& Klueter, 2015; Keum & See, 2017) this dissertation helps to integrate the organization 
design and innovation literatures more closely. Much prior work in the innovation domain 
has tended to conflate the various stages of the innovation process (e.g., Garud et al., 2013). 
Using this approach helps to highlight that the same organization design choice (i.e. 
increased decentralization) may have different outcomes depending on whether it pertains 
to firms’ invention, development or commercialization activities. This has broader 
implications for future studies relating to organization design in that the relevant design 
element must be closely mapped to the specific activities being undertaken. Broad 
measures of design may not be able to capture how such choices can impact a targeted set 
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of organizational outcomes, leading to misleading or null inferences. This dissertation can 
therefore highlight an important additional contingency beyond, for example, the type of 
innovation, when investigating the relationship between firms’ designs and their 
innovation outcomes, namely the innovation process stage. Thus, it is important to 
understand where (in organization e.g. R&D) and when (in the relevant process e.g. 
invention stage) design choices are made. This can help to reconcile the varied findings 
within the extant literature pertaining to how firms’ design choices can impact their 
innovation outcomes as these studies focus on different aspects of “where” and “when”.  
 This dissertation provides a significant theoretical contribution in that it extends 
recent work combining both the knowledge-based and organizational economics-based 
theories (e.g., Argyres, 2011; Argyres et al., 2012; Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Kapoor & 
Lim, 2007). Whereas previous studies combining both theoretical lenses have focused on 
the boundaries of the firm, this dissertation uses their integration to examine how internal 
design features can impact various organizational outcomes.  
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on the capability-based view of 
the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991). I argue that firms’ organization designs, such as the extent to 
which they decentralize certain parts of their organization, can strongly influence firms’ 
access to their broader knowledge base which can, in turn, shape boundary choices 
associated with different stages of the innovation process. Thus, internal design choices 
can shape firms’ innovation capabilities and influence whether firms undertake these 
activities in-house or externally. This dissertation can therefore provide some insight into 
the foundations of firms’ capabilities (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2007).  
This dissertation also helps to shine a light on how internal organization design can 
shape resource allocation decisions. These internal resource allocation decisions can shape 
both how firms innovate as well as their innovation outcomes. However, the extant strategy 
literature has paid “relatively little attention” to this topic (Bardolet et al., 2011). I highlight 
that increasing competition between business units may have unintended consequences in 
that although these highly incentivized units may exert more effort to sell their new 
products they are likely to compete intensively with other units for resources to facilitate 
the sales of new products. This can lead to empire-building and resource accumulation in 
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units that do not have the best use for these resources. In contrast, in more centralized 
organizations in which resources are allocated at an individual product level, resources can 
be allocated based on the merits of each product rather than the business unit. This does 
not rule out that even in more centralized firms that managers associated with individual 
products may lobby for more complementary resources than they actually can use 
effectively but the impact is likely to be greater in more decentralized firms. Thus this study 
helps to illustrate that beyond inventing and developing inventions, successful innovation, 
which involves firms capturing value from their new offers, requires effective allocation 
of complementary resources. 
 Finally, this dissertation extends recent work investigating how firms’ internal 
design can shape their decision to innovate internally or externally (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; 
Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017). This work has primarily examined the sourcing of 
knowledge in the form of patents as opposed to more fully refined inventions which forms 
the focus of this dissertation. Further, this work has not examined the type of knowledge 
sourced or the sourcing mode. Such an analysis can provide insights into what shapes 
firms’ integration of external inventions addressing a key gap in the open innovation 
literature as there has been  “a relative dearth of research related to integrating [External 
Inventions]” (West & Bogers, 2014).  
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Abstract   
Prior studies investigating the relationship between organization design and innovation 
have generally treated innovation as an outcome rather than a process. In this study, I offer 
a framework in which I conceptualize the innovation process as consisting of upstream 
tasks around invention, and downstream tasks around development. This allows me to 
examine how various facets of organizational decentralization impact innovation through 
integrating knowledge- and incentives- based views of the firm. On the one hand, greater 
centralization is associated with enhanced intra-organizational knowledge flows, which 
enhance innovation. On the other, greater decentralization is associated with higher 
observability of effort and facilitates the more effective use of incentives increasing 
innovation efforts. I empirically examine this trade-off in the context of the pharmaceutical 
industry. I find that greater centralization is associated with the creation of more original 
inventions and more inventions progressing through early development. In contrast, greater 
decentralization is associated with the creation of more inventions and more progressing 
through later development. These results indicate that knowledge flows play a greater role 
upstream and incentives a greater role downstream. This enables us to understand where 
and when design choices can impact innovation, thereby helping to reconcile disparate 
findings in the extant literature. 
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Introduction 
“If you look at history, innovation doesn't come just from giving people incentives; 
it comes from creating environments where their ideas can connect.” Steven 
Johnson, Wired Magazine. 2010 
 
Innovation is a multi-faceted process (Garud et al., 2013). Within this process firms 
need to undertake a diverse array of activities ranging from the upstream creation of 
inventions through to the ultimate commercialization of these inventions further 
downstream (e.g., Arora et al., 2016; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). Firms’ organization designs 
can shape how effectively they undertake these activities through influencing both intra-
organizational knowledge flows (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Karim & Kaul, 2015) 
and managerial incentives (e.g., Argyres et al., 2012; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). The 
relative importance of knowledge flows and incentives will vary throughout the innovation 
process as very different activities are undertaken. Thus, the same organization design will 
differ in its impact on firms’ innovation outcomes at each stage of the innovation process.  
However, prior studies investigating the relationship between organization design 
and innovation have tended to treat innovation as an outcome rather than as a process and 
focused on different stages within the process, such as invention or commercialization, in 
isolation (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Damanpour, 1991; Karim & Kaul, 2015; 
Tushman et al., 2010). This, in part, can help to explain the varied findings within the extant 
literature. For example, some studies highlight the benefits of greater decentralization on 
firms’ innovation outcomes (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Tushman et al., 2010) whereas others 
highlight the benefits of greater centralization (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et 
al., 2014). As a result of this fragmented approach, we lack a coherent theoretical 
framework describing how firms’ design features can impact innovation throughout this 
multi-faceted process. It is difficult to evaluate the relationship between firms’ organization 
designs and their innovation without considering the pertinent stage of the innovation 
process and the associated activities within that stage. 
In this study, I examine innovation as a process rather than an outcome to determine 
how various facets of organizational decentralization can impact different stages of this 
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process. I do so theoretically through combining a knowledge-based view of the firm, 
which is represented as repository of knowledge and the fundamental organizational 
purpose is one of problem-solving (e.g., Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992), with an 
incentives-based view of the firm, which is portrayed as a bundle of contracts and the 
fundamental organizational purpose is to ensure coordination and cooperation through 
suitable alignment of incentives (e.g., Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam et al., 2014).  
Further upstream in the invention and early development stages of the innovation 
process, firms undertake search to solve complex technical problems with highly uncertain 
outcomes (e.g., Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). The focal unit for these stages 
of the innovation process is Research and Development (R&D) (Argyres & Silverman, 
2004). I argue that decentralization of R&D is associated with reduced intra-organizational 
knowledge flows (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Karim & Kaul, 2015) which can 
limit distant search thereby reducing the originality of inventions and their progression 
through the earlier stages of development. However, the tighter alignment between actions, 
outcomes and incentives enhances local search such that R&D decentralization is 
associated with the creation of more inventions. In contrast, further downstream in the later 
development stages of the innovation process, activities are more routinized (e.g., scale-up 
of manufacturing, development of marketing plans), complex technical issues have been 
largely addressed and the uncertainty as to whether an invention will reach the market place 
diminishes (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). For these stages of 
the innovation process, the broader organization beyond R&D is involved (e.g., Dougherty, 
1992; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Yang & Dougherty, 1993). In this case, I argue that 
greater decentralization at a corporate level is associated with the progression of more 
inventions through the later stages of development due to the more effective application of 
incentives engendering greater managerial effort. 
I test these arguments in the context of the pharmaceutical industry using a unique, 
dataset hand-collected from a variety of archival sources such as company’s annual reports 
and clinical trial databases as well as interviews with managers. This rich dataset enables 
me both to test my theoretical predictions as well as derive greater insights into the 
mechanisms through which firms’ designs can influence their innovation outcomes. I find 
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evidence to suggest that firms do face a knowledge-incentive trade-off such that the same 
design can enhance knowledge flows but limit the effectiveness of incentives. Further, 
viewing innovation as a process enables me to illustrate that intra-organizational 
knowledge flows play a greater role further upstream and the role of incentives increases 
in prominence further downstream.  
This study makes three contributions. First, examining innovation as a process 
rather than an outcome enables a deeper understanding of how organization design can 
impact firms’ innovation outcomes. As a result, this study can help to reconcile some of 
the disparate findings in the extant literature examining the relationship between 
decentralization and firms’ innovation outcomes. Second, this study contributes to the 
recent debate concerning the integration of knowledge-based and organizational 
economics theories. Prior studies have focused on integrating these theories to examine the 
boundaries of the firm by examining the holdup risks associated with unique assets that are 
required to create unique capabilities (e.g., Argyres & Zenger, 2012). In contrast, this study 
highlights that a knowledge-based process is subject to incentives considerations which 
can shape how internal organization design impacts firms’ innovation outcomes. Thus this 
study extends the debate from the boundaries of the firm to internal organization design. 
Finally, this study provides insights into how organization design can shape firms’ 
capabilities. Specifically, a firm may have a broad technological knowledge base but its 
organization design may limit its ability to recombine knowledge across technological 
domains and generate more original inventions, thereby limiting a firm’s product 
development capabilities.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Prior literature 
A key organization design element is the degree to which firms centralize their 
activities within a single unit or decentralize them into multiple, more independent units 
(e.g., Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). For example, Xerox was famous for its 
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centralized R&D organization centered around its Palo Alto research center (e.g., 
Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Greater centralization has recently been emphasized 
by iconic firms such as Microsoft and Apple that have functionally-led structures as 
opposed to dividing into separate business units (Kesler & Kates, 2016). In contrast, 
companies such as Johnson & Johnson (Galuszka, 2008), ABB (Malone, 2004) and ITW 
(Conlin, 1999) have more decentralized structures with separate units acting largely 
independently. Multiple streams within the strategic management literature have examined 
the relationship between different facets of organizational decentralization and a variety of 
innovation outcomes. These studies have examined design at a corporate or overall 
organization level (e.g., Damanpour, 1991) and at a functional unit level such as R&D (e.g., 
Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Further, decentralization has been examined from a 
horizontal perspective (e.g., Tushman et al., 2010), in which an organization is divided into 
more units, and a vertical perspective, in which authority is delegated down the 
organization (e.g., Keum & See, 2017). Similar variety is observed in the innovation 
outcomes examined. These outcomes range from patent outputs (e.g., Arora et al., 2014) 
to product launches (e.g., Puranam et al., 2006).  
The mechanisms through which scholars have theorized that organizational 
decentralization impacts firms’ innovation outcomes have broadly fallen into two domains. 
First, some studies have used a knowledge-based view of the firm, in which a firm’s design 
can shape knowledge flows and how it searches for solutions to innovation problems (e.g., 
Karim & Kaul, 2015). Second, other studies illustrate that design can shape the incentives 
managers face during the innovation process. For example, managers may screen out 
innovation options in their own best interests rather than those of the organization (e.g., 
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). Argyres and Silverman (2004) illustrate how R&D design can 
shape the breadth of firms’ search processes. Ultimately, some studies illustrate the benefits 
of greater decentralization (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006) while 
others illustrate the benefits of greater centralization (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; 
Eggers, 2016). This is perhaps unsurprising given that these studies examine different 
stages of the innovation process, focus on different facets of decentralization and use 
different theoretical lenses. 
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Innovation process: theoretical framework 
In this study I take a process-based perspective of innovation (e.g., Garud et al., 
2013; Keum & See, 2017). Viewing innovation as a process with a sequence of stages 
provides two advantages in enabling a more complete understanding of the relationship 
between decentralization and innovation. First, this approach enables the more precise 
definition of innovation outcomes and design parameters. This is because different parts of 
the organization will be involved and different innovation outcomes will be associated with 
each stage of the process. Second, in developing my theoretical arguments I combine 
knowledge- and incentives- based views of the firm. Seeing innovation as a process enables 
me to unpack the relative impact of these factors on firms’ innovation outcomes as their 
relative importance will vary throughout the process. 
 
Figure 3: Theoretical framework 
 
 
Consistent with prior studies, I divide the innovation process into three stages of 
invention, development and commercialization as illustrated in Figure 3 (e.g., Garud et al., 
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2013). First, there is the act of invention (e.g., Arora et al., 2016; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). 
Invention is an act of discovery that involves search to solve complex technical problems 
(e.g., Fleming & Sorenson, 2004) generating novel ideas that in themselves are of limited 
economic value (Schumpeter, 1939). The creation and subsequent refinement of inventions 
is a knowledge recombination activity focused on finding solutions to these complex 
problems (e.g., Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). Rich intra-organizational 
knowledge flows are therefore critical. The focus is very much on scientific knowledge. 
Outcomes associated with invention relate to both the quality and quantity of inventions 
(e.g., Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). The organizational unit responsible for a firm’s 
invention activities is R&D (e.g., Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). Thus it is decentralization 
of R&D (R&D Decentralization) that is most relevant design parameter. Invention consists 
of more of the R in R&D 
Second, development is focused on converting an invention into a final product. 
Development typically consists of multiple activities such as addressing the remaining 
technical issues associated with an invention, refining and supplementing inventions with 
complementary knowledge and scaling up for manufacture (e.g., Mitchell & Singh, 1996; 
Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). The earlier stages of development are still knowledge intensive as 
firms need to address complex technical problems in converting an invention into a viable 
product. Again rich intra-organizational knowledge flows are highly important to facilitate 
this stage of the innovation process. However, in the later stages of development, activities 
are more routinized and complex technical issues have been largely addressed with more 
of focus on issues such as resource allocation (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Further, 
the identity of the final product and its market potential are much clearer at this stage (e.g., 
Aghion & Tirole, 1994). Thus the importance of rich knowledge flows diminishes and 
incentives play a larger relative role as the focus is now on engendering greater effort to 
get a product over the final hurdles and into the market. Development outcomes pertain to 
the progression of inventions through development (e.g., Chandy, Hopstaken, Narasimhan, 
& Prabhu, 2006). For the earlier parts of the development process, which are difficult to 
distinguish from invention, R&D will again be the focal unit (e.g., DeSanctis, Glass, & 
Ensing, 2002; Garud et al., 2013; Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). Later in the development 
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process the broader organization is involved, including functions beyond R&D such as 
marketing (e.g., Dougherty, 1992; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Yang & Dougherty, 1993). 
In R&D the focus is on more of the D. The degree of decentralization (Corporate 
Decentralization) in this context refers to whether the organization is more functionally 
orientated and focused on its overall portfolio of inventions or more disaggregated into 
individual business units that are focused on their own sub-set of inventions (e.g., Burton 
et al., 2011).  
Third, there is market launch or commercialization, which relate to firms’ value 
capture from their developed offers. Outcomes from this stage relate to measures such as 
revenues or profits from new products. This forms the focus of Chapter 4. 
It should be noted that the innovation process is often iterative. For example, 
inventions may need to return to the earlier sub-stages of development. To simplify the 
theoretical argumentation and empirical analyses, the focus in this paper is on the invention 
and development stages in isolation, with an emphasis on forward progression. For each 
stage, I examine how the relevant facet of organizational decentralization influences 
knowledge flows and incentives, which in turn shapes firms’ upstream invention outcomes 
as well their development outcomes further downstream. 
 
Organizational decentralization and invention  
 Decentralization in this case relates to dividing R&D into separate units focusing 
on, for example, different scientific or product domains (Kay, 1988). It is akin to horizontal 
dis-integration of R&D. These decentralized units may be located within business units or 
be separate corporate research units reporting to different heads (e.g., Argyres & 
Silverman, 2004). I distinguish between a single centralized R&D unit and multiple, 
decentralized units through allocation of decision rights (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1992). 
Managers leading a centralized R&D unit have decision rights across the complete 
portfolio of firms’ inventions and hierarchical authority over the parts of the organization 
working on these inventions with, for example, the ability to readily shift resources 
between different R&D projects. In contrast, managers leading decentralized R&D units 
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only have decision rights for the relevant sub-portfolio of inventions and hierarchical 
authority over those associated parts of the organization creating and developing those 
inventions and can shift resources between projects within their sub-portfolios but not 
across sub-portfolios within different units. 
 Using two theoretical perspectives I examine managers leading centralized or 
decentralized R&D units directing their subordinates’ efforts. First, using a knowledge-
based perspective (e.g., Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992), I consider how these 
managers and associated organization designs can influence intra-organizational 
knowledge flows thereby impacting how knowledge is recombined to create both new 
inventions and facilitate their subsequent development. Second, using an incentives-based 
perspective (e.g., Kapoor & Lim, 2007), I examine how managerial incentives associated 
with different designs can influence the attention and efforts of managers’ subordinates 
and their subsequent actions.  
 As described above, the upstream act of invention can be translated into the search 
for a solution to a specific problem, with search being either primarily local or more distant 
(e.g., Dosi et al., 2003; Macher, 2006). More distant search is facilitated by rich scientific 
knowledge flows that enable the recombination of a firm’s broader knowledge (e.g., 
Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Tsai, 2002; Zhang, Baden-
Fuller, & Mangematin, 2007). However, greater decentralization can hinder knowledge 
flows limiting firms’ ability to undertake more distant search for two reasons (e.g., Macher, 
2006).  
First, leveraging the concept of stickiness of knowledge transfer, both the source 
and recipient of the knowledge may lack the motivation to transfer or utilize this knowledge 
(Szulanski, 1996). Increased decentralization of R&D is associated with competition 
between units pertaining to different areas (Haas & Hansen, 2007; Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999). 
As a result, managers leading such decentralized units will encourage their subordinates to 
focus on their units’ invention activities rather than sharing knowledge with other units 
which may provide these units with an advantage. Similarly, managers of decentralized 
units may encourage their subordinates to not utilize knowledge from other units for fear 
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of being dependent on these units and thus potentially losing future resources or unit 
independence. This can often manifest itself as “not-invented-here” syndrome (Katz & 
Allen, 1982). In contrast, centralization of R&D is associated with reduced competition 
facilitating knowledge sharing (e.g., Karim & Kaul, 2015). Within a centralized unit the 
sole hierarchical authority with all-encompassing decision rights can leverage their 
hierarchical power to encourage different units reporting to them to share knowledge  (e.g., 
Argyres, 1996; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). These arguments get to the heart of how 
incentives- and knowledge-based theories can be integrated, namely incentives, combined 
with hierarchical authority, can shape knowledge flows (e.g., Argyres, 2011). 
Second, Grant (1996) highlights that the highly tacit knowledge associated with the 
creation and refinement of inventions may require rich and frequent communications. If 
the recipient and source of the relevant knowledge are in separate organizational units, the 
more distant relationship between these units is likely to result in greater difficulties in the 
transfer of more tacit knowledge associated with the creation of inventions (Szulanski, 
1996). Relatedly, managers within a unit may simply be unaware of the capabilities and 
knowledge existing in other units and thus may be less able to access them (e.g., O'dell & 
Grayson, 1998).  
Thus, decentralization of R&D into multiple units hinders the flow of knowledge 
between these units, as compared to within a single centralized R&D unit, limiting distant 
search. Firms with decentralized R&D units are thus likely to draw on a narrower range of 
knowledge in developing their inventions, as inventors have access to less of a firm’s 
existing knowledge base. Inventions that draw on a narrower body of knowledge are 
typically described as being less original (Hall et al., 2001). Originality is one of multiple 
measures used to measure the quality of an invention (e.g., Ghosh, Martin, Pennings, & 
Wezel, 2013; Valentini, 2012). Further, prior studies have indicated that inventions that 
draw on a broader body of knowledge are more successful commercially (Miller, 2006). 
Thus invention originality is likely to be an innovation outcome of significant concern to 
managers within firms. Through the argumentation outlined above I hypothesize: 
H1: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the generation of inventions 
that are less original than those of firms with centralized R&D. 
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As outlined above, recombination of knowledge associated with more distant 
search is more critical for complex, unstructured problems and the creation of more original 
inventions (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2012; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). In contrast, for the 
solution of less complex problems, local search may suffice and rich intra-organizational 
knowledge flows may not be as critical. However, increased managerial effort can facilitate 
the creation of more inventions that draw on a narrower body of knowledge. 
In a centralized R&D unit, the lead manager who is responsible for the complete 
portfolio of inventions can shift resources from one sub-portfolio to another. In contrast, 
for firms with decentralized R&D units, resources are less able to be shifted from one sub-
portfolio to another. For example, a centralized Head of R&D may easily shift resources 
between two sub-portfolios (A and B) under their direct control. However, if R&D is 
decentralized with one unit responsible for sub-portfolio A and another responsible for sub-
portfolio B these resources are less easily shifted. As a result, the managers responsible for 
sub-portfolios A and B in two separate decentralized R&D units have more control of their 
sub-portfolios than otherwise equivalent managers in a centralized R&D unit. This makes 
the usage of higher-powered incentives for such sub-portfolio managers more effective in 
the decentralized case (e.g., Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997).  
Further, higher-powered incentives can be more effectively aligned to managerial 
effort and outcomes in multiple, decentralized units as compared to an otherwise 
equivalent, aggregated centralized unit (Argyres, 1996; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). This is 
because such disaggregation enables the unique contributions of managers to be more 
readily observed, and there is a resultant clearer line of accountability. For example, 
compare a centralized R&D unit working on projects A and B against two separate, 
decentralized R&D units working on projects A and B respectively. In the decentralized 
case, there is a clearer demarcation in that managers work on A or B, allowing the effective 
use of higher-powered incentives. In the centralized case, managers may work on both A 
and B (especially if resources are shared), making allocation of rewards based on one 
project succeeding and the other failing more difficult. Ultimately, in decentralized units 
the likelihood of free-riding is reduced because of this clearer linkage between effort and 
outcomes (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). 
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These arguments highlight that higher-powered incentives can be utilized more 
effectively in more decentralized organizations than more centralized ones. As a result, 
managers responsible for each sub-portfolio engender more effort in their respective 
decentralized units as compared to when aggregated into a centralized R&D unit and this 
trickles down to greater efforts further down the organization (Zenger, 1994). Further, 
decentralized units are less likely to be prone to inertia due to their smaller size (e.g., 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). These inertial pressures may slow 
decision making, as decision rights are not localized close to where knowledge lies (e.g., 
Macher, 2006). Thus, any enhanced effort in more decentralized units is likely to be more 
effective due to these reduced inertial pressures.  
Higher powered incentives are also likely to be more effective in inducing greater 
effort for easily measurable outcomes (e.g., Gibbons, 1998). The quantity of inventions 
produced is much easier to measure than their quality, which is subjective and may require 
additional time to be suitably revealed. Similarly, incentives are likely to be less effective 
to increase knowledge sharing due to difficulties in its measurement (e.g., Taylor, 2006). 
Thus the additional effort spurred by incentives is likely to be associated with the creation 
of an increased number of inventions. These arguments suggest that managers will exert 
greater effort in invention tasks when in multiple, decentralized units as compared to a 
single, centralized unit. Further, the impact of managers’ efforts in decentralized units is 
also likely to be greater. Ultimately this greater effort will lead to more comprehensive 
local search, meaning more varied knowledge may be recombined within the local domain, 
but less knowledge recombined across domains (as implied earlier for Hypothesis 1). As 
managers are more likely to be incentivized by the quantity of inventions, this increased 
effort should be realized in the form of a higher number of inventions for firms with 
decentralized R&D. Thus: 
H2: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the generation of more 
inventions than firms with centralized R&D. 
 
Organizational decentralization and development 
Further downstream, in the early stages of the development process R&D will 
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continue to be the focal unit (e.g., Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). It is often difficult to 
distinguish the early stages of development from invention. A firm is still trying to 
understand how an invention works as well as refining its design. Further, significant 
technical challenges may be involved in the initial stages of converting a “raw” invention 
into an offering that can ultimately be commercialized. Thus, during early development a 
firm may need to access its broader knowledge base in order to address challenging 
technical problems (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2006). 
As outlined in the previous section, decentralization limits intra-organizational 
knowledge flows. Such knowledge flows can provide significant benefits to the refinement 
of firms’ inventions early in development. For example, managers are more able to solve 
technical problems through accessing a firms’ broader knowledge as well as develop more 
creative solutions to problems (e.g., Haas & Hansen, 2005). In addition, such enhanced 
knowledge flows can provide access to a firm’s set of best practices (Szulanski, 1996) and 
help to limit fruitless work such as “reinventing the wheel” (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 
1999). Ultimately, despite the greater managerial effort induced through more effective 
usage of incentives in decentralized R&D units, this effort may be fruitless. This is because 
the knowledge required to address technical issues early in development may lie in other 
decentralized R&D units and not be readily accessible. In contrast, in centralized R&D 
units the breadth of a firm’s knowledge is more readily accessible, enabling technical issues 
to be addressed.1 This will result in a decreased number of inventions progressing through 
these earlier stages of development, as technical failures are less able to be avoided when 
firms decentralize R&D. Thus: 
H3: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the progression of fewer 
inventions through the earlier stages of development than firms with centralized 
R&D. 
 
As an invention progresses downstream through development, the type of technical 
problems that need to be addressed become less complex and the knowledge required to 
                                                 
1 This argumentation assumes that both decentralized and centralized R&D units are developing inventions of similar quality. This is 
controlled for empirically using various measures of portfolio composition 
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undertake development tasks becomes more routinized and explicit (e.g., Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). For example, the focus is on well-honed routines such as scaling up a 
product and preparing distribution channels. As a result, the requirement for rich, tacit, 
intra-organizational knowledge flows diminishes as the compartmentalized knowledge in 
a specific sub-unit will be sufficient to facilitate the progression of an invention. Further, 
access to codified information on inventions (e.g., Spencer, 2003) and process tools can 
help to reduce the uncertainty of the later stages of development (e.g., Grönlund, Sjödin, 
& Frishammar, 2010). Incentives and the greater managerial effort that they engender are 
therefore likely to play a greater relative role in shaping development outcomes as 
inventions progress. This is because firms are likely to be able to access the knowledge 
they need to undertake later development locally or through more explicit communications. 
Further, the extant literature also highlights the limitations of incentives for invention and 
early development due to its inherent uncertainty and the difficulty in designing suitable 
compensation schemes (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Ederer & Manso, 2013; Manso, 
2011). In contrast, for the later stages of development, there is a clearer link between effort 
and performance.  
The degree of decentralization (Corporate Decentralization) in this context refers 
to whether the organization is more functionally orientated and focused on its overall 
portfolio of inventions or more disaggregated into individual business units that are focused 
on their own sub-set of inventions (e.g., Burton et al., 2011). The outputs of a business unit 
can be readily observed and outcomes attributed to specific managerial effort more clearly 
than in a more integrated functional structure (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Thus, higher-
powered incentives can be utilized more effectively in a decentralized structure. As the 
progression of inventions through development is readily observable, managers are likely 
to be incentivized based on some form of this metric.  
Analogous to the logic for Hypothesis 2, I argue that managers in more 
decentralized firms will exert more effort to progress inventions through the later stages of 
development as compared to managers in more centralized organizations. Thus each 
individual decentralized unit will progress more of their own sub-set of inventions to ensure 
some inventions can be launched into the market place. This will result in more inventions 
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progressing for the entire firm as compared to a more centralized organization. Further, the 
concern associated with not progressing any individual invention is mitigated in more 
centralized organizations due to the pooling of risk across the firms’ entire portfolio, 
potentially further lessening the effort undertaken to progress individual inventions through 
the later stages of development. Thus, firms that are more decentralized will be associated 
with the progression of more inventions through the later stages of the development 
process: 
H4: Greater corporate decentralization is associated with the progression of more 
inventions through the later stages of development.  
 
Methods  
Research context and sample 
 The context for this study is the global pharmaceutical industry over the period 
1995 to 2015. This industry provides a suitable context for this study for three primary 
reasons. First, the industry has a well-defined innovation process (e.g., Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Kapoor & 
Klueter, 2015). This enables the determination of clear measures of invention and 
development. Second, there is heterogeneity in the organization designs of the firms within 
this industry driven by a variety of factors such as merger and acquisition activity and 
changes in senior leadership. Third, focusing on a single industry enables me to unpack the 
degree of diversification of a firm from its organization design. Diversified firms are likely 
to be more decentralized and the degree of diversification may also impact firms’ 
innovation outcomes. Thus focusing on a single industry enables me to control for this 
issue. 
The study sample consists of 49 leading pharmaceutical firms over the period 1995 
to 2015. Focusing on larger pharmaceutical firms that are responsible for the majority of 
innovation within the industry is common within the strategic management literature (e.g., 
Anand, Oriani, & Vassolo, 2010; Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Kapoor & Klueter, 
2015). The sample is based on 2004-6 annual prescription drug sales as defined by the 
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Pharmaceutical Executive magazine’s Top 50 Pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Klueter, 
Monteiro, & Dunlap, 2017). 2 In this period 64 separate firms appeared in the Top 50 in 
one or more years. The 15 firms over that period that are excluded are either private firms 
or did not provide sufficient information on their organizational structures in their public 
filings. These excluded firms were in the lower half (26-50 ranking in terms of 
pharmaceutical sales) in one or more of the three years in the 2004-6 period. Using the 
mid-point of the sample enables the examination of firms that have at least 10 years of 
history within the sample time-frame prior to any significant M&A event. 33 out of the 49 
sample firms are still in the top 50 pharmaceutical firms in 2015, 13 firms had been 
acquired by other firms in the sample and 3 firms had divested their pharmaceutical 
businesses to firms not in the sample. Upon acquisition or divestment of their 
pharmaceutical business these 15 firms dropped out of the sample. Compared to a universal 
sample of listed pharmaceutical firms from Compustat, the sample dataset of firms is 
significantly larger and more profitable on average. 
 Invention measures are created using patent data (e.g., Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). 
Patent data is obtained from the European Patent Office (EPO) Worldwide Patent 
Statistical (PatStat) database (e.g., Conti, Gambardella, & Mariani, 2013). This database 
provides good coverage across multiple patent-granting jurisdictions (Kang & Tarasconi, 
2016). This is especially important for the sample of firms in this study which includes 
multiple non-US firms. Using patent data to measure firms’ inventive output suffers from 
multiple limitations such as not all inventions may get patented (e.g, Levin et al., 1987), 
patents may not always correspond to products (e.g., Hall et al., 2001) and patents may be 
filed for strategic rather than knowledge capture purposes (e.g., Spender & Grant, 1996). 
However, some of these limitations are mitigated within the pharmaceutical industry as 
firms patent a large proportion of their inventions and these patents closely relate to final 
products (e.g., Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). 
With its well-defined industry-wide milestones (e.g., Chandy et al., 2006; Kapoor 
& Klueter, 2015), the progression of drug candidates through clinical trials provides a 
                                                 
2 The top 20 pharmaceutical firms by R&D spend represented 60 % of industry R&D spend and the top 20 pharmaceutical firms by 
prescription sales represented 64 % of industry sales in 2015 (EvaluatePharma, 2016).  
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means with which to compare firms’ development outcomes. Such development data is 
collected from the Pharmaprojects database (e.g., Chandy et al., 2006; Kapoor & Klueter, 
2015). Further, the theoretical simplification made above in which the innovation process 
is assumed to be non-iterative is more likely to be appropriate in this context. It is unlikely 
that, for example, drug-candidates that pass from Phase 1 to 2 will then return to Phase 1 
unless they are used in new indications (i.e. to treat a different condition) which generally 
represent separate inventions. 
Organizational structural data is hand-collected from company 10-K, 20-F, 
DEF14A SEC filings and annual reports. Financial data is obtained from Compustat.  
Two datasets are developed. The first (invention) dataset enables Hypotheses 1 and 
2 to be tested. This data exists at the firm-year level. The second (development) dataset 
enables Hypotheses 3 and 4 to be tested. This data exists at the firm-year-clinical phase 
level. T-tests reveal that for each clinical phase the sample means for each independent and 
control variable at a firm-year level are not statistically different and also not statistically 
different from the sample means for the corresponding variables in the first “invention” 
dataset. This analysis is supplemented with 61 interviews with mid- and senior-level 
executives in strategy and R&D roles from 28 of the sample firms and industry experts. 
The interviews were semi-structured based on an interview guide and lasted between 30 
and 90 minutes. The focus of these interviews was to evaluate the validity of the 
organization design measures, to determine how different clinical phase transitions map to 
the hypotheses and to discuss how various forms of decentralization can impact knowledge 
flows and incentives. Appendix 3 provides further details of these interviews. 
 
Measures 
 Dependent variables. Invention Measures: A key challenge in using patent-based 
measures is ensuring accurate assignment of the patent assignee. Although EPO’s Patstat 
database has undertaken a significant amount of effort to standardize assignee names 
through the field DOC_STD_NAME, there are still multiple variants of the same assignee 
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name. A two-fold process is pursued in order to obtain accurate patent assignee names.3 
Both approaches used to develop standardized names provide similar results with 99.7 % 
matching. Those patents that did not match using both methods were manually checked 
and assigned appropriately. Appendix 2 provides further details. 
To measure the quantity of inventions (Quantity), the number of patent families 
filed by firms annually is estimated.4 Patent family counts are used to avoid double 
counting of patents filed in multiple jurisdictions. Patents assigned in the European 
Community statistical classification of economic activities category (NACE2) 21 
(manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations) are used. 
The year in which a patent family is developed is defined as the earliest filing date of a 
patent in that family.  
To measure the breadth of knowledge from which patents draw (Argyres & 
Silverman, 2004) or patent originality (Hall et al., 2001), the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) 4-digit technical classifications of the citations made by a focal patent 
are examined. Measures of originality produced by the OECD are utilized (Squicciarini, 
Dernis, & Criscuolo, 2013). This Originality measure is developed using the approach 
recommended by Hall et al. (2001). The larger the value, the more original a patent is as it 
draws from a broader array of technologies. The maximum originality patent in a family is 
assigned as the originality for that family. These values are then used to estimate an average 
originality per patent family for each firm-year (Originality).   
 Development Measures: This measure is built using the number of drug candidates 
progressing through the various phases of clinical development per firm-year. The initial 
risk set of drug candidates are those entering pre-clinical trials. Using data from the 
Pharmaprojects clinical trials database, a panel dataset by drug candidate -year is developed 
in which parent firms are assigned to each drug candidate and the clinical phase which a 
drug has reached at the end of the relevant year is captured. Assigning drug candidates in 
                                                 
3 First, manual matching of assignees to sample firms is conducted using text strings with correction for merger and acquisition 
activity. Second, the assignee-matching process utilized by Arora et al. (2014) is also pursued. Further details are provided in  
Appendix 2. 
4 According to the European Patent Office a patent family “is a set of either patent applications or publications taken in multiple 
countries to protect a single invention by a common inventor(s).” 
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the Pharmaprojects database to parent firms requires a careful assessment of individual 
deals between firms in which a specific drug candidate may be sold to another firm, a firm 
may acquire or merge with another firm or drug candidates may be developed through 
alliances with other firms. Using data from both the Pharmaprojects “Overview” section 
and the Recap database, firms can be assigned to each specific drug candidate.5 Appendix 
2 provides further details. 
The number of drug candidates in a firm’s portfolio moving from pre-clinical trials 
(phase 0) to phase 1 (variable - prog1), phase 1 to phase 2 (prog2), phase 2 to phase 3 
clinical trials (prog3) and phase 3 clinical trials to pre-registration (PR) (prog4) per year 
are measured. As a result, four dependent variables representing how effectively firms 
progress drug candidates through the development process are created. Pre-clinical trials 
are still very much in the spirit of discovery and include both in-vitro and in-vivo testing to 
evaluate items such as drug safety, dose response, method of delivery of a drug molecule, 
pharmokinetics (the study of drug movement through the body), pharmodynamics (how 
the drug is likely to work in the body) and how to manufacture drug-candidates at small-
scale (Petrova, 2014). At this stage scientists are still looking at multiple variants of a drug 
candidate and trying to understand its mode of action. Phase 1 clinical trials are generally 
the first human trials and are focused on testing safety and dosage levels. These tend to be 
undertaken with a small number (10s) of healthy volunteers. Phase 2 clinical trials tend to 
involve larger numbers of patients (100s) with the target disease condition and the focus is 
on testing the efficacy of drug candidates and their side effects. Phase 3 clinical trials 
involve larger numbers of patients (1000s) and the focus is on efficacy and monitoring for 
adverse reactions. In parallel with phases 1-3, scientists will continue to investigate items 
such as different drug delivery technologies, pharmodynamics, pharmokinetics and 
manufacturing approaches for the relevant drug-candidates. Further, effective clinical trial 
design in these phases is critically important and can reap rewards (e.g., Patel, Antoni, 
Freedman, Levesque, & Sundy, 2017; Petrova, 2014). Towards the later parts of phase 2, 
commercial functions such as marketing and sales will start to play a larger role in market 
                                                 
5 Drug candidates that are inactive for a period of greater than three years are assumed to have been dropped by the focal firm and no 
longer contribute to the drug candidate portfolio unless evidence of later progression is observed in the data. 
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planning.  
For this study, earlier stage development is defined as the progression from pre-
clinical to phase 1 and later stage development as the progression from phase 2 to phase 3. 
As described above the pre-clinical phase is still knowledge rich and involves addressing 
complex technical problems. The Phase 2 to 3 transition is a particularly important 
transition as it involves a significant increase in the level of investment by the focal firm 
(Sertkaya, Wong, Jessup, & Beleche, 2016).  
 
Independent variables: The independent variables relate to two specific measures 
of organizational decentralization, R&D and Corporate. These measures are developed 
using top management team data available from company 10-K/20-F/DEF 14A SEC filings 
and Annual Reports. The use of top management team data to develop high-level 
organizational structural measures has been used recently in the strategic management 
literature (e.g., Albert, 2018; Girod & Whittington, 2015; Guadalupe, Li, & Wulf, 2014).  
Such high-level design measures may be limited in that for firms with the same 
high-level structure there are design differences below this high level. For example, a 
centralized R&D unit may be geographically dispersed and decentralized R&D units may 
be co-located and have integrative sub-units designed to share information. However, my 
theoretical argumentation is made at this higher organizational level and thus these 
measures are appropriate to test my hypotheses. Further, the managers within the sample 
firms interviewed confirmed that the structure of the top management team (TMT) 
provides an accurate reflection of their firms’ structures, specifically the key business units 
and how R&D is designed.  
A database of 15,129 executive and extended executive team roles for the sample 
of 49 firms over the period 1995-2015 is developed. This results in a total of 898 firm-
years of data and an average of 16.8 executive and extended executive roles per firm-year 
(standard deviation = 11.1). Coding of roles and various facets of organizational 
decentralization are undertaken by the author through careful review of the management 
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roles in each organization and further validated through review of organizational 
descriptions from companies’ filings (e.g. CEO’s letter to shareholders). For 28 out of the 
49 firms, interviews with strategy and R&D managers were conducted to confirm whether 
the measures developed were accurate.  Appendix 3 provides further interview details. 
First, to evaluate decentralization of R&D, it was determined whether firms’ R&D 
or Research (in the case of functionally separate R&D) is organized into a single or multiple 
units. For diversified firms which operate beyond pharmaceuticals, R&D units that pertain 
to pharmaceuticals were focused upon and R&D units dedicated to areas such as consumer 
products were excluded in order to control for the level of diversification. Using this 
approach, the variable R&D Decentralization is defined as a binary variable set to 1 if there 
are multiple R&D or research groups reporting to separate heads within the TMT covering 
different pharmaceutical domains or to leads of business units and 0 if the firm has a single 
integrated pharmaceutical R&D or research group reporting to a single TMT lead. 12.3 % 
of the sample firm-years have R&D Decentralization = 1.  
It is recognized that although the variable R&D Decentralization is binary, firms 
may have “hybrid” R&D organizations (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 
2014). In order to partly control for this I develop a control variable, R&D Functional 
Differentiation, which measures whether firms’ R&D is integrated into one unit or has 
separate research and development units. It is akin to vertical dis-integration of R&D as 
compared to the horizontal dis-integration associated with R&D Decentralization. I use 
this control variable as some aspects of R&D may be more centralized (e.g. research) and 
others more decentralized (e.g. development). This binary variable is coded as 1 if there 
are separate research and development heads reporting to the CEO and 0 if R&D is 
integrated. Decision rights are split between research and development activities and there 
are separate hierarchical reporting lines pertaining to each function if R&D Functional 
Differentiation = 1. In contrast, a functionally integrated R&D unit is associated with 
decision rights over the complete R&D process and has a single associated hierarchical 
authority covering all R&D. Firms’ descriptions of R&D in their financial filings are also 
examined to clarify whether R&D is integrated. 22 % of the sample firm-years have R&D 
Functional Differentiation = 1. Appendix 2 provides more details on this process. 
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2. Corporate Decentralization
Integrated Functional
Amgen - 2014
CEO
EVP Ops.
Gen Counsel
EVP R&D
EVP Comm.
EVP Pot Init.
CFO
C. Comp. Of.
SVP Bus. Dv.
SVP HR
More Differentiated
CSL - 2008
CEO
Gen Counsel
Ch. Sci. Off.
Corp Dev.
GM HRCSL Bioplas.
Finance
CSL Behring
CSL Biother.
BU Role Admin Func. Prod Func.Role Key:
Corporate Differentiation = 0.00 Corporate Differentiation = 0.38
1. R&D Decentralization
CEO
Head Small Molecule 
R&D
Head Biotech R&D
(Genentech)
Roche
CEO EVP R&D
Amgen
Eisai 
CEO
Oncology  R&D
Neurology R&D
Chugai R&D
=1
=0
=1
3. R&D Functional Differentiation
CEO
EVP Discovery 
Research
EVP 
Development
AstraZeneca
CEO
President WW 
R&D
Pfizer
Biogen
CEO
President 
Research
President 
Development
=1
=0
=1
In order to develop a measure of corporate decentralization, TMT members are 
categorized as general managers, administrative functional managers or product functional 
managers using the approach developed by Guadalupe et al. (2014). The independent 
variable Corporate Decentralization is therefore determined as a proportion, namely the 
number of general manager roles in the TMT divided by the TMT size (excluding CEO) 
(Albert, 2018). These general manager roles relate to managers who are responsible for the 
performance of a defined sub-section of the business which may be a geographical or a 
specific product area. To account for firms operating in non-pharmaceutical domains, 
business unit leads in these areas are excluded. The higher the value of this variable, the 
more decentralized a firm is.6 Examples of all the measures are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Illustrative examples of structural measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6 Firm fixed effect regressions of the number of general manager, administrative functional and product functional roles (dependent 
variables) versus firm size (independent variable) illustrated no relationship between the number of each type of role and firm-size. 
Further, examining a sub-sample of firms of different size further illustrated no relationship between the number of each type of role 
and firm size. For example, AstraZenece (2005) had 2 general manager roles, 2 administrative functional roles and 4 product 
functional roles with a total of 65,300 employees. In contrast, CSL (2008) had 3 general managers, 4 administrative functional roles 
and 1 product functional roles with a total of 9,300 employees.   
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Control variables: Table 2 illustrates the control variables used. Further, a variety 
of fixed effects are used to control for other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Descriptive statistics and correlation tables are presented in Table 3 (H1-2) and Table 4 
(H3-4) for all the variables. Appendix 4 provides further details on descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2: Summary of control variables used in this analysis. All firm-year level. 
Variable  Description Rationale 
1. Diversification controls 
Business 
Segment 
Dummy 
Fixed Effects 
Series of dummy variables representing 
whether a firm has operating segments in 
categories beyond pharmaceuticals. 
Specifically: consumer goods, medical 
devices, animal medication, bulk chemicals, 
nutrition. Also have dummy if firm has a 
generics business. These can vary by firm-
year as firm acquires or divests specific 
businesses. 
Control for diversification of firms’ businesses 
beyond pharmaceuticals 
SBU Reflects the total number of business units 
within a firm – namely the number of 
operating segments that report separate 
financial statements in their annual reporting 
documents 
Controls for general firm diversification. 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
87 requires that firms disclose information about 
their operating segments, these represent distinct 
profit centers within a firm and are used by senior 
management to make strategic decisions. 
 
Tech. 
diversity 
Measure of technological diversity of firms’ 
R&D efforts.  
For invention this is measured using a 
Herfindahl measure. The sum of the squared 
proportions of patent families filed in a focal 
year that pertain to each therapeutic class is 
subtracted from 1. 
Similarly for development, the sum of the 
squared proportions of drug candidates in 
each therapeutic class in a firm’s portfolio 
within a specific phase in a focal year is 
subtracted from 1. 
Note, however this measure does not control 
for the coherence of the R&D efforts but 
simply measures diversity. 
Controls for the level of technological diversity of a 
firm’s R&D activities. Provides a measure of the 
diversity of knowledge within a firm thereby 
controlling for firms’ knowledge recombination 
capabilities. 
Firms undertaking a broader array of technological 
activities are more likely to differentiate their R&D 
efforts (either by technical domain or function) as 
well as fragment into more business units. Also 
firms will have a broader range of technical 
knowledge from which to draw. 
2. Firm-level controls 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Series of dummy variables for each firm Control for a range of sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity 
R&D 
Intensity  
The annual spend on R&D by a firm as a 
proportion of annual revenues 
Firms that spend a higher proportion of their sales 
on R&D may potentially see higher inventive and 
innovative output (e.g., Mairesse & Mohnen, 
2005).   
Size  Natural log of the annual sales of each firm 
in the study sample  
Larger firms may potentially generate more 
innovation outputs as they have access to more 
                                                 
7 https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs8 
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Variable  Description Rationale 
resources such as a broader knowledge base. They 
are also likely to be more differentiated. 
Performance  The annual return on assets of the firm 
(Richard et al., 2009)  
Higher performing firms may potentially develop a 
higher volume of higher quality innovations 
slack Current Ratio Prior studies have indicated greater slack may help 
to drive the development of new technologies 
(Greve, 2003).   
Patent stock Discounted total quantity of patent families 
filed by focal firm (Arora et al., 2014). 
Measured in 000s. 
Controls for firms’ existing knowledge collected 
over a period of time which will impact innovation 
outcomes. Also can control for firms’ invention 
capabilities. 
SG&A Natural log of a firm’s selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses 
Potentially those firms with higher values of 
SG&A are more innovation focused and need to 
spend more on sales expenses to educate customers 
about the benefits of their new products.   
CEO A dummy variable set to 1 if a new CEO was 
appointed in a specific firm-year 
 
May be the catalyst for a reorganization or uptick in 
performance. 
3. Competition controls 
competition Measure of competition firms face across 
their development portfolios. Sum of squared 
“market shares” (by drug-candidate count) of 
drug-candidates within all development 
phases per therapeutic class weighted by 
proportion of overall portfolio subtracted 
from 1. Higher value signifies firms operate 
in more competitive therapeutic classes 
 
Controls for the degree of competition firms face 
across their portfolio of drug-candidates. Firms in 
more competitive markets may be incentivized to 
innovate and organize differently.  
4. Portfolio level controls 
portfolio Number of drug candidates in drug pipeline 
at particular stage in clinical development 
(e.g. Phase 0) 
A larger portfolio is likely to be strongly correlated 
with the number of inventions that progress 
through the commercialization process. 
external Proportion of externally-sourced drugs in 
portfolio at specific stage of clinical 
development 
Externally-sourced drug-candidates may be more 
difficult to commercialize due to issues such as not 
invented here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
bio Proportion of portfolio at specific stage of 
clinical development that are biologics 
High level control for firms that tend to focus on 
biotechnology as opposed to small molecules. 
NCE Proportion of portfolio at specific stage of 
clinical development that are new chemical 
entities (NCE) 
Indication of degree of novelty of portfolio. NCEs 
include no component that has been previously 
approved by the FDA. NCE designation from the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides 
firms with five years of marketing exclusivity.8 
Novelty This takes a value between 0 and 2. If the 
mechanism of action and origin of material 
in the relevant broad therapeutic domain are 
new to the firm the value is set at 2, if one of 
these is new it is set as 1, and if neither are 
new it is set to 0. An average of this variable 
is then calculated across a firm’s complete 
portfolio per firm-year. 
 
This provides an alternative measure (Klueter, 
2013) to bio and NCE to measure the novelty of a 
firm’s development portfolio as novelty could be 
correlated with both design and innovation 
outcomes. 
 
Other Controls 
Year fixed 
effects 
Series of dummies for each year in sample  
 
                                                 
8 https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm386685.pdf 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for invention analyses (H1-2: unit of analysis - firm-year). N=803 
Variable  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.Quantity  230.2 249.4 1.00               
2.Originality 0.575 0.195 0.01 1.00              
3.R&D Decentralization 0.123 0.329 0.10 -0.09 1.00             
4.R&D Functional Differentiation 0.223 0.416 0.04 0.02 -0.13 1.00            
5.Corporate Decentralization 0.258 0.244 0.18 0.05 0.04 -0.16 1.00           
6.performance 0.078 0.087 0.22 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 1.00          
7.R&D Intensity 0.178 0.223 -0.11 0.08 0.08 0.15 -0.17 -0.54 1.00         
8.SG&A 7.831 1.386 0.68 -0.18 0.07 -0.00 0.14 0.26 -0.08 1.00        
9.size 8.650 1.494 0.65 -0.23 0.06 -0.04 0.18 0.37 -0.36 0.91 1.00       
10.slack 2.476 1.644 -0.26 0.09 -0.02 0.17 -0.20 -0.08 0.31 -0.39 -0.49 1.00      
11.CEO 0.111 0.314 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.03 1.00     
12.SBU 2.487 1.274 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.29 -0.15 -0.23 0.01 0.10 -0.15 -0.04 1.00    
13.tech. diversity 0.762 0.104 0.26 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.35 0.33 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 1.00   
14.patent stock 1.137 1.290 0.87 -0.17 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.18 -0.09 0.74 0.70 -0.25 0.04 0.09 0.36 1.00  
15.competition 0.959 0.029 -0.60 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.17 -0.19 0.04 -0.57 -0.52 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.24 -0.62 1.00 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for development analyses (H3-4: unit of analysis - firm-year-clinical phase) 
 Phase 0 to 1 Phase 1 to 2 Phase 2 to 3 Phase 3 to 4                    
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.prog  4.536 5.622 2.304 2.730 1.446 1.693 1.516 1.752 1.00                   
2.drop 5.562 7.108 2.067 3.214 2.541 3.456 1.130 1.659 0.56 1.00                  
3.R&D Decentralization 0.123 0.329 0.134 0.340 0.126 0.332 0.122 0.328 0.01 0.04 1.00                 
4.R&D Functional Diffn. 0.225 0.418 0.233 0.423 0.231 0.422 0.229 0.421 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 1.00                
5.Corporate Decent. 0.261 0.246 0.256 0.244 0.267 0.245 0.265 0.245 0.12 0.10 0.05 -0.16 1.00               
6.performance 0.080 0.089 0.080 0.089 0.081 0.085 0.082 0.081 0.15 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 1.00              
7.size 8.724 1.486 8.772 1.464 8.770 1.469 8.741 1.448 0.39 0.39 0.07 -0.07 0.17 0.35 1.00             
8.SG&A 7.909 1.373 7.958 1.346 7.961 1.354 7.913 1.372 0.44 0.42 0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.26 0.92 1.00            
9.slack 2.440 1.650 2.431 1.643 2.417 1.609 2.459 1.642 -0.17 -0.17 -0.02 0.18 -0.22 -0.10 -0.49 -0.40 1.00           
10.R&D Intensity 0.181 0.224 0.184 0.226 0.179 0.205 0.172 0.186 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.19 -0.52 -0.38 -0.12 0.33 1.00          
11.patent stock 1.187 1.308 1.220 1.313 1.222 1.315 1.191 1.307 0.47 0.42 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.70 0.74 -0.25 -0.10 1.00         
12.competition 0.958 0.028 0.958 0.027 0.957 0.028 0.958 0.028 -0.45 -0.43 -0.06 0.07 -0.15 -0.18 -0.50 -0.56 0.20 0.06 -0.61 1.00        
13.CEO 0.112 0.315 0.114 0.318 0.117 0.321 0.112 0.316 0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 1.00       
14.portfolio 30.27 30.09 12.75 13.71 15.58 14.76 9.972 8.746 0.73 0.81 0.05 -0.04 0.15 0.16 0.49 0.53 -0.22 -0.05 0.56 -0.59 0.04 1.00      
15.external 0.468 0.249 0.484 0.278 0.537 0.248 0.648 0.250 -0.18 -0.20 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.10 -0.03 -0.24 1.00     
16.NCE 0.524 0.256 0.540 0.296 0.523 0.268 0.449 0.282 0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.17 -0.05 -0.02 0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.19 -0.27 1.00    
17.bio 0.257 0.233 0.243 0.246 0.253 0.227 0.235 0.266 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 -0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.00 -0.06 0.13 -0.60 1.00   
18.tech. diversity 0.693 0.236 0.608 0.267 0.671 0.228 0.605 0.285 0.36 0.36 0.00 -0.00 0.24 0.12 0.50 0.54 -0.27 -0.07 0.45 -0.39 0.04 0.47 -0.26 0.37 -0.24 1.00  
19.SBU 2.483 1.293 2.466 1.272 2.476 1.276 2.483 1.290 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.30 -0.15 0.10 0.02 -0.15 -0.24 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.11 1.00 
Number of observations 787 764 762 785                    
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Analysis approach 
 The analysis approach used varies with the nature of the dependent variable and is 
conducted at the firm-year or firm-year-clinical phase level. The independent variable 
Originality (H1) is bounded between 0 and 1. The main analyses use the fractional logit 
approach (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996; Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). To avoid issues with 
over-dispersion using count variables, for the dependent variables quantity (H2), and 
prog1-4 (H3-4) negative binomial regression analyses are used (Long & Freese, 2006).9   
An empirical concern associated with examining firms’ organization designs 
relates to omitted variable bias. In order to start to address this issue a variety of control 
variables are utilized. As the main analyses, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (e.g., 
Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) is used to generate matched samples of observations for 
decentralized and centralized firms through these control variables. This helps to reduce 
the possibility that the results are driven by the inherent differences between decentralized 
and less decentralized firms. In the first stage, a logit regression is used to estimate the 
likelihood that a firm is “treated”. For the invention and early development hypotheses 
(H1-3), the “treatment” variable is R&D Decentralization i.e. whether the firm has 
decentralized R&D. For later stage development (H4), the “treatment” is a dichotomized 
(around the median) version of Corporate Decentralization.10 In this logit regression all 
the covariates in Table 5 are regressed against R&D Decentralization alongside a year-
grouping variable (i.e. 1995-1999 is set as 1 etc.) in the test of H1 and H2. In the test of H3 
all the covariates in Table 6 are regressed against R&D Decentralization alongside a year-
grouping variable. In the test of H4 all the covariates in Table 7 are regressed against the 
dichotomized Corporate Decentralization. In the second stage, regressions are conducted 
using only observations that are successfully matched using the logit regression. Propensity 
score matching using both nearest neighbor and caliper matching methods is used with 
                                                 
9 Initially SG&A and SBU were included in the regressions. However as SG&A is so strongly correlated with size (correlation 
coefficient = 0.91) and the number of business units is largely reflected through the business segment controls, these two controls were 
excluded to minimize multicollinearity. As a result the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for both regressions were below 2.5, below 
the recommended level of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
10 Various cut-off points between 0.2 and 0.6 were used to dichotomize Corporate Decentralization as an additional robustness check. 
Similar results were observed for each cut-off point. 
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similar results being obtained regardless of the approach.11 Coarsened Exact Matching 
(CEM) (e.g., Iacus, King, & Porro, 2011)12 is also used as a further robustness check. 
Appendix 5 provides further details on the matching procedures followed in this chapter. 
This appendix illustrates the first stage propensity matching models in which the relevant 
organization design parameter is used as the dependent variable. Further, this appendix 
illustrates the matching of observations for the relevant structural variables (e.g. centralized 
R&D and decentralized R&D) across a variety of observable variables.  
A variety of fixed effects are also used. However, firm-fixed effects are limited in 
examining H1-H3 due to the low variation of R&D Decentralization over time (31/49 firms 
do not change R&D decentralization). For the 18 firms which do change R&D 
Decentralization, I find support for H1-3 using firm-fixed effects. I undertake firm-fixed 
effect analyses in the tests of H4 as Corporate Decentralization has more temporal 
variation (Allison & Waterman, 2002).  
 
Results 
Invention: Hypotheses 1 and 2  
Table 5 illustrates the main analyses that are used to test H1 and H2. Models 1 – 3 
focus on originality as the dependent variable. Across models 2 - 3 R&D Decentralization 
has a statistically significant negative coefficient. Thus firms with decentralized R&D are 
associated with less original inventions. On average, R&D Decentralization is associated 
with patents that have 0.07 lower originality (0.36 standard deviation lower value of 
originality).13 Interviews with R&D managers highlighted that the creation of patented 
inventions required knowledge from a variety of sources to be combined. For example, the 
interviews indicated that in the invention stage, the focus is on screening a large number 
                                                 
11 Further details on the propensity score matching approach are provided in the Appendix 5 i.e. first stage logit regression results and 
post-matching balance tables. 
12 The CEM STATA Routine (http://gking.harvard.edu/cem) is used to perform this analysis. 
13 Similar results are obtained for alternative patent measures similar to originality, namely radicalness and generality. The latter result 
using patent generality is consistent with the work of Argyres and Silverman (2004). Further details are presented in the online 
appendix to this paper. 
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of potential molecules as well as understanding their modes of action to identify target 
groups of molecules that show promise. In order to identify potential lead molecules and 
develop a better understanding of the mode of action of such molecules, scientists may 
need to draw from a wide variety of disciplines in order to create an invention. Managers 
also highlighted how organization design could impact intra-organizational knowledge 
flows. For example: 14  
“We have three separate R&D units that are deliberately siloed from each other so 
as to encourage competition between these units. They don’t tend to share any of 
their knowledge with each other.” 
 
It appears that in a centralized R&D unit a firm’s broader knowledge base is more 
accessible enabling the creation of more original inventions consistent with H1. 
Models 4 – 6 focus on quantity as the dependent variable. Consistent with H2, 
models 5 -6 indicate that firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the creation of 
more inventions than firms with centralized R&D units as illustrated by the statistically 
significant positive coefficients for R&D Decentralization. On average, decentralization of 
R&D is associated with the generation of 51 more patent families per firm-year (0.21 
standard deviation higher value of quantity). This helps to explain prior findings by 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994). They found evidence to suggest that firms that were more 
decentralized with respect to resource allocation are associated with increased patent output 
which is alignment with the findings pertaining to H2. Interviews also highlighted how 
incentives could shape the quantity of inventions: 
“You get what you incentivize and are able to measure. Volume of output and 
numbers are easier to measure than quality and that is what we tend to reward. It 
is all about getting targets and pushing candidates through the various milestones 
of the development process” 
 
  
                                                 
14 Due to confidentiality agreements with the firms whose managers are interviewed, comments cannot be attributed to individual 
firms or managers. 
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Table 5: Regression analyses relating to invention hypotheses (H1-2).  
Dependent Variable H1: originality 
Fractional Logit Regression 
H2: quantity 
Negative Binomial Regression 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
R&D Decentralization  -0.167** -0.311**  0.228+ 0.207* 
  (0.0553) (0.105)  (0.136) (0.0945) 
       
R&D Functional Differentiation  0.0398 -0.172  0.109 0.0436 
  (0.0603) (0.112)  (0.0950) (0.0955) 
       
Corporate Decentralization  0.122 0.362+  -0.0319 0.101 
  (0.118) (0.207)  (0.149) (0.219) 
       
       
performance -0.413 -0.413 -0.913 0.160 0.181 1.762+ 
 (0.350) (0.345) (0.619) (0.605) (0.613) (0.918) 
       
R&D Intensity -0.0315 0.0116 0.753 0.245 0.187 1.692+ 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.567) (0.266) (0.271) (0.948) 
       
size -0.00688 0.00181 0.0469 0.326** 0.316** 0.407** 
 (0.0439) (0.0451) (0.101) (0.0629) (0.0603) (0.0868) 
       
slack 0.00473 0.00684 0.0276 0.00487 -0.00195 0.0115 
 (0.0208) (0.0201) (0.0331) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0421) 
       
CEO -0.0619 -0.0642 -0.276+ 0.0156 0.0295 0.0281 
 (0.0534) (0.0538) (0.142) (0.0582) (0.0578) (0.0990) 
       
tech. diversity  0.942** 0.895** 0.857 1.749** 1.798** 2.467* 
 (0.342) (0.339) (0.650) (0.672) (0.646) (1.224) 
       
patent stock -0.00864 -0.0118 -0.0388 0.468** 0.463** 0.388** 
 (0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0672) (0.0685) (0.0657) (0.0655) 
       
competition -2.541* -2.497* -5.722** -2.991+ -3.158+ -3.426+ 
 (1.196) (1.166) (1.979) (1.638) (1.645) (1.925) 
       
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects 
 
N N N N N N 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Matching 
 
N N PSM N N PSM 
Matching – Treatment variable - - R&D 
Decent. 
- - R&D 
Decent. 
N 803 803 144 803 803 150 
Pseudo-R2 0.0626 0.0632 0.0751 0.131 0.132 0.183 
Log Likelihood -513.3 -513.0 -95.40 -4488.4 -4479.9 -790.1 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
For H1 and H2, firm-years matched with R&D Decentralization=1 and 0 using caliper radius 0.00035. 
Similar results obtained using various caliper and nearest neighbor matching approaches. PSM – Propensity 
Score Matching 
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Development: Hypotheses 3 and 4   
Table 6 and Table 7 illustrate the main analyses used to test H3 and H4. Support 
for H3 is illustrated by the statistically significant negative coefficients for R&D 
Decentralization in Models 2 -3 in Table 6. Decentralization of R&D is associated with 
the progression of 0.89 fewer drug candidates from pre-clinical to phase 1 (0.16 standard 
deviations). The interviews with R&D managers highlighted the benefits of R&D 
centralization in the earlier stages of development: 
“The early stages of development are difficult to distinguish from discovery. That 
is why organizing to ensure greater integration across therapeutic areas is 
important as an idea in one area may be able to be translated into another 
therapeutic area. Often the best ideas are those which start in one area but move 
to another” 
 
Prior studies have illustrated that drug-candidates fail to progress through clinical 
trials primarily because of efficacy, strategic and operational issues as opposed to safety 
(Harrison, 2016). It is precisely these more technical issues that enhanced intra-
organizational knowledge flows can help to overcome. Later in the development process 
in the phase 2 to 3 transition, H4 receives support in that greater Corporate 
Decentralization is associated with the progression of more inventions (Models 2-3 in 
Table 7). This is exhibited by the statistically significant positive coefficient for Corporate 
Decentralization. A one standard deviation increase in Corporate Decentralization (0.27) 
is associated with 0.15 more drug candidates progressing from Phase 2 to 3 in a year on 
average (0.09 standard deviation higher number of drug candidates progressing). 
Interviews highlighted that for the phase 2 to 3 transition a broader range of functions are 
generally involved unlike prior transitions:  
“Pre-clinical and Phase 1 are R&D heavy with limited commercial input. 
Marketing and other commercial functions don’t tend to be significantly involved 
in the drug development process till it comes to the Phase 2 to 3 transition, prior to 
that it is mainly R&D driven”  
  
The impact of decentralization on incentives was also raised by several 
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interviewees: 
 “A more corporate [centralized] structure lacks the provision of good incentives 
as you tend to under-reward good performance and over-look poor performance. 
It is harder to pin down who is responsible for what” 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that decentralization of R&D hinders the 
progression of drug-candidates from Phase 2 to 3. However, for the Phase 1 to 2 and Phase 
3 to Pre-registration transitions no evidence was observed to suggest that decentralization 
of R&D is associated with the progression of fewer drug-candidates. This provides some 
tentative evidence to suggest that the importance of knowledge flows declines through 
development. Interviews highlighted:15 
“Early on it is important to get a wide range of technical eyes on a problem with 
scientists from many disciplines exchanging ideas. Later on in clinical development 
everything is so therapeutic area specific that little can be gained from, for 
example, a cardiovascular team talking to an oncology team”  
 
  
                                                 
15 I also conduct Wald tests comparing the coefficients for R&D decentralization across clinical phase transitions. I find that the 
coefficients are significantly larger for the Pre-clinical to Phase 1 and Phase 2 to 3 transitions than for the Phase 1 to 2 and Phase 3 to 
Pre-registration transitions (which are not significantly different from zero). Thus it appears that knowledge flows are critical for the 
pre-clinical to Phase 1 and Phase 2 to 3 transitions but not the other two transitions. This provides some tentative evidence to suggest 
that the importance of knowledge flows declines through development but for the critical Phase 2 to 3 transition they appear to still 
play a role. It is likely that firms are still working on addressing technical issues such as scaling up manufacturing and understanding 
pharmodynamics and pharmokinetics where intra-organizational knowledge flows may help.  
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Table 6: Negative binomial regression analyses relating to development hypothesis 
(H3) 
Dependent Variable Number of inventions progressing to next phase (prog) 
Clinical Phase Transition H3: Phase 0 to 1 Supplemental Analysis: Ph. 1 to 2 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
R&D Decentralization  -0.223* -0.196*  -0.144* -0.0181 
  (0.0947) (0.0855)  (0.0728) (0.179) 
R&D Functional 
Differentiation 
 -0.0755 -0.134  0.142+ 0.276** 
  (0.0766) (0.148)  (0.0780) (0.0989) 
Corporate Decentralization  0.153 0.126  0.113 0.167 
  (0.127) (0.252)  (0.180) (0.253) 
performance 0.0383 0.00508 0.00399 0.736* 0.619+ 0.669 
 (0.431) (0.408) (0.589) (0.371) (0.358) (0.751) 
R&D Intensity 0.528* 0.596** 0.669** 0.290 0.300 0.385 
 (0.213) (0.200) (0.209) (0.209) (0.200) (0.383) 
size 0.274** 0.285** 0.278** 0.0772 0.0901+ 0.0522 
 (0.0555) (0.0506) (0.0800) (0.0504) (0.0473) (0.0704) 
slack 0.0334 0.0401* 0.0595* -0.00653 -0.0108 -0.0335 
 (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0297) (0.0254) (0.0264) (0.0469) 
CEO 0.00871 -0.00334 -0.210* 0.00894 0.00629 0.00881 
 (0.0703) (0.0703) (0.0854) (0.0720) (0.0734) (0.142) 
patent stock 0.0976* 0.0982* 0.113* 0.0170 0.0129 0.00165 
 (0.0399) (0.0385) (0.0475) (0.0351) (0.0356) (0.0609) 
portfolio 0.00765** 0.00744** 0.00912** 0.0265** 0.0286** 0.0397** 
 (0.00224) (0.00250) (0.00297) (0.00612) (0.00592) (0.00796) 
external -0.638** -0.662** -0.319 0.0819 0.115 0.132 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.302) (0.152) (0.164) (0.242) 
NCE -0.580** -0.600** -0.604+ 0.343+ 0.293 0.219 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.319) (0.192) (0.188) (0.260) 
bio 0.393 0.391 0.318 0.972** 0.875** 0.901* 
 (0.256) (0.253) (0.347) (0.252) (0.258) (0.413) 
tech. diversity 1.953** 1.913** 1.334** 1.980** 1.896** 1.709** 
 (0.261) (0.249) (0.289) (0.264) (0.252) (0.432) 
competition -5.832** -6.035** -8.185** -2.326 -1.581 -3.774 
 (1.701) (1.860) (2.503) (2.446) (2.296) (2.976) 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects 
 
N N N N N N 
Bus. Seg. Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Matching N N PSM N N PSM 
Matching – Treatment 
variable 
- - R&D 
Decent. 
- - R&D 
Functional 
Diff. 
N 787 787 309 764 764 310 
Pseudo-R2 0.237 0.241 0.264 0.224 0.227 0.238 
Log Likelihood -1568.3 -1561.8 -593.1 -1199.8 -1195.6 -444.7 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
H3: Firm-years matched with R&D Decentralization=1 and 0 using 3 nearest neighbors. Similar results obtained using 
various caliper and nearest neighbor matching approaches. Supplemental Analysis: Firm-years matched with R&D 
Functional Differentiation =1 and 0 using a caliper matching radius = 0.008. Similar results obtained using various caliper 
and nearest neighbor matching approaches. PSM – Propensity Score Matching 
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Table 7: Negative binomial regression analyses relating to development hypothesis 
(H4) 
Dependent Variable Number of inventions progressing to next phase (prog) 
Clinical Phase Transition H4: Phase 2 to 3 
Model 1 2 3 
R&D Decentralization  -0.204+ -1.364** 
  (0.104) (0.331) 
R&D Functional Differentiation  -0.0876 0.147 
  (0.0919) (0.396) 
Corporate Decentralization  0.330* 0.843** 
  (0.166) (0.202) 
    
    
performance 0.478 0.432 -1.359 
 (0.460) (0.429) (1.871) 
R&D Intensity 0.308 0.328 4.111+ 
 (0.253) (0.336) (2.154) 
size 0.143** 0.123 -0.0220 
 (0.0519) (0.115) (0.779) 
slack 0.00275 -0.0534 0.135 
 (0.0313) (0.0442) (0.174) 
CEO -0.00706 -0.0146 0.727** 
 (0.0784) (0.0824) (0.237) 
patent stock 0.0871* -0.00291 -0.455 
 (0.0439) (0.0609) (0.338) 
portfolio 0.0172** 0.0261** 0.0589** 
 (0.00366) (0.00399) (0.0158) 
external 0.185 0.0743 1.639* 
 (0.215) (0.254) (0.813) 
NCE -0.205 -0.760* -2.518* 
 (0.251) (0.343) (1.230) 
bio 0.166 -0.278 -4.086** 
 (0.302) (0.412) (1.138) 
tech. diversity 1.445** 1.145** -1.785 
 (0.362) (0.397) (1.861) 
competition -2.644 -3.176 -10.30 
 (2.013) (2.421) (16.51) 
    
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects 
 
N Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y 
Matching N N PSM 
Matching – Treatment variable - - Corporate Dec. 
dichot. 
N 762 762 124 
Pseudo-R2 0.191 0.220 0.444 
Log Likelihood -1013.2 -977.3 -125.6 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
H4: Firm-years matched with dichotomized Corporate Decentralization = 1 and 0 using caliper matching 
radius = 0.0002. Similar results obtained using various caliper and nearest neighbor matching approaches.  
PSM – Propensity Score Matching 
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Robustness tests 
Six robustness tests are undertaken (Table 8). First, the analyses are repeated using 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). For H1-3 R&D Decentralization is used as the 
treatment variable and for H4 the “treatment” is a dichotomized (around the median) 
version of Corporate Decentralization. Observations are matched using all the independent 
variables in Table 5 (H1-2), Table 6 (H3) and Table 7 (H4) respectively. These variables 
are all coarsened into 2-5 strata. Second, alternate regression models are used to test all 
four hypotheses. OLS linear regression models are used with dependent variables of 
originality (H1) and log(quantity) (H2). For H3 and 4, both zero-inflated negative binomial 
and Poisson regressions were utilized (Model 2, Table 8). Third, as an alternative test of 
H3 and H4, the unit of analysis is changed to the drug-candidate-year with the dependent 
variable being a binary variable set to 1 if the drug-candidate progresses from pre-clinical 
to phase 1 (H3) or phase 2 to 3 (H4) (Model 3, Table 8). The likelihood of inventions 
progressing to the next phase is estimated using logit models with a linear time-varying co-
variable (Allison, 1982). This enables me to control for individual drug-specific 
characteristics (e.g. NCE status, source, whether biotech or anti-cancer drug). Fourth, as 
an alternative to NCE and bio as measures of the novelty of a firm’s development portfolio, 
the variable novelty is used to test H3 and H4 (Model 4, Table 8). Fifth, firms may vary in 
their geographical coverage of their R&D (Model 5, Table 8).16 An additional control is 
included in the main analysis with the number of countries that a firm’s inventors come 
from per year to account for this dispersion. Propensity-scoring matched models are 
undertaken (Table 5 models 3 and 6). All five tests provide further support for H1-4. 
Finally, analyses are conducted using 1-year lagged values and three-year rolling 
average values of the two structural measures (Model 6). These analyses are conducted 
primarily to rule out reverse causality. Support is found for H1 and H3 but the degree of 
statistical significance drops due to a reduction in power due to the loss of a year’s worth 
of data. H2 is now marginally statistically insignificant (0.1<p<0.18). However, H4 is no 
                                                 
16 Firms with decentralized R&D on average have inventors in 19.1 countries versus 15.7 countries for firms with centralized R&D. 
This difference is statistically significant (p=0.004). This provides some confidence in the measure of R&D decentralization as firms 
that are more decentralized are likely to be more geographically dispersed. Thus, there is a risk that this variable of the number of 
countries in which firms invent is a “bad control” (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). As a result it is only used in robustness tests and not the 
main analyses. 
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longer supported. This is consistent with additional functions being brought in at the end 
of the Phase 2. It is likely the increased effort associated with the greater number of drug 
candidates progressing occurs towards the end of the phase. Further details of these 
robustness tests are provided in Appendix 6. 
Table 8: Robustness tests of main hypotheses: key results  
Relevant 
Independent 
Variable  
Hyp. Coefficients (p-values) 
1. CEM  2. 
Alternate 
specifi-
cation 
3. Drug-
candidate
- year 
analysis 
4. 
Alternate 
novelty 
measure 
5. 
R&D 
geog. 
control 
6a. 
Lagged 
IV 
6b. 
Rolling 
average 
IV 
R&D 
Decentralization 
1 -0.190 
(0.011) 
-0.037 
(0.007) 
- - -0.207 
(0.012) 
-0.162 
(0.023) 
-0.161 
(0.022) 
R&D 
Decentralization 
2 0.279 
(0.000) 
0.246 
(0.100) 
- - 0.184 
(0.047) 
0.186 
(0.172) 
0.224 
(0.156) 
R&D 
Decentralization 
3 -0.216 
(0.019) 
-0.150 
(0.034) 
-0.263 
(0.006) 
-0.213 
(0.038) 
- -0.133 
(0.176) 
-0.237 
(0.037) 
Corporate 
Decentralization 
4 0.216 
(0.025) 
0.328 
(0.047) 
0.259 
(0.084) 
0.299 
(0.071) 
- 0.144 
(0.437) 
0.073 
(0.673) 
 
 
Analysis of mechanisms  
Six additional analyses are conducted to explore the validity of the knowledge flow 
and incentives mechanisms through which organization design is hypothesized to impact 
innovation outcomes (also see Appendix 7). First, how firms’ pre-existing breadth of 
knowledge (tech. diversity) moderates the association between R&D Decentralization and 
the progression of inventions through the early stages of the development process is 
examined (Phase 0 to 1 as tested for H3). If the knowledge flow mechanism is pertinent, 
firms with a broader array of knowledge will benefit more from centralization of R&D as 
these enhanced knowledge flows will provide an even greater array of knowledge for 
managers to tackle technical issues. Support for this argumentation is provided through an 
extended version of model 2 in Table 6, which includes an additional term, tech. diversity 
x R&D Decentralization, which is negative and statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. This result is graphically illustrated in Figure 5a. It can be seen that for 
low levels of tech diversity (narrower knowledge base), firms with decentralized R&D 
progress more inventions. However, for higher levels of tech. diversity firms with 
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centralized R&D progress more inventions. This clearly illustrates the knowledge-
incentive trade-off. At low levels of tech. diversity incentives outweigh knowledge flows 
but this relationship reverses at higher values of tech. diversity where knowledge flows 
play a larger role. 
 Second, firms with a greater proportion of more novel inventions in their early 
development portfolio (as estimated using NCE) are likely to benefit more from a greater 
degree of R&D centralization. This is because such inventions will require greater access 
to firms’ knowledge bases to address the more challenging technical issues. This 
argumentation is supported using an extended version of model 2 in Table 6 which includes 
the interaction term, NCE x R&D Decentralization, which is negative and statistically 
significant at the 99 % confidence level. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5b. For 
more basic portfolios with fewer NCEs, intra-organizational knowledge flows may not be 
as critical as the technical issues associated with these portfolios can be addressed using 
local knowledge within a specific R&D unit. Thus firms with decentralized R&D may be 
able to progress more inventions through early development. This is because of the greater 
effort and effectiveness of this effort associated with decentralized R&D units overcoming 
reduced knowledge flows.17 Similar results are also obtained using novelty (Figure 5c). 
Third, an additional R&D design element pertains to whether this group is 
integrated into one unit or split into separate research and development units (R&D 
functional differentiation). It is akin to vertical dis-integration of R&D. Decision rights are 
split between R&D activities and there are separate hierarchical reporting lines for each 
function. In contrast, a functionally integrated R&D unit is associated with decision rights 
over the complete R&D process. A key innovation stage involves the handover of 
inventions from research to development (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). In line with an 
incentive-based argumentation, functional differentiation of R&D is likely to be associated 
with the progression of more inventions. This is because in separate units, research 
managers will exert greater effort to ensure more inventions progress to development as 
                                                 
17 Further, consistent with the theoretical argumentation provided above, the interaction term NCE x R&D Decentralization is only 
statistically significant for the phase 0 to 1 transition where the benefits of rich technical knowledge flows are likely to be the greatest 
in the development process. 
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the outputs of their actions are more observable enabling more effective use of incentives. 
To test this logic, the coefficient for the variable R&D Functional Differentiation is 
examined at different development stages. For the Phase 1 to 2 transition, this coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant indicating that separation into individual R&D units 
is associated with the progression of more drug-candidates (Models 5 and 6 in Table 6). 
Functional differentiation of R&D is associated with 0.43 more inventions progressing 
from Phase 1 to 2 (0.16 standard deviations). Interviews highlighted:  
“Research managers are incentivized by the number of drugs that they can get into 
Phase 2 (Proof of Concept), which means a lot of questionable candidates may get 
thrown over the fence into Phase 2” 
Review of companies’ filings suggests that for functionally separate research and 
development units, research undertakes early stage (Phase 1) clinical trials. Interviews 
highlighted that functional integration of R&D was associated with a single budget as 
opposed to separate research and development budgets. Managers suggested that this could 
result in a shift of resources to later development. This in turn can lead to fewer drug 
candidates progressing from Phase 1 to 2. Further details are provided in Appendix 7. 
Fourth, an indirect route to examine the incentives-based mechanisms involves the 
evaluation of the time lag between the date of filing of firms’ patents and their eventual 
grant date. Régibeau and Rockett (2010) indicate that this lag is dependent on the efforts 
made by the filing organization. Thus a lower grant lag can indicate that firms exert more 
effort to get granted, patented inventions (Harhoff & Wagner, 2009). As a result, the mean 
grant lag for firms’ granted patent families per year is regressed against the variables in 
Table 3 (including originality) with two additional controls pertaining to the average 
number of claims and non-patent citations per patent within a patent family. These controls 
are focused on ensuring like with like patents are compared for centralized and 
decentralized R&D units. As illustrated in Table 9a, the coefficient for R&D 
Decentralization is negative and significant at the 95 % confidence level. This analysis 
indicates that firms with decentralized R&D are associated with patent grant lags that are 
50 days shorter (Sample mean is 1212 days) than firms with centralized R&D units. This 
result is consistent with the incentives-based argumentation that managers in decentralized 
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R&D units expand more effort to create and patent inventions. 
Fifth, it may be the case that more inventions are progressed in development 
because managers progress lower quality inventions rather than exerting greater effort. 
This alternative explanation is examined through evaluating the likelihood of inventions 
that enter phase 2 and 3 progressing to phase 3 and Pre-registration respectively using both 
cox proportional hazards and logit models with a time-varying co-variable (Allison, 1982). 
If lower quality inventions are progressed, there will be a reduced likelihood of these 
inventions progressing through the later stages of development as, for example, reduced 
efficacy becomes more apparent. No evidence is observed (Table 9b) to suggest that firms 
with functionally differentiated R&D units and firms with higher values of Corporate 
Decentralization progress lower quality inventions as the inventions progressed in these 
firms are as likely to progress through the later stages as those in firms that are functionally 
integrated across R&D and with lower Corporate Differentiation. The non-significance of 
the coefficients for R&D Functional Differentiation at the time drug candidates move from 
phase 1 to 2 and Corporate Decentralization at the time when drug candidates move from 
phase 2 to 3 support this assertion. 
 Finally, if managers exert greater effort then it is likely that inventions will progress 
through the development process more rapidly. In order to examine this assertion, the 
average time for drug-candidates to progress through phase 2 into phase 3 is examined over 
the 20-year time period and regressed against the mean level of Corporate Decentralization 
over this period for each firm alongside a set of control variables to control for differences 
in firms’ size, diversification and portfolio composition. As illustrated in Table 9c, a 
statistically significant negative coefficient is observed for Corporate Decentralization 
suggesting that, after controlling for key firm and portfolio differences (e.g. proportion of 
NCEs in portfolio), firms that are more decentralized at the corporate level are associated 
with the more rapid progression of drug-candidates through later development (phase 2 to 
3). This is again consistent with an incentives-based argumentation.18  
                                                 
18 Additionally beyond the analyses presented, I find some limited evidence to suggest that the heads of functionally integrated R&D 
units receive less total compensation that the heads of separate research and development units. Also I find some evidence to suggest 
that top management team executives in firms with higher values of Corporate Decentralization tend to have a lower fixed component 
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Figure 5: Examination of knowledge-flow mechanism. Charts illustrating 
interaction between R&D Decentralization and (a) tech. diversity and (b) NCE (c) 
Novelty.  
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(c)  
                                                 
of their total compensation but similar overall, total compensation to executives in firms with lower values of Corporate 
Decentralization. Both provide some indirect, tentative evidence to suggest that greater decentralization is associated with higher-
powered incentives. See Appendix 7 for further details. 
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Table 9: Incentives mechanism analyses (a) patent grant-lag; (b) likelihood of 
progression of drug-candidates to next clinical phase; (c) time to progress through 
phase 2 trials 
 
(a) DV=Patent grant-lag (Days) - OLS regression Model 1 Model 2 
R&D Decentralization -81.65** -50.20* 
 (28.72) (20.03) 
R&D Functional Differentiation 63.20+ 15.69 
 (33.63) (29.00) 
Corporate Decentralization 61.68 70.18 
 (63.94) (63.00) 
Main Control Variables (Table 3) Y Y 
Patent-level controls (e.g. originality) Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects N Y 
N 782 782 
R2 0.618 0.644 
 
 
(b) Likelihood of drug progression Logit – linear time function Cox Proportional Hazards 
model 
Progression Phase 2 to 3 Phase 3 to PR Phase 2 to 3 Phase 3 to PR 
Model 1 2 3 4 
R&D Functional Differentiation 
when drug moved into Phase 2 
0.0916 
(0.255) 
 0.0868 
(0.175) 
 
Corporate Decentralization when 
drug moved into Phase 3 
 0.107 
(0.379) 
 -0.0747 
(0.320) 
Firm-year level controls Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Drug-level controls Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 5168 3578 4473 2712 
Log Likelihood -1289.2 -1334.8 -2063.2 -2055.5 
 
 
(c) DV= Time to progress from Phase 2 to 3 (years) 
OLS regression 
Model 1 (No Structural 
Controls) 
Model 2 (With 
Structural Controls) 
Mean Corporate Decentralization -1.898* -1.741+ 
 (0.899) (0.937) 
Main Control Variables (Table 4) Y Y 
N 47 47 
R2 0.277 0.294 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between firms’ organization designs and their 
innovation outcomes through integrating knowledge- and incentive-based theoretical 
lenses. Firms face a knowledge-incentive trade-off with respect to the relationship between 
their organization designs and innovation outcomes that varies in its impact through the 
innovation process. First, during the invention stage, decentralization of R&D is associated 
with the creation of more inventions, but these inventions are less original. This is because 
greater decentralization is associated with reduced intra-organizational knowledge flows 
limiting the breadth of knowledge that can be accessed. However, for inventions that draw 
on local search only requiring knowledge within an organizational unit, decentralization 
enables the more effective use of incentives, which engenders greater managerial effort 
and also is associated with greater efficacy of this effort, thus facilitating the creation of 
more inventions. Second, greater R&D decentralization during the earlier stages of 
development is associated with the progression of fewer inventions as firms struggle to 
address complex technical issues, as they are unable to draw on their broader knowledge 
bases. However, later in development when complex technical issues have been largely 
resolved, greater corporate decentralization facilitates the progression of more inventions. 
Ultimately, greater decentralization can engender greater managerial effort due to the more 
effective utilization of higher-powered incentives, however it limits access to a firm’s 
broader knowledge base. In order to address challenging technical problems the cost of 
reduced knowledge flows can outweigh greater effort. However, when dealing with less 
complex problems this greater effort is more effective.  
Consistent with the work of Argyres and Zenger (2012) that focused on the 
boundaries of the firm, incentives and intra-organizational knowledge flows are 
intertwined. The higher powered incentives associated with greater decentralization can 
decrease motivation to share or utilize shared knowledge thereby reducing intra-
organizational knowledge flows. Further, the greater organizational “distance” between 
sub-units in a more decentralized design can hinder the transfer of highly tacit, complex 
knowledge. Without combining the knowledge- and incentives-based perspectives, it is not 
possible to fully explain the relationship between organization design and firms’ innovation 
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outcomes. Viewing innovation as a process enables me to unpack these two mechanisms 
as their relative impact on innovation will vary through the innovation process. 
 This study highlights that in a desire to create more nimble, autonomous units, with 
greater decision rights, managers may limit the benefits associated with the scope of 
knowledge within their firms. With the reduced intra-organizational knowledge flows 
associated with decentralized R&D, firms may limit themselves to local search and miss 
out on rich knowledge recombination opportunities associated with more original 
inventions. Further, by reducing access to their broader knowledge firms may struggle to 
progress more inventions through the technically-complex earlier stages of development. 
This was experienced by Procter & Gamble when they decentralized R&D as part of their 
“Organization 2005” efforts (Mandlowitz & O'Brien, 2012). Although more products hit 
the market, they were less original, with analysts stating that P&G was “reformulating and 
not inventing.” This was in large part driven by the fact that in the decentralized structure 
scientists from different parts of the business were less able to share knowledge. As senior 
P&G managers noted: 
“We knew that most of P&G’s best innovations had come from connecting ideas 
across internal businesses.” Huston and Sakkab (2006)  
 
However, for later stage development where intra-organizational knowledge flows 
are less pertinent and the knowledge required to progress inventions is more 
compartmentalized, firms can benefit from more autonomous units. This is consistent with 
the ambidexterity and disruptive innovation literatures (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Tushman et al., 2010). 
Together these results contribute to the strategic management literature in three 
important ways. First, by conceptualizing innovation as a process rather than as an outcome 
(e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Keum & See, 2017) this study helps to integrate the 
organization design and innovation literatures more closely. Much prior work in the 
innovation domain has tended to conflate the various stages of the innovation process (e.g., 
Garud et al., 2013). This approach therefore helps to highlight that different facets of 
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organization design play a greater or lesser role throughout the innovation process. For 
example, in the initial knowledge-rich invention and early development stages, 
decentralization of R&D is most pertinent. However, as an invention gets closer to market, 
the degree of corporate decentralization is most relevant. This enables me to theorize and 
observe that similar organization design elements (i.e., increased or reduced 
decentralization) may result in different outcomes depending on whether they pertain to 
firms’ invention or development activities. Thus it is important to understand where (in the 
organization, e.g., R&D) and when (in the relevant process, e.g., invention stage) design 
choices are made in order to fully appreciate the role of design on organizational 
performance. This may help to reconcile the varied findings within the extant literature 
pertaining to how decentralization can impact innovation, as these studies focus on 
different aspects of “where” and “when.” For example, work examining centralization of 
R&D has focused on invention (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 2014), 
whereas the ambidexterity literature has tended to examine later development and launch 
(e.g., Tushman et al., 2010). This process-based approach also suggests that certain 
organization designs may be better fits for different innovation strategies. For example, 
greater decentralization can facilitate the creation of more incremental inventions that can 
be readily translated into final products. Whereas greater centralization of R&D can help 
to create more original inventions that are able to make it through early development. 
Second, this study adds to the debate regarding the importance of integrating 
capabilities-based with organizational economics-based theories (e.g., Argyres, 2011; 
Argyres et al., 2012; Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Dosi et al., 2003; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). 
Prior work has focused on examining the boundaries of the firm rather than looking within 
the “Black Box” that is the firm. These studies have tended to focus on the holdup risks 
associated with unique assets that are required to create unique capabilities (e.g., Argyres 
& Zenger, 2012). In contrast, this study highlights that a knowledge-based process is 
subject to incentives considerations which can shape how internal organization design 
impacts firms’ innovation. Namely, firms need to manage a delicate trade-off between rich 
intra-organizational knowledge flows and effective use of incentives with respect to their 
designs. This study therefore answers the call to leverage both capability and organizational 
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economics perspectives in examining internal organization design (Argyres & Zenger, 
2012).  
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the capability-based view of 
the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991). Firms cannot be assumed to be unitary actors (e.g., Bidwell, 
2012) and firms’ designs, such as the extent to which they decentralize certain parts of their 
organizations, can strongly influence access to their broader knowledge bases. For 
example, this study illustrates that in the early stages of development, decentralization of 
R&D is associated with the progression of fewer inventions, with the benefits of 
centralization being enhanced when a firm has a broader knowledge base. Thus, by being 
able to access their broader knowledge base, managers within centralized R&D units can 
more effectively address the technical challenges that they are likely to face during the 
early stages of development. This study therefore highlights that although a firm may have 
a broad knowledge base, it may not always translate into superior performance simply 
because this knowledge may not be accessible to the parts of a firm undertaking key 
activities. Thus, two firms with the same knowledge base can experience very different 
innovation outcomes based on their designs. This can therefore provide some insight into 
the foundations of firms’ product development capabilities (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1995; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). From an organization design perspective, greater 
centralization or integration can facilitate rich intra-organizational knowledge flows, 
thereby enhancing capabilities associated with the creation of original inventions that can 
be progressed effectively through the early stages of development. In contrast, 
decentralizing to maximize the efficacy of incentives can facilitate capabilities associated 
with the creation of a higher volume of inventions and more effective progression of these 
inventions through later development.  
 In conclusion, this paper highlights that firms’ organization design can influence 
both knowledge flows and incentives. This helps to illuminate an inherent trade-off firms 
face in that greater decentralization is associated with more effective usage of incentives, 
yet limits knowledge flows. Through conceptualizing innovation as a process I am able to 
unpack the impact of organization design on knowledge flows and incentives. This enables 
me to highlight the boundary conditions pertaining to where greater decentralization may 
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enhance or reduce firms’ innovation outcomes as well as how organization design can 
shape firms’ innovation capabilities. 
 
  
 67 
 
CHAPTER 3: MIND THE GAPS: HOW ORGANIZATION DESIGN 
SHAPES THE SOURCING OF INVENTIONS 
 
Finalist, Strategic Management Society Annual Meeting Best Conference PhD Paper 
Prize; 2018 
Abstract  
In their quest to sustain their innovativeness, firms pursue multiple inventions, with only a 
small proportion of them achieving fruition. In addition to the challenge of 
commercializing their inventions, firms also face the challenge of replenishing and 
maintaining the flow of inventions within their pipelines. This replenishment could be done 
via internally or externally sourced inventions through licensing, alliance or acquisition 
modes. Existing research has considered this decision to take place at the firm-level and 
the logic for decision-making at the transaction-level. I integrate the incentive- and 
knowledge-based views of the firm to offer a new theory to explain this decision. Within 
the theory, I consider that firms may decentralize such decisions within specific R&D units, 
and that the decision-making might operate at the pipeline-level rather than at the 
individual transaction-level. This allows me to consider different sources of heterogeneity 
within firms’ decision-making processes, and show how organization design can have 
significant implications for firms’ invention sourcing. I explore these arguments using a 
novel dataset of firms’ invention sourcing decisions in the pharmaceutical industry between 
1995 and 2015. I find that decentralized designs with multiple R&D units are associated 
with a higher proportion of externally sourced inventions. This difference is primarily 
driven by differences in the propensity to license, and for inventions of moderate novelty. 
These findings highlight an important linkage between firms’ internal organization designs 
and their sourcing of inventions, and in doing so, show how such decision-making is 
impacted by both managerial incentives and intra-organizational knowledge flows. 
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Introduction 
“In terms of things that keep me awake at night, I would say that I’m actually less 
concerned about this quarter and how we’re doing, as I am about keeping our 
innovation pipeline full,” Clifton Pemble, Garmin CEO 2018 
“We allocate resources across the best internal and external opportunities we 
assess. The balance of internal R&D coupled with external programs and 
collaborations has generated the successful portfolio of current medicines and 
pipeline candidates we have today”, Robert A Bradway, CEO Amgen 2016 
 
As illustrated by the quotes above, firms’ invention pipelines are critical to their 
competitiveness. Sustaining the flow of inventions through their pipelines requires 
continuous replenishment with new inventions as existing inventions are weeded out or 
reach fruition (e.g., Chan, Nickerson, & Owan, 2007; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014). This 
replenishment can be undertaken via internally generated inventions or externally sourced 
inventions through licensing, alliances or acquisition modes (e.g., Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2006; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). 
 Prior studies have tended to examine the sourcing decision at the level of the 
individual transaction made by the focal firm (e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Bidwell, 
2012; Weigelt & Miller, 2013). However, because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
generation and the commercialization of inventions, the decision to replenish pipelines is 
typically not undertaken at the individual transactional level but rather at the overall 
pipeline level (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; Nishimura & Okada, 2014). This is because the 
problem of replenishment is associated with the efficiency of knowledge generation with 
respect to both the timing and the alignment with the firm’s existing pipeline whereas the 
problem of sourcing is associated with the efficiency of coordination for a specific 
transaction. Further, firms may vary in terms of how they are internally organized for 
innovation (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004). A centralized organization design is 
typically associated with creating and managing a universal invention pipeline that feeds 
different businesses or markets. In contrast, a decentralized design is typically associated 
with the creation and management of a set of invention pipelines specific to different 
businesses or markets.   
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In this study, I offer a framework in which I view firms’ sourcing of inventions as 
a process of replenishing their invention pipelines, and I consider this decision based on 
how the focal firm is internally organized for innovation, distinguishing between 
centralized and decentralized designs. The framework is premised on the notion that 
centralized and decentralized designs may vary in terms of managerial incentives around 
replenishment as well as in terms of intra-organizational knowledge flows impacting the 
discovery of inventions (e.g., Argyres et al., 2012; Argyres & Zenger, 2012). Specifically, 
I explore the relationship between a firm’s internal organization design and the proportion 
of inventions in its pipeline that are sourced externally, and how this relationship varies 
with the mode of external sourcing. 
I argue that managers within decentralized Research and Development (R&D) units 
face greater pressures to ensure a steady flow of inventions for a specific business unit. 
They are thus more incentivized towards moving inventions through the development 
process rather than developing internal capabilities (DeSanctis et al., 2002). Sourcing 
inventions externally can help overcome internal capability constraints and ensure a steady 
flow in the pipeline (e.g., Leiblein & Miller, 2003). In contrast, centralized R&D units have 
greater freedom to work on cross-organizational technologies and build internal 
capabilities (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004). As a result, managers in decentralized R&D 
units are more likely to source inventions externally than those in centralized units. 
Moreover, given that this relationship is premised on accessing inventions rather than 
capabilities, I expect it to be primarily driven by differences in the propensities for licensing 
than those for alliances and acquisitions.  
I test these arguments within the context of the global pharmaceutical industry 
using a novel dataset of 12,016 drug candidates sourced or created by 49 leading firms over 
the period 1996-2015. I supplement this data with 61 interviews with managers from 28 of 
these firms to probe the mechanisms through which design choices can influence sourcing 
decisions and to validate the structural measures I utilize. This industry provides a suitable 
context for this study as the sourcing of externally created drug candidates for subsequent 
development by other firms is well-established (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2012; Rothaermel 
& Alexandre, 2009). Further, I am able to observe firms’ full drug development pipelines 
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over an extended period of time and develop specific measures of firms’ organization 
designs that enable me to test my theoretical arguments.  
On average, 37% of drug-candidates used to replenish firms’ pipelines in a typical 
year are sourced externally. Consistent with my arguments, this proportion is 35.6% for 
R&D organized in a centralized manner and 41.3% for when it is organized in a 
decentralized manner. This difference in the propensity to replenish pipelines via external 
inventions is confirmed via multivariate regression analysis. Further, this difference is 
driven by the propensity to license and not by the propensities for acquisitions and 
alliances, and by inventions of intermediate novelty. These results are robust to a variety 
of alternate specifications and strategies to control for omitted variable bias. 
 This study makes three primary contributions to the strategy and the innovation 
literatures. First, the study helps to extend the theoretical considerations associated with 
the make versus buy decision pertaining to inventions which firms subsequently develop 
into final products. I add to existing theory in this domain by highlighting that firms’ 
internal design can shape both managerial incentives and their firms’ invention creation 
capabilities which, in turn, influence the propensity of firms to source inventions 
externally. Further, in contrast to previous work that has tended to examine individual 
make-buy decisions in isolation, I argue that firms make this decision in the context of 
supplementing their stock of inventions and enhancing the flow of inventions through the 
development pipeline. Second, I build on recent work that has examined how firms’ 
internal design choices can shape their decision to source ideas externally or create them 
internally (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017; Leiponen & Helfat, 
2011). This study extends this work by providing a holistic theoretical perspective and by 
illustrating that design choices can also influence the mode through which firms source 
inventions as well as the novelty of inventions sourced. Third, this study suggests an 
important linkage between firms’ internal design and the composition of markets for 
technologies. This could prove fertile ground for future cross-industry studies. For 
example, do industries that have well-developed markets for technologies have a higher 
prevalence of firms with decentralized R&D, whereas those with thinner technology 
markets tend to have firms with centralized R&D units? 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Theoretical framework 
The innovation process can be divided into three stages (e.g., Garud et al., 2013). 
First, there is the act of invention (e.g., Arora et al., 2016; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). 
Invention involves the creation of novel ideas that in themselves are of limited economic 
value (Schumpeter, 1939). The key outputs of this stage are inventions, namely tangible 
ideas that need to be further developed. Second, development is focused on converting an 
invention into a final product that can yield commercial value. Third, there is market launch 
or commercialization, which relate to firms’ value appropriation from their developed 
offerings. In crafting the theoretical arguments, I focus upon the development stage of the 
innovation process.  
To ensure a continuous flow of new products to the market place, firms generally 
manage a development pipeline of inventions (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; Grönlund et al., 2010; 
Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014). As firms develop these inventions, some are ultimately 
unsuccessful, and some make it to market. As a result of this depletion of inventions in the 
pipeline, firms need to continually replenish their pipeline with new inventions. Firms can 
supplement their development pipeline with inventions that have been created through an 
internal invention process or can choose to bypass internal invention and source inventions 
externally via a variety of different modes such as licensing, acquisitions or alliances 
incorporating them directly into the internal development process (Arora, Fosuri, & 
Gambarella, 2001; Arora & Gambardella, 2010). In this study, I focus on the decision 
managers make as to where to source inventions to replenish their pipelines and how this 
may be influenced by their firms’ organization designs. 
Prior studies examining the decision by firms to source externally or make 
internally have tended to do so through two lenses. First, the focus of previous work has 
been at the individual transaction level neglecting the impact of firms’ existing pipelines 
of inventions (e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). Second, extant work has focused on a 
single locus of where these decisions are made in organizations (e.g., Weigelt & Miller, 
2013; Williamson, 1985a, b). However, otherwise identical firms may make very different 
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choices for a specific transaction if one has a depleted stock of inventions under 
development with limited flow as compared to another firm with a well-stocked and 
distributed pipeline. Further, firms may manage their pipeline of inventions as a single 
entity that feeds different businesses or firms may have multiple pipelines dedicated to 
different parts of the business meaning decisions to make or buy are dispersed. 
In developing my theoretical arguments, I build on prior work that highlights that 
the management of firms’ pipelines of inventions is generally undertaken by Research and 
Development (R&D) (e.g., Mikkola, 2001). I focus on how firms’ R&D designs can shape 
managers decisions with respect to how they replenish their invention pipelines. Firms can 
centralize R&D to obtain scale and scope benefits as well as undertake non-business unit 
specific R&D (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). 
Alternatively, firms can decentralize R&D to enable the R&D units to focus on business-
specific problems and be closer to end-markets and customers (e.g., Arora et al., 2014). 
Figure 6 illustrates these two differing designs. 
 
Figure 6: Two models of pipeline management associated with different R&D 
structures 
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R&D unit heads – Higher powered
Focus
(e.g., DeSanctis, Glass 
et al. 2002)
Build capabilities to facilitate the creation 
of inventions internally
Exploration focus
Deliver products to business tied to their 
specific needs
Exploitation focus
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In developing a set of hypotheses I draw on both knowledge- and incentives-based 
theories. Recently scholars have illustrated how these two broad theoretical areas can be 
integrated to provide rich insights into important organizational phenomena (e.g., Argyres 
et al., 2012). I argue that organization design can shape managerial incentives and intra-
organizational knowledge flows which in turn can shape how resources are allocated across 
internal and external invention activities. This ultimately shapes the proportion of 
inventions sourced externally for subsequent internal development by the focal firm. 
 
R&D decentralization and the sourcing of external inventions 
For the purposes of the theoretical development in this paper, a key difference 
between the two R&D designs is the level at which the pipeline of inventions is managed 
(Figure 6). In the centralized case, the Head of R&D typically manages the complete firm-
pipeline and guides R&D sub-unit leads to develop a variety of inventions. Due to this 
reduced control of R&D activities sub-unit heads in the centralized R&D model, these 
managers are more likely to have lower powered incentives (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; 
Bardolet et al., 2010). In contrast, in the decentralized R&D design, the R&D unit heads 
typically manage their own pipelines for their respective units, and due to the stronger 
linkage between effort, outcomes and consequences will tend to face higher-powered 
incentives (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). As highlighted by Adner and Levinthal (2004), the 
R&D unit heads in the decentralized design are likely to be unaware of the broader set of 
invention options available to the firm in contrast to the Head of R&D in the centralized 
design. They will also face greater career consequences from the failures associated with 
their specific units’ pipelines. In contrast, in the centralized R&D model, the Head of R&D 
benefits from the risk pooling associated with managing the entire firm’s pipeline of 
inventions (e.g., Hill & Hansen, 1991). In managing their pipelines, managers evaluate 
their firms’ capabilities in being able to create new inventions. They also track the stock of 
inventions in their pipelines and the distribution of inventions within the pipeline or flow 
of inventions through the pipeline i.e. how close or far to the market place they are (e.g., 
Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014; Nishimura & Okada, 2014).  
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In the decentralized R&D model, managers face greater pressure to ensure a steady 
flow of inventions to the market (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; DeSanctis et al., 2002). This is 
because such R&D units are designed to support their respective business units and are 
thus beholden to their respective business units for resources such as financial funding 
(e.g., Argyres, 1996; Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Commercial managers in these 
decentralized business units are reliant on the steady flow of inventions to market to ensure 
they receive sufficient resources to make their business units viable entities. These 
commercial managers will strongly influence R&D managers to ensure a steady flow of 
inventions to market rather than helping the R&D unit develop capabilities for internal 
creation of inventions (e.g., DeSanctis et al., 2002). This highlights the intricate inter-play 
between firms’ capabilities and managerial incentives (e.g., Argyres & Zenger, 2012). 
Finally, in firms with decentralized R&D, highly incentivized unit heads are less likely to 
share inventions as they are effectively competing against each other or do not want to 
expend resources sharing inventions with other units (e.g., Karim & Kaul, 2015). Thus 
managers in decentralized R&D units are less likely to have access to their firms’ full suite 
of inventions as unit heads will seek to secure more organizational resources for their own 
units by limiting access to their own units’ inventions. Similarly, unit managers may be 
less inclined to utilize other unit’s inventions for fear of being seen as reliant on these other 
units potentially limiting access to future resources or the longer term viability of the 
relevant business unit. This is akin to not invented here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
In contrast, within the centralized R&D model, R&D Heads manage their firms’ 
entire invention development pipelines. R&D Heads will tend to face less pressure from 
business units with respect to their innovation activities due to, for example, direct 
corporate funding or no direct reporting line of R&D to commercial functions (DeSanctis 
et al., 2002). As a result, heads of centralized R&D units are more able to focus on building 
cross-organizational inventions and technologies as well as internal capabilities associated 
with the creation of new inventions in the longer term (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; 
DeSanctis et al., 2002). Further, heads of centralized R&D units have greater discretion to 
reallocate resources across the complete organizational pipeline of inventions under 
development which helps to facilitate a steady flow of inventions to market. For example, 
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a firm with centralized R&D with four inventions in two areas A and B, two of which 
progress in area A and two fail in area B, may replenish the portfolio internally with two 
internal inventions, one from area A and one from area B. The Head of R&D may then 
reallocate resources from area B to A. In contrast, if the firm has two decentralized R&D 
units that focus on areas A and B and faces the same scenario, unit A has three inventions 
moving forward, whereas B only has one. Unit B faces a greater risk of eventually having 
no inventions in its pipeline (thereby losing future resources) and thus is more likely to 
source externally to bolster its thin pipeline. This steadier flow of inventions through the 
development process in centralized R&D units is also facilitated by the sharing of 
inventions across R&D sub-units. Managers of R&D sub-units within firms that have 
centralized R&D units will thus have greater access to their firms’ stock of inventions than 
managers within decentralized R&D units. 
These arguments indicate that managers within decentralized R&D units are more 
likely to replenish their pipelines of inventions with external inventions. This is because 
they are less incentivized to build internal capabilities associated with the creation of new 
inventions and are more focused on pushing inventions through development. External 
inventions provide a route to build both the stock and flow of inventions of decentralized 
R&D units’ pipelines. Further, managers in decentralized R&D units have reduced access 
to their firms’ broader internal invention stock for subsequent development also leading to 
them accessing relatively more external inventions. Effectively, creating inventions 
internally can take too long for heavily pressurized managers of decentralized R&D units 
and in order to meet on-going commercial needs, these managers look to source a greater 
proportion of inventions externally. Thus, at an overall firm level: 
H1: Firms with decentralized R&D will source a higher proportion of inventions 
externally than firms with centralized R&D.  
 
R&D decentralization and the mode of sourcing of inventions 
Firms can access inventions from external markets through a variety of modes such 
as alliances, acquisitions, and licensing (Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Van de Vrande, 
Lemmens, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006). These modes of sourcing external technologies are 
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associated with different degrees of investment and risk and can be used to help build 
capabilities or simply be used to introduce an invention that a firm subsequently develops 
and commercializes (e.g., Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). 
 As outlined above, the primary focus of managers within decentralized R&D units 
is upon invention development rather than capability building. In contrast, heads of 
centralized R&D units will tend to have a greater focus on capability development (e.g., 
Argyres, 1996; Argyres & Silverman, 2004). In addition, managers of decentralized R&D 
units will tend to have access to fewer resources than heads of centralized R&D units. This 
is because of a pooling of resources across the centralized R&D unit enables the Head of 
the R&D unit to focus these resources on the areas of most need of attention. Whereas in 
the decentralized R&D units, resources are dispersed across the organization with units 
actively competing for resources, potentially resulting in good invention projects 
potentially not securing sufficient resourcing. 
 Licensing new inventions involves low commitment and is generally reversible 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Licensing is also more transactional with limited knowledge 
sharing between the licensee and licensor and is thus primarily focused on providing firms 
with inventions to subsequently develop as opposed to building capabilities (Steensma & 
Corley, 2000). Licensing requires limited resources for their active management as 
inventions sourced in this manner can simply be slipped into firms’ pipelines (e.g., Deloitte, 
2017). Licensing could be seen as a low touch alliance, however for the purposes of this 
paper we define alliances as highly integrated arrangements in which firms work together 
to develop an invention. The structure of licensing agreements can also be highly flexible 
with multiple options available such as up-front payments, milestone payments as the 
invention meets specific development milestones and royalty payments based on a 
percentage of sales revenues or profits (e.g., Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2001; 
Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). 
In contrast, acquisitions and alliances with their associated richer knowledge-flows 
enable firms to build their capabilities (e.g., Sears & Hoetker, 2014; Steensma & Corley, 
2000). Acquisitions are associated with large up-front lump-sum cash or equity payments 
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which may be beyond the resources of an individual R&D unit and require cross-
organizational buy-in to ensure that a specific deal can go through. Alliances tend to be 
more resource-intensive in terms of administrative overhead as two separate organizations 
have to be coordinated and information needs to flow freely between both organizations 
which may require significant incremental effort (Steensma & Corley, 2000). Such 
resources may be beyond an individual business unit and managers of such units may need 
cross-organizational support to access the larger levels of resources required to undertake 
acquisitions or alliances. 
 Thus, licensing provides a low resource, low risk means through which managers 
in decentralized R&D units can access new inventions. Such licensed inventions can be 
readily utilized to improve both the stock of inventions to which a manager in a 
decentralized unit has access but also enables such managers to “plug gaps” in their 
invention development portfolios. Due to these specific advantages, unit heads of 
decentralized R&D units are more likely to choose licensing over acquisitions or alliances 
for sourcing inventions externally. Further, centralized R&D units focused on knowledge- 
and capability building will find acquisitions and alliances relatively more attractive than 
licensing. Compared to managers in decentralized R&D units, access to inventions through 
alliances and acquisitions may also be greater for centralized R&D heads. This is because 
with a focus on a firm’s entire development portfolio such centralized R&D heads can pool 
all their R&D resources and use these to access inventions through these more costly 
modes. In contrast, with resources dispersed across R&D units in a decentralized model, 
there is more of a challenge for managers in decentralized units to access sufficient 
resources to enable inventions to be sourced vial alliances or acquisitions. 
Thus, I hypothesize that the gap in the proportion of inventions sourced externally 
between firms with centralized and decentralized R&D is driven by licensing: 
H2: The difference in the proportion of inventions sourced externally between firms 
with decentralized R&D and centralized R&D will be greater for licensing as 
compared to acquisitions or alliances.  
 
 
 78 
 
Methods 
Research context 
The context for this study is the pharmaceutical industry over the 20-year period 
1995 to 2015. This industry has a well-established product development process consisting 
of a sequence of in-vitro discovery activities and in-vitro as well as in-vivo development 
tasks that consist of multiple phases of clinical trials (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; 
Petrova, 2014). During the development process drug-candidates are both tested for safety 
and efficacy and further developed through, for example, evaluation of their mechanisms 
of action and optimization of their delivery to target areas of patients’ bodies. In this study 
an invention is defined as a drug-candidate within a firm’s development pipeline ranging 
from pre-clinical to Phase 3 clinical trials (Petrova, 2014). Drug-candidates are largely 
patented (e.g., Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004) and 
represent a potential new offering that firms can launch into the relevant market. 
This context provides a rich domain for testing the hypotheses described above for 
three key reasons. First, there is an increasing dependence of pharmaceutical firms on 
external inventions created by a variety of organizations such as small entrepreneurial 
biotech companies and universities (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Pisano, 1991; 
Schweizer, 2005). In the sample used in this study, the rolling three-year average of the 
proportion of externally sourced drug-candidates increased from approximately 33 % in 
1996 to 40 % in 2015 (Figure 7).  
Second, external inventions can be sourced via multiple modes such as licensing, 
acquisitions, and alliances (Arora et al., 2001) enabling further analyses into which mode 
firms tend to select when sourcing inventions externally. Similarly inventions can be 
sourced at different stages of development. This is an important consideration, as generally 
internally developed drug-candidates have to go through the full gamut of discovery and 
development stages unless it is a drug-candidate developed previously being used in a new 
indication (i.e. to treat a different disease) whereas externally sourced drug-candidates can 
be acquired at later stages of development. However, as the risk associated with these later 
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stage drug-candidates not making it to market is significantly lower such drug-candidates 
are significantly more costly to obtain.  
 
Figure 7: Proportion of externally sourced drug candidates used to replenish firms’ 
pipelines (average across all firms in a focal year) over the period 1995-2015  
 
 
Finally, the conversion of drug-candidates into final marketed products forms the 
lifeblood of large global pharmaceutical companies ensuring that senior managers pay 
close attention to their drug development pipelines. With only a limited period of 
exclusivity afforded by patent protection, these firms are continuously looking to develop 
new drugs as well as examine new opportunities for drugs whose patents have expired such 
as new forms of drug delivery or new indications. This focus on new product development 
is illustrated by the large proportion of revenues that are dedicated to funding research and 
development compared to other industries, with healthcare R&D spending set to outstrip 
all other industries’ R&D spending in 2018 (Strategy &, 2016). 
Interviews (for further details refer to Data and Sample section) with R&D 
managers support the key assumption made within my theoretical argumentation that firms 
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with centralized R&D manage a single portfolio and firms with decentralized R&D split 
their portfolios across the various R&D units. For example: 
“Our three R&D units have separate business development activities and focus on 
optimizing their own pipelines though corporate business development can provide 
support to each of these units” 19 
“We tended to see each asset team [R&D unit] as a silo with limited communication 
across silos” 
 
Further, interviews with senior R&D and business development managers indicate 
that firms do not look at transactions associated with individual inventions in isolation but 
as part of their broader pipeline of inventions under development. For example: 
“The decision to source externally is moderately to strongly driven by gaps in the 
pipeline considered in the context of expected attrition rates and desired future 
product launches in the therapeutic areas of focus” 
 
Data and sample 
In this study I use a mixed methods approach to test the hypotheses and understand 
their underlying mechanisms (Creswell & Clark, 2011). The sample consists of 49 leading 
pharmaceutical firms over the period 1995 to 2015. The sample is developed using 2004-
6 annual prescription drug sales as defined by the Pharmaceutical Executive magazine’s 
Top 50 Pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Klueter et al., 2017). Over this period, 64 firms 
appear in the Top 50 list. The 15 excluded firms are either private firms or do not provide 
sufficient information on key variables in their public filings. These excluded firms are in 
the lower half (26-50 ranking in terms of pharmaceutical sales) in one or more of the three 
years in the 2004-6 period. Using the mid-point of the sample enables the examination of 
firms that have at least 10 years of history within the sample time-frame prior to any 
significant M&A event. 33 out of the 49 sample firms are still in the top 50 pharmaceutical 
firms in 2015, 13 firms had been acquired by other firms in the sample and 3 firms had 
                                                 
19 Due to confidentiality agreements with firms interviewed we are unable to reveal the specific sources of these quotations. 
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divested their pharmaceutical businesses. Upon acquisition or divestment of their 
pharmaceutical business these 16 firms dropped out of the sample.   
The dataset consists of 12,016 drug-candidates entering the sample firms’ pipelines 
over the period 1996-2015. 1995 data is used to create one-year lagged values for some of 
the variables. The primary data is sourced from the Pharmaprojects clinical trial database 
(e.g., Chandy et al., 2006; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). This database provides an overview 
of the drug development pipelines of large pharmaceutical and smaller biotechnology firms 
highlighting variables such as the stage of clinical development per calendar year, the 
therapeutic class of the drug-candidate, whether the firm developing the drug is an 
originator or licensee and more technical aspects such as the mode of action of the focal 
drug. 
This data is supplemented with patent data from the European Patent Office Patstat 
database (e.g., Conti et al., 2013), company annual reports/financial filings and financial 
data from Compustat. The unit of analysis is the firm-year, with the proportion of drug 
candidates in various categories entering firms’ invention development pipelines being the 
dependent variables in this study (see below for further details).  
To enrich the quantitative analysis, 61 interviews were conducted with managers 
within 28 firms from the sample and with multiple industry experts. The managers 
interviewed were senior level R&D or strategy managers who had a good understanding 
of the internal creation and external sourcing of drug-candidates through multiple modes 
(e.g. M&A, acquisition of single drug-candidate and alliances). The focus of the interviews 
was around understanding the factors that shape the decision to source drug-candidates 
externally or create them internally, identifying which parts of the organization are 
responsible for making such decisions and validating the organization design measures,. 
The interviews were conducted via teleconference and each interview typically lasted 
between 30 and 90 minutes with outline questions distributed to the respondents in advance 
to enable suitable preparation. In some cases, follow-up clarification questions were 
conducted post-interview through email. See Appendix 3 for more details. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable:  To test Hypothesis 1, the key dependent variable pertains to 
the proportion of inventions entering a firm’s development pipeline sourced externally in 
a focal year (external). Defining whether a drug-candidate is internally created or 
externally sourced using the Pharmaprojects database requires a careful assessment of 
individual deals between firms in which an individual drug candidate may be sold to 
another firm, a firm may acquire or merge with another firm or drug-candidates may be 
developed through alliances with other firms or through licensing agreements.  
A structured process is followed to determine this key variable. First, the originators 
and licensees of each drug-candidate provided by the Pharmaprojects database are 
examined to provide an initial indication of whether a drug is internally developed or 
licensed from another firm. Second, to ensure that a drug candidate is allocated to the 
appropriate firm, other drug candidate transactions not captured by Pharmaprojects are 
examined using the Recap database to ensure that the allocated originators for a specific 
drug-candidate did originally create the invention. The Recap database provides a 
comprehensive database of key transactions between firms at both the overall 
organizational level (i.e. mergers and acquisitions) and at the individual drug level. Further 
details on the origin of the drug candidate are available from the “Overview” section of the 
Pharmaprojects database. This information can be used to help further validate whether a 
drug-candidate was created by the allocated originator or sourced via an acquisition or 
alliance. If no evidence was obtained from either Recap or the “Overview” section that a 
drug-candidate was sourced externally then it was designated as internally created. Further, 
if the drug-candidate was externally sourced, drug-candidates were then allocated to one 
of three sub-categories (acquisition, alliance, licensed) based on the information from the 
Recap database and the “Overview” section of the Pharmaprojects database. See Appendix 
2 for more details. 
To test Hypothesis 2, three related dependent variables are developed; the 
proportion of drug-candidates sourced via licensing (license), via acquisition (acquisition) 
and alliances (alliance). These variables are estimated by dividing the number of drug-
candidates entering a firm’s pipeline in a focal year via a particular external mode by the 
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total number of drug-candidates entering a firm’s pipeline in that year. Acquisition refers 
to whether a drug-candidate enters a firm’s pipeline via acquisition of a complete firm or a 
single drug-candidate. 
In a supplemental analysis three related dependent variables are developed that 
measure the proportion of externally-sourced drug candidates that fall into different novelty 
categories. Two approaches are used to estimate the degree of novelty of the drug-
candidates. First, I develop a variable which takes on the value of 0, 1 or 2, with the higher 
the number the higher the degree of novelty of the drug candidate (Klueter, 2013). If the 
mechanism of action and origin of material in the broad therapeutic domain are new to the 
firm the value is set at 2, if one of these is new it is set as 1, and if neither are new it is set 
to 0. The proportion of externally sourced drug candidates with novelty values 0 (low 
novelty), 1 (medium novelty) and 2 (high novelty) are estimated for each firm-year. In the 
second approach, I measure the proportion of drug-candidates that are sourced externally 
that are new chemical entities (nce) and the proportion of externally sourced drug-
candidates that are not new chemical entities (non-nce). New chemical entities (NCE) 
include no component that has been previously approved by the FDA. NCE designation 
from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides firms with five years of 
marketing exclusivity. 
 
Independent Variables: To test the two hypotheses, a single independent variable 
is developed, R&D Decentralization (more details are provided in Appendix 2). This 
measure estimates the degree of decentralization of R&D across various domains (e.g. 
therapeutic or scientific areas) and is determined by examining whether firms’ R&D or 
Research (in the case of functionally separate R&D) is organized into a single or multiple 
units. This is determined through a careful evaluation of company’s annual reports, 10-Ks, 
20-Fs and DEF 14As. These data sources are used to develop a database of 15,129 
executive and extended executive team roles for the sample of 49 firms over the period 
1995-2015. This results in a total of 898 firm-years of data and an average of 16.8 executive 
and extended executive roles per firm-year (standard deviation = 11.1). For diversified 
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firms which operate beyond pharmaceuticals, R&D units that pertain to pharmaceuticals 
were focused upon and R&D units dedicated to areas such as consumer products were 
excluded. This method of developing structural measures is consistent with recent 
empirical approaches using Top Management Team (TMT) data to examine how firms’ 
design choices influence a variety of organizational outcomes (e.g., Albert, 2018; Girod & 
Whittington, 2015; Guadalupe et al., 2014). 
The variable R&D Decentralization is defined as a binary variable set to 1 if there 
are multiple R&D or research groups reporting to separate heads within the TMT covering 
different domains or to leads of business units within the pharmaceutical domain and 0 if 
the firm has a single centralized R&D or research group reporting to a single TMT lead. I 
recognize that firms can have hybrid R&D structures which are partially centralized or 
decentralized (Argyres & Silverman, 2004). However, this measure is intended to 
dichotomize whether firms’ R&D units are more or less decentralized. I recognize that this 
measure does potentially suffer from some limitations but interviews with R&D managers 
in a sub-sample of firms indicated that the measure I use is indicative of firms’ R&D 
structures. 
 
Control Variables:  The control variables and justification for their use are 
summarized in Table 10. Five sets of control variables are used in the regression analyses. 
First, additional structural design controls are used at the firm-year level such as the degree 
of corporate decentralization of the firm. Second, a variety of firm-specific controls such 
as R&D intensity and the stock of patents are utilized. Third, the degree of market 
competition firms’ face in their respective therapeutic areas of focus is also controlled for. 
Fourth, controls pertaining to the degree of diversification of the firm across therapeutic 
classes in its invention pipeline as well as its overall business are estimated. Finally, a series 
of controls are used relating to the properties of firms’ drug-candidate pipelines under 
development. A variety of fixed effects are used to control for other sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity. These fixed effects controls include year, therapeutic category and business 
category.  
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Table 10: Summary of control variables used in this study 
Variable  Description Rationale 
1. Organizational Design controls (non-lagged, use one-year lagged as robustness test) 
R&D functional 
Differentiation 
This variable represents whether firms’ research 
and development units are integrated across both 
functions -research and development or are 
separated into individual research and 
development units. This is developed using 
companies’ TMT compositions and set to 0 if 
R&D is functionally integrated under a single 
Head or 1 if it is functionally disintegrated into 
separate research and development units with 
separate heads in the top management team. 
Firms with separate research and 
development units may have different 
preferences for sourcing drug-candidates 
externally. For example, separate research 
units may have a greater preference for 
creating inventions internally thereby 
leveraging their key resources and 
capabilities. In contrast in a functionally 
integrated R&D unit, there may be more 
pressure from development to source 
inventions externally. 
Corporate 
Decentralization 
This variable represents whether a firm is more 
functionally aligned or more divisionally 
aligned. This variable is estimated using the 
composition of firms’ TMTs (excluding CEO) 
and dividing the number of business unit leads 
by the total size of the top management team. 
The greater the value of this variable, the more 
decentralized a firm (Albert, 2018). 
More decentralized firms with multiple 
business units with well-defined innovation 
targets may place more pressure on R&D 
to build the stock and flow of their 
pipelines driving up the likelihood of 
replenishing the pipeline with externally 
sourced inventions. 
Business 
Development 
Role 
A dummy set to 1 if the focal firm has a business 
development manager role within the top 
management team in the relevant year. 
Firms with dedicated business development 
units may have access to more external 
sourcing opportunities. 
2. Firm-level controls (lagged one year) 
Performance  The annual return on assets of the firm (Richard 
et al., 2009)  
Higher performing firms may potentially 
develop a higher volume of innovations 
R&D Intensity  The annual spend on R&D by a firm as a 
proportion of annual revenues  
Firms that spend a higher proportion of 
their sales on R&D may potentially see 
higher inventive and innovative output 
internally (e.g., Mairesse & Mohnen, 
2005).   
SG&A Natural log of a firm’s selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses  
Potentially those firms with higher values 
of SG&A are more innovation focused and 
need to spend more on sales expenses to 
educate customers about the benefits of 
their new products.   
Size  Natural log of the annual sales of each firm in 
the study sample 
Larger firms may potentially generate more 
innovation outputs as they have access to 
more resources such as a broader 
knowledge base. They are also likely to be 
more differentiated. 
Slack Current Ratio Prior studies have indicated greater slack 
may help to drive the development of new 
technologies (Greve, 2003).   
New CEO A dummy variable set to 1 if a new CEO was 
appointed in a specific firm-year 
May be the catalyst for a reorganization or 
uptick in performance through, for 
example, accelerated sourcing of external 
drug candidates. 
Total Patent 
Stock 
Discounted total quantity of patent families 
granted by focal firm (Arora et al., 2014). A 15 
% discount rate is used. Similar “stock” 
measures of a firm’s experience in a specific 
knowledge domain have been used in prior 
studies (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010). 
Controls for firms’ existing knowledge 
collected over a period of time which will 
impact whether firms decide to make or 
buy a specific invention. Also helps to 
control for firms’ internal inventive 
capability. 
Patent family 
count 
Number of patent families filed by firm in a 
specific focal year (e.g., Arora et al., 2014) 
Firms filing more patents may be less 
likely to source inventions externally as 
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Variable  Description Rationale 
they may have a more readily available 
source of internal inventions. 
3. Competition controls (lagged one year) 
Competition  Measure of competition firms face across their 
development portfolios. Sum of squared market 
shares (by drug-candidate count) of drug-
candidates within all development phases per 
therapeutic class weighted by contribution to 
portfolio (i.e. proportion of firms’ portfolio a 
therapeutic class represents across all phases) 
subtracted from 1. Higher value signifies firms 
operate in more competitive therapeutic classes 
Controls for the degree of competition 
firms face across their portfolio of drug-
candidates. Firms in more competitive 
markets may be incentivized to innovate 
and organize differently, also competition 
for external drug candidates could be 
greater limiting supply of available 
candidates. 
4. Diversification Controls (lagged one year) 
SBU Reflects the total number of business units 
within a firm – namely the number of operating 
segments that report separate financials 
statements in their annual reporting documents 
Controls for general firm diversification. 
More diversified firms may limit R&D in 
pharmaceuticals and rely more on external 
sourcing of inventions. International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 820 
requires that firms disclose information 
about their operating segments, these 
represent distinct profit centers within a 
firm and are used by senior management to 
make strategic decisions.  
Technical 
Diversification 
Measure of technological diversity of firms’ 
R&D efforts. This is estimated using the sum of 
the squared proportions of drug candidates in 
each therapeutic class in a firm’s portfolio within 
a focal year and subtracted from 1. The larger the 
value the more diversified a firm’s portfolio is 
across therapeutic classes in a specific year. 
Controls for the level of technological 
diversity of a firm’s R&D activities. Firms 
undertaking a broader array of 
technological activities are more likely to 
differentiate their R&D efforts (either by 
technical domain or function) as well as 
fragment into more business units, 
potentially increasing the likelihood of 
externally sourcing drug candidates. Also 
firms will have a broader range of technical 
knowledge from which to draw. 
Category 
Dummy Fixed 
Effects 
Series of dummy variables representing whether 
a firm has operating segments in categories 
beyond pharmaceuticals. Specifically: consumer 
goods, medical devices, animal medication, bulk 
chemicals, nutrition. Also have dummy if firm 
has a generics business. These can vary by firm-
year as firm acquires or divests specific 
businesses. 
Control for diversification of firms’ 
businesses beyond pharmaceuticals 
5. Portfolio level controls (lagged one year) 
Clinical 
Experience 
Total stock of clinical trials across all phases 
estimated using the methodology described by 
Macher and Boerner (2012). However, the total 
stock of clinical trials (not just successful trials) 
across pre-clinical to phase 3 is used with a 15 % 
discount rate. 
Greater clinical trial experience in a 
therapeutic class may be another form of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) that may influence the make versus 
buy decision. 
Internal Overall 
Portfolio 
Total number of internally-sourced drug-
candidates across all therapeutic classes. 
Controls for the size of the existing 
portfolio and whether firms have a 
proclivity to source externally External 
Overall 
Portfolio 
Total number of externally-sourced drug-
candidates across all therapeutic classes. 
Bio Proportion of firms’ portfolio that are 
biotechnology candidates. 
Firms focusing on biotechnology may 
source more externally due to access to 
many biotechnology start-ups. 
                                                 
20 https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs8 
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Variable  Description Rationale 
Therapeutic 
Category Fixed 
effects 
Series of dummies for each therapeutic category 
indicating whether a firm is actively developing 
drugs in this therapeutic category. 
 
6. Other Controls 
Year fixed 
effects 
Series of dummies for each year in sample  
 
Analysis approach.   
As the dependent variables are proportions and bounded between 0 and 1, I use the 
fractional logit analytical approach to test all three hypotheses (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996; 
Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). I also use linear probability models for some robustness tests. 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity a variety of fixed effects are used such as business 
category and in some robustness tests, firm-fixed effects. Due to the fact that many firms 
do not change their R&D organizational structures significantly over time (31 out of 49 
firms in the sample maintained the same structure), firm fixed effects significantly reduce 
the statistical power associated with testing Hypotheses 1 to 3.  
To further control for omitted variable bias, I also test our hypotheses using 
propensity score matching models – PSM (e.g., Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Such an 
approach uses matched samples of observations for decentralized and centralized R&D 
based on the control variables outlined in Table 10. This helps to reduce the possibility that 
the results are driven by the inherent differences between firms with decentralized and less 
decentralized R&D as regular regressions are estimated only on observably equivalent 
groups. In addition, I also undertake Coarsened Exact matching (CEM) as a further 
robustness test of the hypotheses (Iacus et al., 2011).21 Again I match firm-years using all 
covariates in Table 10 as for the propensity score matching analysis. These variables are 
coarsened into 2-5 strata. Observations for firms with centralized and decentralized R&D 
are then matched using the coarsened values of these covariates. Observations are dropped 
from the sample if there are no corresponding observations associated with the other R&D 
design in a strata associated with any covariate in the initial matching step. I then conduct 
                                                 
21 We use the cem STATA Routine (http://gking.harvard.edu/cem) to perform this analysis. 
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the regression analyses on these matched observations. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-level (Petersen, 2009). Appendix 5 provides further details on the matching process. 
To test Hypothesis 2, separate regressions are run for the three dependent variables 
associated with this hypothesis (i.e. H2: license, acquisition and alliance). Wald tests are 
then conducted to test whether the coefficients for each of the three models for the variable 
R&D Decentralization associated with Hypothesis 2 are equal.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 11 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the sample of firm-years in this 
study. 37 % of drug-candidate inventions entering a firm’s portfolio are externally sourced 
over this period. This level of external sourcing of drug candidates is consistent with other 
studies of the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Pfrang, Dealhoy, 
Heller, & Shah, 2017). Figure 7 illustrates that there has been a moderate increase in the 
proportion of externally sourced inventions over this time period. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, the proportion of drug-candidates sourced externally is 35.6% for R&D 
organized in a centralized manner and 41.3% for when it is organized in a decentralized 
manner. From Table 11, it can also be seen that licensing is the main mode through which 
external drug candidates are sourced, followed by alliances and acquisitions. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, I observe a strong correlation between the proportion of drug-candidates 
sourced by licensing and R&D decentralization. I also observe that as the novelty of drug-
candidates increases the proportion of drug-candidates sourced externally increases. 
 12.6 % of firm-year observations have decentralized R&D units, with 29.1 % of 
these observations having a business development role within the top management team. 
The prevalence of Business development roles within the top management team has 
increased substantially from 12 % of firms in 1995 to 41 % of firms in 2015. It appears that 
as sourcing of external drug-candidates becomes increasingly important for firms, firms 
have decided to build their associated capabilities associated with sourcing external 
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inventions through creating dedicated business development units (e.g., Kale, Dyer, & 
Singh, 2002). Appendix 4 provides further details on the descriptive statistics results. 
 
Main analysis 
Table 12 illustrates the main analyses used to test Hypothesis 1. We observe that 
firms with a higher number of internal inventions within their pipelines, facing more 
competitive markets in their respective therapeutic areas and with more novel portfolios 
are less likely to source inventions externally. It seems that firms which have historically 
developed more internal inventions will continue to do so. Further, potentially firms 
operating in more competitive markets have less access to external inventions as there are 
simply more buyers for these technologies and as a result firms may have to rely more on 
creating inventions internally. Models 2 and 3 provide some tentative evidence to support 
Hypothesis 1 with the coefficient for R&D Decentralization being marginally significant 
(0.05<p<0.1) in the fractional logit model (Model 2) and marginally insignificant 
(0.1<p<0.11) in the linear probability model (Model 3). Using both PSM (both caliper and 
nearest neighbor) and CEM, we see stronger support for Hypothesis 1 in that firms with 
decentralized R&D units tend to be associated with sourcing a greater proportion of 
external inventions. Using the matched samples, we find that the proportion of externally 
sourced inventions for firms with decentralized R&D is 43 % as compared to 38 % for 
firms with centralized R&D, a difference of five percentage points, consistent with the 
descriptive statistics outlined above. 
Table 13 illustrates the analyses undertaken to test Hypothesis 2. It appears that 
firms with a larger internal pipeline of inventions source a lower proportion of inventions 
through alliances and acquisitions, but not through licensing. Similarly, firms with more 
novel pipelines appear to be associated with sourcing fewer inventions through acquisitions 
and licensing but not alliances. This is not unsurprising as firms are more likely to form 
alliances to create more novel inventions due to the rich knowledge transfer between 
organizations (e.g., Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2007).
  
 
9
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics (unit of analysis drug candidate-year). N=808 firm-years 
Variable MEAN SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1.External 0.370 0.224 1.00                           
2.License 0.160 0.159 0.51 1.00                          
3.Alliance 0.120 0.144 0.42 -0.19 1.00                         
4.Acquisition 0.091 0.155 0.53 -0.11 -0.13 1.00                        
5.Low Novelty 0.390 0.317 0.61 0.27 0.24 0.32 1.00                       
6.Medium Novelty 0.474 0.296 0.72 0.30 0.28 0.39 0.26 1.00                      
7.High Novelty 0.591 0.419 0.47 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.24 1.00                     
8.R&D Decentralization 0.126 0.332 0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.04 0.12 0.07 -0.04 1.00                    
9.R&D functional differentiation 0.225 0.418 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 1.00                   
10.Corporate Decentralization 0.260 0.244 0.04 0.17 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.16 1.00                  
11.Business Development Role 0.291 0.454 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.06 1.00                 
12.Performance 0.079 0.088 -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 1.00                
13.R&D Intensity 0.179 0.221 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.15 -0.19 0.11 -0.54 1.00               
14.SG&A 7.875 1.374 0.06 0.12 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.09 0.25 -0.10 1.00              
15.Size 8.693 1.484 0.06 0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.16 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.17 0.03 0.37 -0.37 0.91 1.00             
16.Slack 2.491 1.684 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.17 -0.21 -0.03 -0.09 0.30 -0.40 -0.49 1.00            
17.New CEO 0.113 0.316 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.04 1.00           
18.Total Patent Stock 1.487 1.897 0.05 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.72 0.68 -0.24 0.03 1.00          
19.Patent Family Count 0.232 0.250 0.05 0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.20 -0.11 0.67 0.64 -0.27 0.02 0.74 1.00         
20.Competition 0.959 0.028 -0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.15 0.00 0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.16 -0.06 -0.18 0.05 -0.56 -0.51 0.23 -0.01 -0.61 -0.59 1.00        
21.SBU 2.479 1.282 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.29 -0.08 -0.14 -0.24 0.01 0.09 -0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.11 -0.00 1.00       
22.Technical Diversification 0.749 0.178 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.25 -0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.07 -0.02 0.48 0.42 -0.23 0.02 0.33 0.43 -0.34 0.16 1.00      
23.Clinical Experience 0.333 0.330 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.18 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.13 0.19 -0.05 0.76 0.70 -0.29 0.04 0.87 0.72 -0.72 0.05 0.42 1.00     
24.Internal Overall Portfolio 35.627 37.665 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 -0.29 -0.14 0.05 -0.02 0.20 0.07 0.20 -0.05 0.65 0.59 -0.30 0.06 0.63 0.74 -0.74 0.05 0.47 0.81 1.00    
25.External Overall Portfolio 30.296 27.790 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.06 -0.05 -0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.16 0.06 0.21 -0.06 0.70 0.64 -0.28 0.05 0.70 0.69 -0.73 0.01 0.42 0.87 0.79 1.00   
26.Portfolio Novelty 1.024 0.245 -0.11 -0.15 0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.00 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 0.08 -0.69 -0.67 0.34 -0.03 -0.60 -0.53 0.56 -0.01 -0.39 -0.67 -0.56 -0.61 1.00  
27.Bio 0.242 0.195 0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 0.13 0.07 -0.10 0.14 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 -0.12 -0.35 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 1.00 
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In Table 13 I observe that the difference in the proportion of inventions sourced by 
different modes between firms with centralized and decentralized R&D units is only 
significant for licensing and not for acquisitions and alliances. Comparing the coefficients 
for R&D Decentralization across models, I find that the coefficient is higher for licensing 
as compared to both alliances and acquisitions (p < 0.001) consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
Using propensity score matching I observe that the proportion of drug-candidates 
sourced via licensing is five percentage points higher for firms with decentralized R&D as 
compared to firms with centralized R&D units. Thus licensing appears to be responsible 
for the full difference in the proportion of inventions sourced externally between firms with 
centralized and decentralized R&D units described in Hypothesis 1.  
The interviews with pharmaceutical company executives provide some support to 
suggest that the decision to source inventions externally through licensing could be 
undertaken at an R&D unit level, whereas bigger deals such as acquisition require cross-
organizational support and sign-off. For example: 
“Deals to obtain external drug candidates can vary tremendously in size. Smaller 
decisions such as licensing deals can be made at the local R&D unit level, whereas 
major acquisitions go all the way up to the board” 
 “The decision-making and process and governing body varies with the stage and 
size of the deal…For much smaller collaborations/deals approvals can be 
delegated to R&D Managers 2-3 levels below the CEO” 
 
Thus it appears that for licensing, especially for early development stage drug-
candidates, the decision can be made at an individual unit level, thereby explaining the 
greater preponderance for licensing when R&D is decentralized but no differences in 
alliances and acquisitions. Therefore, licensing enables the focal firm to more immediately 
supplement its portfolio than alliances or acquisitions as partners have to be 
engaged/integrated and the way of operating agreed which can cause potential delays and 
complications in converting the drug-candidate into a final product. In contrast, drug-
candidates sourced via licensing can more readily be incorporated into a firm’s pipeline 
and potentially be able to be converted into final products in a more timely manner.  
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Table 12: Main analysis - tests of Hypothesis 1. Fractional Logit (FL) and OLS 
regressions. Sample drops from 808 to 769 due to lagging of independent variables by 
one-year 
 
DV = External Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Type of Model FL FL OLS FL PSM CEM OLS 
R&D Decentralization  0.172+ 0.0387 0.227* 0.0673** 
  (0.0984) (0.0237) (0.0951) (0.0207) 
      
R&D Functional Differentiation  -0.105 -0.0213 -0.0259 -0.0590* 
  (0.0646) (0.0151) (0.188) (0.0234) 
Corporate Decentralization  0.244 0.0623+ -0.584+ 0.0992+ 
  (0.154) (0.0350) (0.312) (0.0535) 
Business Development Role 0.0510 0.0214 0.00908 -0.0392 0.0243 
 (0.0740) (0.0747) (0.0170) (0.169) (0.0200) 
      
Performance -0.358 -0.357 -0.0747 2.701** 0.235 
 (0.639) (0.634) (0.143) (0.712) (0.219) 
R&D Intensity -0.0914 -0.106 -0.0225 0.640+ 0.120 
 (0.242) (0.235) (0.0524) (0.360) (0.163) 
SG&A -0.0767 -0.0654 -0.0150 -0.196 -0.0659+ 
 (0.0843) (0.0853) (0.0188) (0.169) (0.0371) 
Size 0.130 0.119 0.0278 0.237 0.0557 
 (0.0995) (0.102) (0.0226) (0.204) (0.0396) 
Slack 0.0229 0.0296 0.00725 -0.125 0.00414 
 (0.0350) (0.0354) (0.00793) (0.0831) (0.0124) 
New CEO -0.200* -0.199* -0.0421+ 0.423* -0.0853* 
 (0.0945) (0.0969) (0.0220) (0.173) (0.0409) 
Total Patent Stock -0.0329 -0.00128 -0.00197 -0.0300 0.0386+ 
 (0.0489) (0.0509) (0.0114) (0.0819) (0.0215) 
Patent Family Count 0.136 0.103 0.0200 -0.900* -0.128 
 (0.293) (0.308) (0.0706) (0.404) (0.104) 
      
Competition -4.911+ -5.180+ -1.130 -11.16+ -0.664 
 (2.751) (2.813) (0.681) (6.300) (0.944) 
      
SBU 0.0107 -0.0466 -0.0499 74.36 -0.0420 
 (0.0955) (0.104) (0.0345) (63.50) (0.0353) 
Technical Differentiation -0.188 -0.204 -0.0497 2.937** 0.0334 
 (0.410) (0.396) (0.0824) (0.851) (0.161) 
      
Clinical Experience -0.363 -0.537 -0.119 -0.169 -0.134 
 (0.369) (0.393) (0.0798) (0.540) (0.125) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00895** -0.00829** -0.00187** -0.00945** -0.00207* 
 (0.00205) (0.00211) (0.000478) (0.00331) (0.000776) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00817* 0.00850* 0.00189* -0.00185 0.00254* 
 (0.00340) (0.00352) (0.000808) (0.00570) (0.000983) 
Portfolio Novelty -1.081** -1.002** -0.227** -1.238* -0.120 
 (0.383) (0.367) (0.0782) (0.576) (0.0913) 
Bio 0.249 0.315 0.0664 0.0563 0.0813 
 (0.301) (0.288) (0.0667) (0.780) (0.118) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 769 769 769 165 486 
R2 0.0305 0.0314 0.198 0.0777 0.330 
Log Likelihood -489.6 -489.1 163.8 -109.7 198.2 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
FL – Fractional Logit, PSM – Propensity Score Matching; CEM – Coarsened Exact Matching  
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Table 13: Main analysis - tests of Hypothesis 2. Sample drops from 808 to 769 due to 
lagging of variables by one-year. DVs proportion of drug candidates sourced via 
mode 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Acquisition Alliance License 
Type of Model FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
R&D  -0.0781 -0.627 -0.00089 -0.152 -0.216 -0.0259 0.360** 0.448** 0.111** 
Decentralization (0.221) (0.393) (0.0189) (0.136) (0.166) (0.0155) (0.125) (0.158) (0.0174) 
R&D Functional  -0.255 -0.471 -0.0258 0.132 0.979** 0.00823 -0.134 -0.567+ -0.0610* 
Differentiation (0.186) (0.594) (0.0250) (0.128) (0.364) (0.0239) (0.129) (0.299) (0.0266) 
Corporate  -0.214 -0.546 -0.0217 0.0452 -0.959* 0.0553 0.665** 0.188 0.0807* 
Decentralization (0.353) (0.804) (0.0394) (0.255) (0.453) (0.0415) (0.220) (0.661) (0.0306) 
Business  -0.0314 -0.779 -0.00433 -0.0687 -0.408+ -0.00165 0.112 0.0826 0.0222 
Development Role (0.153) (0.492) (0.0166) (0.130) (0.246) (0.0167) (0.113) (0.253) (0.0198) 
Performance -0.695 2.947 0.0929 0.263 -0.726 0.0515 -0.399 4.401** 0.0855 
 (1.202) (2.127) (0.194) (0.770) (1.458) (0.119) (0.676) (1.535) (0.117) 
R&D Intensity 0.0933 0.343 0.0947 0.467 -1.351 0.146 -0.713+ 2.404* -0.156 
 (0.362) (1.216) (0.148) (0.308) (1.136) (0.109) (0.383) (1.095) (0.148) 
SG&A -0.148 0.639 -0.00358 0.0964 0.0930 -0.00727 -0.118 -0.666** -0.0406 
 (0.170) (0.625) (0.0288) (0.122) (0.306) (0.0224) (0.164) (0.228) (0.0303) 
Size 0.0549 -0.950 -0.0331 0.209+ -0.0483 0.0428+ -0.00459 0.653* 0.0223 
 (0.208) (0.650) (0.0328) (0.127) (0.278) (0.0239) (0.161) (0.263) (0.0307) 
Slack 0.0681 0.0392 0.0108 -0.00379 0.0627 0.00568 0.00337 -0.0628 -0.00579 
 (0.0460) (0.167) (0.0096) (0.0569) (0.119) (0.0096) (0.0461) (0.0864) (0.0086) 
New CEO -0.466+ 0.355 -0.120* 0.0316 0.410 -0.0823+ -0.0805 0.0689 0.114** 
 (0.266) (0.529) (0.0516) (0.163) (0.360) (0.0463) (0.106) (0.270) (0.0407) 
Total Patent Stock 0.130 -0.207 0.0164 -0.108 -0.286* -0.00322 0.0209 0.0991 0.0150 
 (0.0808) (0.235) (0.0108) (0.0884) (0.144) (0.0079) (0.0609) (0.168) (0.0122) 
Patent Family Count -0.852 -0.0514 -0.0761 -0.221 -0.580 -0.0295 0.626 -0.573 -0.0147 
 (0.527) (1.113) (0.0717) (0.356) (0.860) (0.0448) (0.407) (0.797) (0.0732) 
Competition -13.77** -2.425 -0.0769 1.872 -20.34+ -0.346 8.247* -1.402 0.919 
 (4.026) (11.10) (1.277) (3.081) (10.59) (0.683) (3.324) (7.920) (0.965) 
SBU -1.692 489.9** -0.105** 0.165 -41.07 0.0518+ -0.920** -310.1** 0.0102 
 (1.372) (71.68) (0.0344) (0.339) (62.40) (0.0300) (0.278) (61.78) (0.0338) 
Technical  -0.806 -3.880 0.0259 1.127 8.168** 0.0383 -0.517 3.548 -0.00980 
Differentiation (0.861) (2.392) (0.0920) (0.871) (2.389) (0.101) (0.666) (2.286) (0.116) 
Clinical Experience -0.780 1.357 -0.104 0.612 3.736** -0.0697 -0.625+ -1.251 0.0345 
 (0.642) (2.151) (0.110) (0.678) (1.180) (0.0805) (0.335) (0.937) (0.0982) 
Internal  -0.0146** -0.0229* -0.0013+ -0.0070** -0.0217* -0.00043 0.00284 0.00318 0.000938 
Overall Portfolio (0.0049) (0.0111) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0057) (0.0007) 
External  0.0159* 0.0348** 0.00300* 0.00468 -0.0259* 0.00115 0.00369 0.00362 -0.00061 
Overall Portfolio (0.0079) (0.0132) (0.0011) (0.006) (0.0129) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0099) (0.0007) 
Portfolio Novelty -1.875** -0.533 -0.271** 0.278 1.024 0.106 -0.744+ -0.845 0.00894 
 (0.571) (1.414) (0.0750) (0.598) (0.971) (0.106) (0.440) (0.906) (0.0669) 
Bio -0.214 -2.164 0.0919 1.116* 3.993** -0.0329 -0.0492 -0.503 0.0361 
 (0.555) (1.620) (0.0936) (0.516) (1.165) (0.0773) (0.399) (1.322) (0.0686) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Cat. 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 769 158 454 769 158 454 769 158 454 
R2 0.0882 0.220 0.331 0.0739 0.155 0.430 0.0468 0.0962 0.406 
Log Likelihood -211.7 -42.11 322.4 -258.2 -51.57 402.2 -320.1 -73.88 365.3 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level. 
PSM – Propensity Score Matching, FL – Fractional Logit, CEM – Coarsened Exact Matching 
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Robustness tests 
I undertake three separate robustness tests of our main results. Further details are 
provided in Appendix 6. First, I lag all three of the structural variables (R&D 
Centralization, R&D Functional Differentiation and Organizational Decentralization) 
one-year. This is undertaken because the decision to source internally or externally may 
take an extended period of time. Using the lagged variables I observe the same results as 
my main results for Hypothesis 1, with the coefficient for R&D Decentralization (lagged) 
being 0.18 (p <0.05) as compared to 0.227 for the non-lagged analysis as illustrated in 
Table 40 (Appendix 6). I observe that R&D Decentralization is only statistically significant 
(p < 0.05) and positive for the proportion of drug candidates sourced externally via 
licensing but not for alliances or acquisitions consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
Second, I undertake all the analyses using firm fixed effects fractional logit models. 
Firm fixed effects are limited in that I observe limited temporal variation in R&D 
Decentralization across firms (31 out of the 49 sample firms do not change R&D 
Decentralization over the study time-period). As illustrated in Table 14, I observe that the 
associated loss of statistical power with only 18 sample firms changing structure over the 
study time period results in the coefficient for R&D Decentralization becoming 
insignificant for Hypothesis 1. However, I observe similar outcomes for Hypothesis 2. 
Namely licensing is the only external mode associated with a higher proportion of 
externally sourced inventions for firms with decentralized R&D as opposed to centralized 
R&D. These observations continue to provide some support for the main theoretical 
arguments. 
Third, I change the unit of analysis to the individual drug-candidate level being 
used to replenish a firm’s development pipeline (Table 15). This results in 12,016 drug-
candidates being incorporated into pipelines over the 1996 to 2015 period. This enables me 
to use individual drug-level controls (e.g. therapeutic area fixed effects) to control for 
additional sources of heterogeneity. I observe that firms with decentralized R&D units are 
associated with a 3.8% higher likelihood of sourcing drugs externally than those with 
single, integrated R&D units. This is consistent with the main observations. 
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Table 14: Robustness tests of main hypotheses using firm-fixed effects fractional logit 
models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable External Acquisition Alliance License 
R&D Decentralization 0.0233 -0.595* -0.0528 0.387** 
 (0.122) (0.254) (0.160) (0.103) 
     
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.0264 -0.184 0.139 0.0559 
 (0.0947) (0.237) (0.164) (0.120) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.0840 -0.402 0.0786 0.285 
 (0.152) (0.453) (0.288) (0.201) 
Business Development Role -0.0823 -0.0838 -0.214+ -0.0388 
 (0.0835) (0.155) (0.116) (0.126) 
Performance -0.520 -0.0422 -0.252 -1.116 
 (0.631) (1.029) (0.882) (0.732) 
R&D Intensity -0.0806 0.274 0.304 -0.688* 
 (0.259) (0.317) (0.322) (0.351) 
SG&A -0.00618 -0.0848 -0.266 0.0547 
 (0.116) (0.219) (0.177) (0.109) 
Size 0.135 0.174 0.355* -0.147 
 (0.142) (0.205) (0.174) (0.136) 
Slack 0.0696+ 0.103+ 0.0702 0.0224 
 (0.0414) (0.0531) (0.0634) (0.0414) 
New CEO -0.208* -0.435+ 0.0354 -0.157 
 (0.0982) (0.237) (0.153) (0.102) 
Total Patent Stock 0.127 0.486* 0.00730 0.0135 
 (0.0945) (0.192) (0.114) (0.0613) 
Patent Family Count -0.441 -2.260** -0.252 0.290 
 (0.352) (0.734) (0.390) (0.427) 
Competition -7.631* -29.53** 2.073 10.75** 
 (3.192) (5.289) (2.869) (3.701) 
SBU 0.270 -0.611 -0.550 0.326 
 (0.194) (1.487) (0.343) (0.224) 
Technical Differentiation 0.373 2.233* 0.303 -0.436 
 (0.590) (1.109) (1.220) (0.821) 
Clinical Experience -1.172+ -4.147** 0.405 -0.225 
 (0.645) (1.233) (0.859) (0.554) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00617* -0.00869+ -0.00697* 0.00331 
 (0.00240) (0.00478) (0.00331) (0.00297) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.000591 -0.00262 0.00230 0.00128 
 (0.00293) (0.00854) (0.00460) (0.00299) 
Portfolio Novelty -1.628* -0.204 -0.700 -1.946** 
 (0.649) (1.002) (0.824) (0.676) 
Bio 0.865 1.467 -0.470 0.895 
 (0.603) (1.430) (0.808) (0.742) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category Fixed 
Eff. 
Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 769 769 769 769 
R2 0.0540 0.150 0.112 0.0840 
Log Likelihood -477.7 -197.3 -247.7 -307.6 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level   
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I also undertake multinomial logit regressions at the drug-candidate level of 
analysis to examine differences across modes of externally sourcing inventions, namely 
whether inventions are sourced via alliances, licensing deals or acquisitions (Table 16). In 
this multinomial logit analysis, the baseline category is internal creation of inventions. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, I observe that division of R&D into multiple units is 
associated with an increased likelihood of licensing but not of sourcing external inventions 
through alliances. Interestingly, I observe that R&D decentralization is associated with an 
increased propensity to source externally via acquisitions though the effect is much weaker 
than for licensing. However, undertaking separate individual logit regressions comparing 
the likelihood of sourcing via alliances, acquisitions and licensing relative to internal 
creation of inventions also suggests that division of R&D into multiple units is associated 
with an increased likelihood of sourcing via licensing, but not acquisitions and alliances. 
This is again consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 15: Robustness check. Logit regressions at drug-candidate level of analysis over 
the period 1996-2015 (using lagged independent variables) 
 
DV = Is drug internal or external Model 1 Model 2 
R&D Decentralization 0.185* 0.191* 
 (0.0937) (0.0897) 
Organization Design controls   Y Y 
Firm-level controls Y Y 
Competition controls Y Y 
Diversification controls Y Y 
Portfolio controls Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects Y Y 
Clinical Phase Fixed Effects Y Y 
Progression Controls N Y 
Number of Observations 12016 12016 
Pseudo-R2 0.133 0.135 
Log Likelihood -7039.5 -7027.4 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
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Table 16: Multinomial logit regression. Dependent Variable is categorical variable 
representing mode of sourcing invention 
 
DV= Mode of Sourcing 
Base category = Internal 
Model 9 
Alliance 
Model 10 
License 
Model 11 
Acquisition 
R&D Decentralization 0.00376 0.317** 0.185+ 
 (0.0949) (0.0749) (0.0953) 
Organization Design controls Y Y Y 
Firm-level controls Y Y Y 
Competition controls Y Y Y 
Diversification controls Y Y Y 
Portfolio controls Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Area FE Y Y Y 
Clinical Phase FE Y Y Y 
Progression Controls Y Y Y 
Number of Observations 12016 12016 12016 
Pseudo-R2 0.132 0.132 0.132 
Log Likelihood -11670.4 -11670.4 -11670.4 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
 
 
Supplemental analyses 
In order to further examine the mechanisms through which firms’ R&D 
organization structures are associated with the proportion of inventions sourced externally, 
I conduct three additional analyses. The first is focused on the novelty of inventions 
externally sourced. The second is focused on examining the impact a corporate business 
development group has on the proportion of inventions sourced externally by firms with 
centralized and decentralized R&D. The final analysis is focused on how the difference in 
the proportion of inventions sourced externally between firms with centralized and 
decentralized R&D varies across the various stages of the development pipeline.  
First, both knowledge flow- and incentives-based arguments suggest that while 
decentralized R&D units are better aligned with business needs they may be limited in their 
ability to create more novel inventions. Using a knowledge-based argumentation, 
knowledge flows across decentralized R&D units will be lower than within centralized 
R&D groups limiting the rich recombination of different facets of a firms’ knowledge for 
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two key reasons (e.g., Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). First, leveraging the 
concept of stickiness of knowledge transfer, both the source and recipient of the knowledge 
may lack the motivation to transfer or utilize this knowledge or the organizational context 
may not be suitable (Szulanski, 1996). Second, Szulanski (1996) and Grant (1996) 
highlight that the highly tacit knowledge associated with the creation and refinement of 
inventions may require rich and frequent communications between the provider and 
recipient of the information. This necessitates a degree of “intimacy” between the recipient 
and source. If the recipient and source of the relevant knowledge are in separate 
organizational units, the more distant relationship between these units is likely to result in 
greater difficulties in the transfer of more tacit knowledge associated with the creation of 
inventions (Szulanski, 1996). Relatedly, managers within a unit may simply be unaware of 
the capabilities and knowledge existing in other units and thus may be less able to access 
them (e.g., O'dell & Grayson, 1998). Firms with decentralized R&D units are thus likely 
to draw on a narrower range of knowledge in developing their inventions which will result 
in a reduced supply of more novel inventions for firms with decentralized R&D. 
Using an incentives-based argumentation, managers within decentralized R&D 
units are likely to have a lower demand for internally-created novel inventions. Managers 
within decentralized R&D units will be incentivized to focus their inventive efforts on more 
business-specific, incremental inventions that are more likely to make it through the 
development process (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; Bercovitz, de Figueiredo, & Teece, 1997). 
Such managers are more likely to source more novel inventions externally as such external 
sources can provide a source of “ready-made” proven novel inventions that can be 
subsequently developed. In contrast, R&D heads in centralized R&D units have the benefit 
of being able to create more novel inventions as they have a greater focus on capability 
development and can create inventions that may not be specific to a current part of the 
business thereby facilitating greater novelty (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004). 
For both high and low novelty drug candidates, no significant difference is observed 
in the proportion of drug-candidates sourced externally between firms with centralized and 
decentralized R&D (Table 17). However, a significant difference is observed for drug-
candidates of intermediate novelty, with firms with decentralized R&D units externally 
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sourcing approximately ten percentage points more of such drug candidates externally. 
Comparing the coefficients for R&D Decentralization across models for the three 
dependent variables measuring the proportion of inventions sourced externally of different 
novelty levels, I find that the coefficient for medium novelty is significantly greater than 
that for low novelty (p=0.07), but it is not significantly greater than that for high novelty 
(partly due to the large standard error for the R&D Decentralization coefficient). 
It appears that R&D decentralization is associated with sourcing a greater 
proportion of inventions of medium novelty externally than firms with centralized R&D as 
compared to low novelty inventions. However, when it comes to highly novel inventions 
both firms with centralized and decentralized R&D appear to externally source a similar 
proportion of external inventions. It may be the case that for highly novel inventions, firms 
with centralized R&D, despite having greater access to their overall knowledge base are 
less able to solve the more complex problems associated with more novel inventions 
internally. This is simply because they have little experience in dealing with such 
challenging technical problems internally and thus are as likely to need to resort to external 
sources of inventions as do firms with decentralized R&D. In contrast for medium novelty 
inventions, firms with centralized R&D appear to be more able to solve such problems 
through recombining existing knowledge across the organization. In this specific context, 
greater novelty is associated with a new mechanism of action and origin of material to the 
focal firm. Addressing both areas of novelty is likely to be highly challenging even for 
firms that recombine knowledge across the entire organization. However, if only one of 
these items is novel to the focal firm, it potentially makes creating such inventions more 
tractable and able to be solved using firms’ existing knowledge base.  
These observations were further supported through our discussions with R&D 
managers in centralized units: 
“We also will use external candidates to add scientific expertise not already within 
our portfolio, example for us would be gene therapy” 
 “Sourcing externally provides an ability to bring in ideas that are not strictly 
related to our technical areas of expertise” 
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Table 17: Supplemental analysis. Fractional Logit and OLS regressions in which 
DVs are proportion of drug candidates of specific novelty class sourced externally 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Low Novelty Medium Novelty High Novelty 
Type of Model FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
R&D  0.210 0.234 0.0654 0.289* 0.540* 0.0668* -0.211 0.162 -0.0410 
Decentralization (0.165) (0.260) (0.0511) (0.124) (0.270) (0.0309) (0.261) (0.893) (0.0737) 
R&D Functional -0.0867 -0.180 0.0717 0.0945 -0.0437 0.0152 -0.0214 -1.771 0.104 
Differentiation (0.140) (0.496) (0.0475) (0.122) (0.424) (0.0375) (0.251) (1.845) (0.0738) 
Corporate  0.510* 2.009** 0.132+ 0.432* 0.525 0.150* 0.110 -1.112 0.165 
Decentralization (0.243) (0.664) (0.0669) (0.213) (0.552) (0.0598) (0.457) (1.943) (0.129) 
Business  -0.0645 -0.500 -0.0314 -0.172 0.0590 -0.0237 -0.178 0.669 -0.0182 
Development Role (0.124) (0.332) (0.0340) (0.125) (0.264) (0.0278) (0.229) (0.902) (0.0760) 
Performance -0.132 4.375 0.295 -1.008 3.794+ 0.158 -1.996 -13.20 -0.139 
 (1.196) (3.148) (0.309) (0.923) (2.022) (0.255) (1.324) (11.43) (0.494) 
R&D Intensity 0.113 4.365** 0.157 -0.610* 4.278** -0.0886 -0.439 -5.316 0.0776 
 (0.495) (1.475) (0.124) (0.287) (1.193) (0.0647) (0.675) (7.243) (0.181) 
SG&A -0.200 0.388 -0.0177 -0.133 -0.361 -0.00168 -0.289 2.112 -0.0456 
 (0.141) (0.377) (0.0472) (0.110) (0.316) (0.0313) (0.269) (3.025) (0.0784) 
Size 0.293 0.291 0.0585 0.0656 0.505 -0.00590 0.438 -0.0544 0.152* 
 (0.186) (0.484) (0.0493) (0.115) (0.406) (0.0312) (0.279) (2.727) (0.0748) 
Slack 0.0994* -0.259 0.0194 0.0449 0.0773 0.00970 0.0424 0.00504 0.0124 
 (0.0492) (0.160) (0.0130) (0.0464) (0.0893) (0.0119) (0.0736) (0.677) (0.0216) 
New CEO -0.296+ 0.350 -0.0294 -0.352** -0.139 -0.0655+ -0.340 -5.018 -0.0255 
 (0.159) (0.448) (0.0506) (0.125) (0.620) (0.0330) (0.317) (3.384) (0.117) 
Total Patent  0.0315 0.114 -0.0164 0.0140 -0.0515 0.00029 -0.212+ -0.634 -0.0449 
Stock (0.0886) (0.200) (0.0265) (0.0651) (0.279) (0.0192) (0.111) (0.653) (0.0470) 
Patent Family  -0.483 -0.992 -0.238 -0.00528 -0.413 -0.0555 0.371 3.212 -0.196 
Count (0.579) (1.066) (0.148) (0.341) (1.177) (0.113) (0.736) (3.960) (0.288) 
Competition -1.685 16.12 0.402 0.514 8.350 0.231 5.752 -41.61 2.286 
 (3.736) (25.70) (2.590) (4.204) (15.78) (1.602) (4.250) (56.15) (3.861) 
SBU 0.825* 0.327 24.23+ -0.0115 0.0281 -0.0383 -0.0181 -1.112 0.147 
 (0.358) (1.036) (13.68) (0.395) (0.216) (0.0966) (0.513) (1.741) (0.203) 
Technical  -2.211 -24.89** 0.0811 0.203 -6.532** -0.202 -1.034 1.097 -0.461 
Differentiation (1.517) (5.717) (0.262) (0.894) (2.202) (0.174) (1.350) (7.014) (0.390) 
Clinical  0.393 2.589+ 0.102 -0.121 -1.216 -0.121 0.698 1.340 0.677 
Experience (0.468) (1.518) (0.197) (0.445) (1.489) (0.158) (1.174) (4.207) (0.430) 
Internal  -0.011** -0.0207 -0.0029* -0.0074* -0.00203 -0.00119 -0.00346 0.00510 -0.00183 
Overall Portfolio (0.0033) (0.0150) (0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0121) (0.0009) (0.0051) (0.0221) (0.0028) 
External  0.00160 -0.0115 0.00063 0.0117* 0.0165 0.00351* 0.00157 -0.0730 -0.00263 
Overall Portfolio (0.0039) (0.0148) (0.0018) (0.0047) (0.0114) (0.0015) (0.0098) (0.0522) (0.0047) 
Portfolio  -0.148 -0.485 0.0599 -1.058+ -1.782 -0.162 -0.384 3.392 -0.404 
Novelty (0.618) (1.625) (0.147) (0.592) (1.615) (0.166) (0.795) (3.023) (0.276) 
Bio -0.577 -11.37** -0.0269 0.226 -6.456** -0.0252 -0.0760 -14.04 -0.363 
 (0.850) (3.056) (0.134) (0.522) (1.531) (0.174) (0.664) (9.862) (0.272) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Cat. 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 628 128 502 699 145 529 440 99 294 
R2 0.0605 0.233 0.199 0.0606 0.189 0.355 0.0918 0.386 0.291 
Log Likelihood -394.2 -70.81 -60.93 -454.2 -86.57 15.46 -270.7 -44.06 -107.4 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
PSM – Propensity Score Matching, FL – Fractional Logit, CEM – Coarsened Exact Matching 
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In addition, firms may source novel inventions externally to complement the 
development of such inventions internally. A business development manager stated: 
“Often early on we will get both internal and external candidates to look at the 
same issue and see which one works out, way of testing out alternatives and 
increasing the likelihood of success” 
 
As an alternative measure to Novelty I utilized new chemical entity status (NCE). I 
examine how the proportion of drug candidates sourced externally varied between NCE 
and non-NCE drugs for firms with centralized and decentralized R&D. As illustrated in 
Table 18, the proportion of non-NCE drugs externally sourced does not differ between 
firms with centralized and decentralized R&D. However, I observe a significant difference 
for the proportion of NCE drug-candidates sourced externally. The difference between the 
coefficients for R&D Decentralization for NCE and non-NCE is statistically significant 
(p<0.08) consistent with the results observed using the measure Novelty. 
 
Table 18: Alternative measure of novelty analyses using proportion of new chemical 
entities (nce) that are externally sourced and proportion of non-nces that are 
externally sourced. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable  External non-NCE External NCE 
Type of Model FL FL PSM OLS CEM FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
R&D  0.0680 0.0419 0.0549 0.187 0.438* 0.0733* 
Decentralization (0.138) (0.199) (0.0523) (0.142) (0.189) (0.0357) 
Org. Design controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm-level controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Competition controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Diversification controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Portfolio controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category 
Fixed Eff. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 702 224 332 658 209 304 
R2 0.051 0.094 0.467 0.078 0.139 0.441 
Log Likelihood -455.0 -138.2 4.491 -399.8 -120.4 18.80 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level  
PSM – Propensity Score Matching;  FL – Fractional Logit, CEM – Coarsened Exact Matching 
Observation counts vary due to missing data on NCE status for some firms’ drug-candidates 
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Second, I examine how the presence of a corporate business development group (as 
reflected by the presence of such a unit whose lead reports directly to the CEO) can 
moderate the primary relationship between R&D design and the proportion of inventions 
sourced externally. Corporate business development groups can act as integrating 
structures across firms with decentralized R&D, thereby impacting firms’ decisions to 
source inventions externally or create them internally (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) i.e. 
can make a decentralized firm more integrated.  
However, as illustrated in Table 19, we observe no moderating impact of having a 
corporate Business Development Unit as illustrated by the non-significance of the 
coefficient R&D Decentralization x Business Development Role in models 1 and 2. I then 
examine how the presence of a corporate business development unit moderates the 
relationship between R&D Decentralization and the proportion of inventions sourced 
through acquisitions, alliances and licensing. I find that the presence of a business 
development group does negatively moderate the relationship between Acquisition and 
R&D Decentralization as illustrated in Models 3 and 4. This suggests that firms with 
decentralized R&D units and a corporate business development group tend to source fewer 
inventions through acquisitions than firms with decentralized R&D units and no corporate 
business development group (both relative to firms with centralized R&D units). This 
finding is consistent with the interviews with R&D and business development managers 
illustrated above in that business development groups may act as a “brake” on individual 
R&D units acquiring external inventions. Prior studies have highlighted the importance of 
such corporate groups in improving firms sourcing efforts (e.g., Kale et al., 2002). 
In the interviews, there was a consistent theme that business development groups 
generally facilitate the decision to source drug-candidates externally. Business 
Development typically does this through highlighting potential external opportunities and 
enabling the execution of a specific deal rather than making the final decision to source 
drug-candidates. However, managers highlighted for larger deals, especially acquisitions, 
the corporate business development group became more involved and could veto such 
critical deals.  
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For example: 
“There is a corporate BD group, they tend to manage large deals, multiple asset 
deals or company acquisitions/alliances, etc.” 
“If it is a big acquisition deal, then individual units cannot make a call, it goes to 
the executive committee and Corporate BD plays a key role” 
 
Table 19: Supplemental analysis examining how corporate business development 
units could moderate the main relationships proposed by H1 and H2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent Variable External Acquisition Alliance License 
Type of Model FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM 
R&D  0.212+ 0.387* 0.257 1.250* -0.197 -0.421+ 0.282* 0.246 
Decentralization (0.124) (0.186) (0.203) (0.527) (0.199) (0.244) (0.132) (0.218) 
         
Business  0.0518 0.104 0.0694 1.231** -0.0798 -0.509 0.0838 -0.294 
Development Role (0.0814) (0.208) (0.156) (0.347) (0.137) (0.349) (0.119) (0.297) 
         
R&D Decent.  -0.0975 -0.316 -0.872* -2.649** 0.108 0.186 0.185 0.457 
x BD Role (0.170) (0.288) (0.407) (0.634) (0.271) (0.415) (0.222) (0.350) 
Org Des. Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm-level controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Competition ctrls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Diversification ctrls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Portfolio controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category  
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Cat.  
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 769 165 769 172 769 172 769 172 
R2 0.0318 0.0782 0.0904 0.197 0.0739 0.156 0.0469 0.0963 
Log Likelihood -488.9 -109.6 -211.2 -52.39 -258.2 -56.29 -320.0 -80.29 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
 
I observe no moderating impact of a corporate business development group on 
sourcing via alliances or licensing. The licensing observation is consistent with the 
arguments made above which suggest that licensing is generally lower risk and 
commitment and can be delegated to individual R&D units. Alliances provide an 
interesting case in that these could potentially be major commitments, yet the results 
indicate that corporate business development groups do not to appear to influence the 
propensity to alliance for firms with either centralized or decentralized R&D. 
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 Third, I examine how the primary relationship indicated by Hypothesis 1 changes 
by the stage of development or clinical phase in which an invention is sourced. In order to 
examine this, I undertake negative binomial regressions examining how the number of 
external drug-candidates externally sourced in each clinical phase is associated with R&D 
Decentralization using the same control variables and fixed effects as illustrated in Table 
10. I undertake this analysis because there is a potential trade-off that firms face. Namely, 
sourcing more candidates at an earlier stage of development is higher risk but lower cost. 
As outlined in the theoretical argumentation, managers in decentralized R&D units face 
greater pressure to ensure a steady flow of new products. Sourcing later stage development 
inventions could be a way of alleviating this pressure.  
 As illustrated in Table 20, I observe that firms with decentralized R&D source more 
external drug candidates than those with centralized R&D in the pre-clinical (phase 0), 
phase1 and phase 2 stages of development. However, I observe less evidence of a 
difference in Phase 3. These results are consistent with the interviews with R&D personnel 
who highlighted that later stage assets due to their lower associated risk of failure tend to 
be more costly to source: 
“The later the phase the more expensive an asset is, early stage millions, later stage 
billions” 
“If we source a phase 2 asset this can be done at the business unit level, any later 
and much broader involvement is required” 
“We are tending to source more pre-clinical drug-candidates recently as it gives 
more optionality and prices go up as for the later stages of the development process 
– prices recently have sky-rocketed for late-stage assets” 
 
These observations are consistent with the theoretical argumentation. Namely, 
those inventions that are more costly and likely to require cross-organizational buy-in to 
source are less likely to be sourced by firms with decentralized R&D thereby narrowing 
the gap of the proportion of inventions sourced externally between firms with centralized 
and decentralized R&D. Later stage drug-candidates represent such inventions and thus 
managers in decentralized R&D units are more likely to externally source earlier 
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development stage inventions which is what is observed in Table 20. Further, and also 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, I observe that firms with decentralized R&D source a 
significantly higher number of inventions through licensing across all these earlier phases 
than firms with centralized R&D, but observe limited differences for alliances and 
acquisitions. Further details on all the supplemental analyses described in this section are 
provided in Appendix 7. 
  
Table 20: Supplemental analysis examining how the relationship between the 
number of externally-sourced drug-candidates and R&D Decentralization varies 
with the stage of clinical development.  
DV= Number 
external drug-
candidates 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Type of Model FL FL PSM  FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM 
Clinical Phase 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 
R&D  0.200* 0.298** 0.341* 0.499** 0.352+ 0.355* 0.256 0.373+ 
Decentralization (0.0800) (0.115) (0.165) (0.173) (0.185) (0.177) (0.196) (0.224) 
Org Design 
Controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm-level 
controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Competition 
controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Diversification 
controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Portfolio controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business 
Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic 
Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 759 231 736 171 736 228 752 235 
R2 0.184 0.227 0.153 0.329 0.114 0.174 0.107 0.165 
Log Likelihood -1654.9 -509.4 -867.1 -182.2 -939.6 -305.1 -840.6 -267.3 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level.  
FL – Fractional Logit; PSM – Propensity Score Matching  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In order to ensure a continuous flow of inventions to market, firms need to 
constantly replenish their development pipelines as inventions reach the market or fall by 
the wayside. This replenishment could be done using internally created or externally 
sourced inventions. Existing theories examining firms’ decisions to source inventions 
externally or create them internally have considered this decision to take place at the firm-
level and the logic for decision-making at the transaction-level. As a result, prior studies 
have focused on isolated issues that pertain to an individual transaction (e.g., Pisano, 1990) 
or invention (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2012) or assumed that firms are “black boxes” with 
pre-defined knowledge and capabilities accessible to the entire firm (e.g., Veugelers & 
Cassiman, 1999; West & Bogers, 2014).  
In this study I integrate the incentive- and knowledge-based views of the firm to 
offer a novel theoretical explanation for this decision. Within my theory, I consider that 
firms may decentralize such decisions within specific units, and that the decision-making 
might operate at the pipeline-level rather than at the individual transaction-level. Firms that 
decentralize their pipeline management will engender greater incentives for managers to 
progress inventions to market at the cost of reduced capability development. This is 
because in decentralized R&D units managers are more beholden to their business units 
for resources in contrast to managers in centralized R&D organizations that are likely to 
receive resources at a corporate level rather than directly from business units. In addition, 
there is an increased likelihood of any individual decentralized R&D unit facing gaps in its 
pipeline as compared to centralized R&D that can pool all its inventions in one portfolio. 
In contrast, firms that centralize R&D and have a single pipeline of inventions will be 
associated with a greater focus on capability development. As a result, managers in firms 
with decentralized R&D units are more likely to externally source inventions they can then 
develop to replenish their pipelines than their equivalents in firms with centralized R&D. 
This is in order to avoid gaps in their pipelines and ensure a steady stream of new products 
to market. In support of these arguments, I find that decentralized organization designs 
with multiple R&D units are associated with a higher proportion of externally sourced 
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inventions, and this difference is primarily driven by licensing, and inventions of moderate 
levels of novelty. 
This study provides three key contributions to the extant literature. First, this paper 
provides a theoretical contribution that enables a deeper understanding of what shapes 
firms’ decisions to create inventions internally or source them externally. I highlight the 
intricate linkage between incentives associated with firms’ design elements and firms’ 
invention creation capabilities. Decentralized R&D unit managers face greater pressure 
from their commercial leads in business units and are more strongly incentivized to ensure 
a steady flow of new products to market and thus focus less on building internal invention 
creation capabilities. Managers within decentralized R&D units also face a greater 
likelihood of gaps within their invention development pipelines as they do not have as 
much risk pooling as otherwise equivalent firms that manage their inventions within a 
single portfolio. External inventions provide a ready route to fill these gaps. This highlights 
the importance of examining the make-buy decision in the context of pipeline management 
as opposed to individual transactions. 
In addition reduced knowledge flows between R&D units are associated with the 
creation of less novel inventions, necessitating the external sourcing of more novel 
inventions. In contrast, firms with centralized R&D units can afford to build invention 
creation capabilities and undertake more innovation activities within the boundaries of the 
firm. Further, managers of R&D sub-units within the centralized model facing lower-
powered incentives are more likely to share internally-created inventions across units than 
managers in decentralized R&D units facing higher powered incentives. These factors help 
to explain why firms with decentralized R&D source more inventions externally.  
Thus it appears that decentralization of R&D and its associated higher powered 
incentives leads to a reduced focus on internal capability development and a greater 
external invention focus. Whereas centralization of R&D and its greater intra-
organizational knowledge flows is associated with a stronger internal invention focus. 
However, for highly novel inventions, firms with centralized R&D reach the limits of their 
capabilities and equally resort to external sourcing of such inventions as firms with 
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decentralized R&D. This reiterates the importance of integrating knowledge- and 
incentives-based theories to understand the foundations for firms’ capabilities (e.g., 
Argyres & Zenger, 2012). 
Second, this study extends recent work examining how firms’ internal design 
choices can shape their decisions to invent internally or externally (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; 
Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017; Leiponen & Helfat, 2011). Consistent with these prior 
studies I find that decentralizing R&D is associated with the sourcing of an increased 
proportion of external inventions, however I provide an alternative theoretical rational and 
illustrate that this difference is driven by licensing as opposed to alliances or acquisitions. 
Licensing provides a lower risk and up-front cost route to access new inventions that does 
not require cross-organizational buy-in and resources unlike, for example, acquisitions.  
Supplemental analyses illustrate that for inventions in the later stages of 
development which are generally more costly, there is no difference in the proportion of 
inventions sourced externally between firms with centralized and decentralized R&D. Such 
late-stage assets may be beyond the resources of individual R&D units. We also observe 
that for firms with decentralized R&D units, the presence of a corporate business 
development unit is associated with reduced sourcing of inventions through acquisitions. 
The interviews highlight that such business development units play a significant role in 
larger scale acquisitions (as opposed to individual licensing of inventions). This suggests 
that business development units may rein in the acquisitions of individual units with an eye 
to optimizing acquisitions for the firm as a whole as opposed to a single unit.  
Thus this study highlights that internal design can shape the mode through which 
managers source external inventions by influencing the resources to which they have 
access and their overall strategic priorities (i.e. building capabilities versus sourcing 
inventions). However, integrating units, such as business development, can further 
influence how managers within decentralized R&D units access external inventions by 
taking an organization-wide perspective and potentially limiting R&D units’ utilization of 
more costly modes such as acquisitions. 
Finally, this study indicates a potential association between firms’ internal design 
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choices and the composition of markets for technologies. It is possible that the more liquid 
the market for technologies, firms may be more likely to decentralize R&D and focus on 
developing basic inventions in-house, externally sourcing more novel inventions for 
subsequent internal development. This would have to be investigated in a multi-industry 
study with industries that have different availabilities of technologies through open 
markets. Consistent with prior studies it is likely that as industries develop and markets for 
technologies emerge that firms will increasingly divide innovative labor between each 
other which has implications for how they are designed internally (e.g., Arora et al., 2016; 
Arora & Gambardella, 1994, 2010). 
 This study has a number of limitations that can provide avenues for future research. 
First, it may be that sources of unobserved heterogeneity associated with individual drug-
candidates could influence the make versus buy decision. For example, a drug-candidate 
may involve a unique technology within a focal therapeutic class, and although the firm 
may have several internal drug-candidates within that category managers may still source 
externally to simply access this technology. It is likely to be the case that firms access such 
technologies prior to invention and use this knowledge to develop unique internal 
inventions. However in this study I do not observe firms’ more upstream sourcing of 
knowledge. It would be valuable to compare firms’ upstream sourcing of knowledge 
through, for example, research agreements with academic institutions and their sourcing of 
more downstream inventions under development and see if they are complementary. For 
example, upstream sourcing may be focused on supplementing internal knowledge that can 
provide firms the ability to develop novel, future inventions. Further downstream, sourcing 
may be more tactical focused on filling gaps in firms’ portfolios.  
Second, concerns regarding external validity may arise due to the focus on a single 
industry context. However, multiple industries follow a similar product development 
process to the pharmaceutical industry such as the aerospace, consumer goods and the 
chemicals industry (e.g., Barczak, Griffin, & Kahn, 2009; Griffin, 1997; Grönlund et al., 
2010). Further, companies in other industries such as Procter & Gamble with its “Connect 
and Develop” model are increasingly externally sourcing the inventions that become their 
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ultimate products (e.g., Huston & Sakkab, 2006). It would be valuable to examine whether 
the results observed in this study hold in other industry environments. 
 Finally, there may be a distinction between how firms are structured internally and 
how they manage their portfolio of inventions. Specifically, firms may have decentralized 
R&D whereas firms may manage the portfolio of inventions as a single portfolio. This may 
be especially important for inventions later in development when the levels of investment 
associated with developing such inventions is much higher. I do find that that the results 
hold during the earlier stages of development including pre-clinical where I consistently 
heard in interviews the decision to source externally was generally made by the head of the 
relevant R&D unit. Relatedly, the measure for R&D Decentralization that I use may not 
fully capture the diversity of R&D structures such as hybrid models. 
Despite these and other limitations, the study offers an important contribution to 
the extant literature on the management of innovation. This study illustrates that moving 
beyond a basic consideration of a specific transaction to considering the composition of a 
firm’s pipeline of existing inventions as well as how a firm manages its invention pipeline 
can provide insight into what shapes the decision to source inventions externally or create 
them internally. It appears that design elements can shape both managerial incentives as 
well as firms’ intra-organizational knowledge flows. External sourcing of inventions, 
especially through licensing, can make up for a lack of effective internal knowledge-flows 
as well as enable hard-pressed R&D managers in decentralized units to ensure a continuous 
flow of inventions to market thereby helping them to “mind the gaps” in their portfolios. 
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CHAPTER 4: STUCTURING TO SELL IDEAS: THE ROLE OF 
ORGANIZATION DESIGN IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
INVENTIONS 
 
Best Paper Proceedings, Academy of Management Annual Meeting; 2019 
 
Abstract  
In this paper I examine the relationship between organization design and firms’ 
commercialization of inventions. I argue that firms face a delicate balance. On the one 
hand, greater decentralization facilitates the more effective use of incentives which aids 
commercialization. On the other hand, greater centralization enables more effective 
allocation of complementary resources which also aids commercialization. 
Complementary resources such as sales and marketing are critical in enabling firms to sell 
new offers. I argue that this balance of the benefits and costs of decentralization shifts with 
the level of complementary resources available and the degree of concentration of sales of 
firms’ existing products. Increasing levels of complementary resources are associated with 
increasingly inefficient allocation for more decentralized firms compared to more 
centralized firms resulting in a decreased proportion of sales of new products for 
decentralized firms compared to more centralized firms. Increasing dependence on a 
smaller proportion of existing products is associated with greater incentives for managers 
in decentralized units to allocate complementary resources away from new offers resulting 
in a decreased proportion of sales from new products for decentralized firms compared to 
more centralized firms. I find support for these arguments in the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
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Introduction 
“You don't want to be Tesla. He was one of the greatest inventors, but it's a sad, 
sad story. He couldn't commercialize anything, he could barely fund his own 
research. You'd want to be more like Edison. If you invent something, that doesn't 
necessarily help anybody. You've got to actually get it into the world; you've got to 
produce, make money doing it so you can fund it.” Larry Page (CEO Alphabet) 
 
The successful commercialization of inventions is a key determinant of firms’ 
ultimate performance (e.g., Nerkar & Shane, 2007; Rothaermel, 2001). However, as 
highlighted by the quote by Larry Page, impressive inventions can often fail to be 
successfully commercialized. For example, Xerox Corporations’ history has been littered 
with several examples of significant inventions such as the graphical user interface or 
computer mouse that it failed to commercialize (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). 
Scholars have highlighted that firms’ organization designs can play a significant role in 
driving the success of their innovation activities (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Eggers, 
2016; Tushman et al., 2010). The canonical design solution to facilitate successful 
innovation has been to create dedicated units separate to the broader organization to focus 
on new offerings (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Lavie et al., 2010). 
However, in understanding the relationship between organization design and 
innovation these studies have tended to focus on innovation as an outcome rather than a 
process (e.g., Garud et al., 2013). The same design element may have very different 
implications at different stages of the innovation process. For example, what may be 
effective for the creation of inventions may not be suitable for the effective 
commercialization and sales of fully developed inventions. Further, many studies have 
focused on firms creating highly novel inventions that may not align well with their 
existing business and the struggle firms face to get these inventions to market as opposed 
to examining value capture once an invention has been launched (e.g., Christensen, 2006; 
Nerkar & Shane, 2007). However, in order to maintain their on-going viability firms often 
manage pipelines of inventions that enable a steady flow of new offers to the market place from 
which they capture value in the form of new product sales (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; Klingebiel 
& Rammer, 2014). Thus, our understanding of how organization design can impact the 
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commercialization of firms’ inventions in terms of the successful sales of these inventions on 
an on-going basis appears to be somewhat limited. This viewpoint is reinforced by recent 
studies that have highlighted that commercialization research is a relatively “fragmented field 
of study” (Kirkegaard Sløk-Madsen et al., 2017) and “remains poorly understood” (Datta et 
al., 2015). 
 In this paper, I examine the relationship between firms’ organization designs and 
their on-going commercialization of new inventions emerging from their pipelines in terms 
of sales of new products. With respect to organization design, I focus on whether firms 
tend to centralize and align functionally or decentralize and align into a variety of different 
business units (e.g., Chandler, 1962). The degree of decentralization has implications for 
how firms manage their invention portfolios and allocate complementary resources to 
facilitate the market adoption of inventions (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Bardolet et 
al., 2011; Teece, 1986). I argue that firms need to manage a challenging balance with 
respect to their designs. On the one hand, greater centralization facilitates functional 
excellence and the more effective allocation of resources. On the other hand, greater 
decentralization facilitates greater customer intimacy and knowledge and is associated with 
the more effective use of higher powered incentives which engenders greater managerial 
effort. Similar to Chapter 3, I extend the knowledge-incentive trade-off in Chapter 2 by 
considering the important topic of internal resource allocation. I argue that the relationship 
between organizational decentralization and the proportion of sales of new products is 
moderated by two factors that can influence this delicate balance through their impacts on 
resource allocation and managerial incentives. First, there is the quantity of complementary 
resources available for the sale of new and existing products which reduces the benefits of 
greater decentralization through magnifying the impact of ineffective resource allocation. 
Complementary resources such as sales and marketing are critical in enabling firms to sell 
new offers. Second, there is the concentration of sales of firms’ existing products, namely 
reliance on the sales of a smaller number of existing products. This is also associated with 
lowering the benefits of greater decentralization as new products receive fewer resources. 
 I find support for these arguments in the context of the pharmaceutical industry 
over the period 1995 to 2015. As a baseline finding, I find that greater corporate 
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decentralization is associated with an increased percentage of revenues from new products 
launched in the current year. I also observe that this relationship is negatively moderated 
by the level of selling, general and administration (SG&A) spending. Further, I find that 
for firms that are more reliant on the sales of a smaller number of products there is a weaker 
relationship between corporate decentralization and the sales of new products. These 
observations are consistent with the less effective allocation of resources associated with 
greater decentralization as well as managerial incentives shaping resource allocation. 
 This study makes three primary contributions to the extant literature. First, this 
study theoretically contributes to the re-emergent organization design literature 
(Greenwood & Miller, 2010; Puranam et al., 2014; Van de Ven, Ganco, & Hinings, 2013) 
by illustrating a key balancing act firms need to manage when organizing to innovate. 
Namely, greater decentralization is associated with the more effective use of incentives and 
greater local market knowledge but comes at the cost of reduced functional scale and units 
competing for resources which can lead to inefficient resource allocation. Second, this 
study helps to extend our understanding of internal capital allocation within large, 
incumbent firms. I argue that greater decentralization comes at a cost in that business units 
increasingly compete for resources which may result in more powerful units accessing 
resources that could be more effectively utilized in other parts of the organization. Third, 
this study provides an interesting insight into the existing debate regarding organizational 
slack and firms’ innovation efforts (e.g., Marlin & Geiger, 2015; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). 
Namely, the relationship between the level of resourcing and innovation performance is 
moderated by organization design. Greater decentralization may be more effective at lower 
resourcing levels as the more effective use of higher-powered incentives enables firms to 
get a “bigger bang” for their buck but this advantage diminishes as resource levels increase. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Organization design and commercialization 
Innovation can be viewed as a process consisting of three key stages (e.g., Garud 
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et al., 2013; Keum & See, 2017). First there is the act of invention that consists of the 
creation of novel ideas that in themselves are of limited economic value (e.g., Kapoor & 
Klueter, 2015; Schumpeter, 1939). Second, development is focused on converting an 
invention into a final product that can yield commercial value. Finally, there is 
commercialization which relates to firms’ value appropriation from their developed 
inventions. With respect to commercialization, firms often manage a portfolio of products 
that they sell to end-customers (e.g., Day, 1977; Eggers, 2012). However, in order to ensure 
their sustainability firms need to continually renew their product portfolios through adding 
new inventions and removing products that are no longer delivering incremental value 
(Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 2006). This is because in competitive industries other firms will 
introduce new products which may make a focal firm’s existing products obsolete (e.g., 
Bayus, Erickson, & Jacobson, 2003; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).  
In this paper I build on the definition of commercialization by Datta et al. (2015). 
Namely commercialization of inventions relates to a firm’s “capacity to bring a 
technological innovation to market and reach some of the mainstream, beyond the initial 
adopters.” I specifically examine commercialization through the proportion of sales from 
new products. I use this lens rather than, for example, the proportion of new products in a 
firm’s product portfolio because the focus of my theoretical development revolves around 
how effectively firms are able to reach customers which involves revenue capture as 
opposed to simply launching a product. The proportion of sales from new products is a 
well-established measure within the strategic management literature (e.g., Klingebiel & 
Rammer, 2014; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). 
Prior studies focusing on the latter stages of the innovation process have 
emphasized the important role of organization design in shaping firms’ various innovation-
related outcomes (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Damanpour & Aravind, 2012). These studies 
have tended to illustrate the benefits of dedicated units for new offers separate to the core 
business (e.g., Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman et al., 2010). 
Arguments to support this assertion relate to avoiding resource dependency on existing 
customers and organizational inertia. However, the focus of these studies has been on firms 
developing new offers that may conflict with a firm’s current business. In this paper I focus 
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on how organization design can impact commercialization of firms’ inventions within their 
on-going invention pipelines. In my empirical analyses I control for invention novelty but 
am neutral to novelty in my theoretical development focusing on firms’ ongoing 
commercialization of new inventions that emerge successfully from their pipelines.22  
 
Figure 8: Corporate Decentralization – examples of different design choices 
 
In this paper, the key organization design element focused upon is whether a firm 
is more centralized and functionally orientated or more decentralized and divisionally 
orientated. Namely the degree of corporate decentralization (e.g., Burton et al., 2011). The 
designs illustrated in Figure 8 portray the extremes of a highly centralized firm which is 
functionally aligned and has no business units and a highly decentralized firm which solely 
consists of a collection of independent business units. However, firms can have differing 
degrees of corporate decentralization with some functions being centralized at a corporate 
level and others being decentralized (e.g., Albert, 2018; Guadalupe et al., 2014). A 
pertinent difference is that centralized firms tend to manage a single portfolio of inventions, 
                                                 
22 In this paper inventions represent products in the innovation process and new products or offers represent the outputs of the process. 
CEO
Functional – Centralized Design Divisional – Decentralized Design
CFO CMO COO
R&D Fun.1 Fun.n
CEO
Div.1 Div.2 Div.3
Div.4 Div.5 Div.6
• Manages single portfolio of inventions
• CEO reports incentivized by functional or 
overall business performance
• More challenging to link invention market 
performance to specific organizational unit 
e.g. was product good (i.e. R&D gets 
plaudits) or was marketing great for a 
mediocre product (e.g. marketing and 
sales gets plaudits)?
• Centralize capabilities to get commercial 
centers of excellence
• Multiple invention portfolios – one for each 
division
• CEO reports incentivized by division 
performance
• Easier to link invention market 
performance with specific organizational 
unit (e.g. if product X is successful unit X 
is rewarded accordingly)
• Capabilities in commercialization may be 
scattered across the organization
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in contrast in more decentralized models each division tends to manage its own portfolio 
of inventions. 
With respect to the commercialization of firms’ inventions emerging from their 
invention pipelines, firms face a delicate balancing act. Greater corporate centralization is 
associated with the development of greater functional expertise which will enable the more 
effective commercialization of new products (e.g., Burton et al., 2011). In addition, the 
commercialization of inventions requires firms to invest in complementary resources such 
as marketing campaigns, salesforces and manufacturing facilities. Without investing in 
these complementary resources firms can limit the sales of their new offers as, for example, 
customers are unaware of these new products, products may not be available in key 
distribution channels or sufficient quantities of the new product cannot be produced. 
Greater corporate centralization is associated with a broader more objective perspective 
when evaluating the merits of individual products requiring such complementary resources 
(Stein, 1997). This is because such resource allocation is likely to occur at the individual 
product level with each product assessed on its own merits as opposed to the business unit 
level in which the merits of individual business units are assessed (e.g., Bardolet et al., 
2011; Bardolet et al., 2010). In more decentralized organizations, managers in business 
units will compete for complementary resources and potentially over-inflate the 
opportunities associated with their business units’ portfolios of inventions that they wish 
to commercialize (Bardolet et al., 2010). These arguments suggest that allocation of 
complementary resources is likely to be more effective in more centralized organizations 
leading to the more effective commercialization of firms’ inventions. 
In contrast, greater corporate decentralization offers two key advantages. First, it 
facilitates the more effective usage of higher powered incentives as there is a clearer 
linkage between performance outcomes and managerial effort (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Zenger 
& Hesterly, 1997). This helps to engender greater effort of the managers commercializing 
new inventions which in turn can result in more effective sales of new products (e.g., 
Zenger, 1994). Further, the effectiveness of incentives is likely to increase from the highly 
uncertain stage of invention through to the more well-defined commercialization stage 
(e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1994). Second, business units are also able to develop greater 
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knowledge of specific customer and market needs as these markets represent their primary 
focus as opposed to a more centralized, functional organization that disperses its focus 
across multiple customer groups and markets (e.g., Burton et al., 2011). This enables firms 
to more effectively drive sales of new products (e.g., Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). Intimate 
knowledge of the specific markets to which firms are selling their products such as 
appropriate distribution channels, suitable advertising media and relevant local competitors 
will facilitate sales of firms’ products. This will be especially important following the 
initial launch of a new product where a product is seeking to penetrate a specific market 
and the marginal benefits of this specific local knowledge will be greater than for 
established products. 
Although, the marginal benefits of effective resource allocation, functional 
expertise, incentives and local market knowledge will be greater for new as opposed to 
existing products (e.g., Angell, 2000; Bayus et al., 2003), ex-ante it is difficult to determine 
whether firms that are more or less decentralized will be associated with a greater 
proportion of sales from new products. As a result, I leave this as an open empirical 
question which I examine later in this paper. My theoretical focus revolves around 
examining the balance between greater decentralization facilitating the more effective 
usage of higher powered incentives and greater centralization enabling the more effective 
allocation of complementary resources. I examine two moderating factors that will 
influence the impact of resource allocation and the relevance of incentives. This enables 
me to develop clear theoretical predictions as to how corporate decentralization is 
associated with the commercialization of firms’ inventions as measured through the 
proportion of sales of new products. 
  
Moderating impact of quantity of complementary resources 
The marginal benefits of complementary resources that facilitate the sale of new 
products are likely to decline as the quantity of these resources increases (e.g., Arrfelt, 
Wiseman, McNamara, & Hult, 2015; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). This is because the most 
favorable opportunities will tend to be taken at lower resource levels and generally be more 
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apparent to managers. As the quality of opportunities declines the level of managerial 
subjectivity is also likely to increase as relative quality will be more difficult to objectively 
determine. However, the decline in marginal benefits differs between firms that are more 
or less decentralized is likely to differ.  
At lower quantities of complementary resources, the greater local market 
knowledge of more decentralized firms is likely to enable them to identify more effective 
complementary resources facilitating increased sales from their newly launched products 
as compared to more centralized firms (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Further, 
managers in decentralized units are likely to engender more effort to drive sales of new 
products than managers in centralized units due to the greater effectiveness of higher 
powered incentives. At this lower quantity of complementary resources, only higher quality 
new product opportunities will tend to be supported effectively. As argued above, the 
marginal benefits of the complementary resources will be higher for these new products. 
Further there is a greater likelihood that each unit within a decentralized firm has at least a 
small set of good new product opportunities thereby helping to ensure complementary 
resources are used effectively. Thus I argue that at lower quantities of complementary 
resources, the benefits of the more effective use of incentives outweighs the costs of less 
effective resource allocation. Further, the marginal benefits of complementary resources 
will be greater for new as opposed to existing products as they are not already established 
in the market place. Thus the complementary resources can increase the sales of new 
products more effectively than existing products. Hence, these arguments suggest that at 
lower quantities of complementary resources, more decentralized firms will be associated 
with a higher proportion of sales from new products that more centralized firms.  
However, as highlighted by the work of Bardolet et al. (2011), centralized firms 
tend to allocate investments in their portfolio of products at the individual product level, 
whereas for decentralized firms resources are allocated at the business unit level. With the 
tendency for business unit managers to battle for complementary resources to increase their 
own personal power there is a risk that firms invest in inferior new product opportunities 
as managers access resources which other parts of the organization could use more 
effectively (e.g., Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Rajan, Servaes, 
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& Zingales, 2000). As complementary resources increase managers in decentralized units 
will tend to over-state the opportunities they have available in order to increase their intra-
organizational power (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000; Stein, 1997). For similarly sized business 
units, in order to overcome this struggle for resources, corporate managers may have a 
tendency to allocate resources equally across business units following the 1/n rule 
(Bardolet et al., 2010). This is not a major issue if new product opportunities are uniformly 
dispersed through the organization. However, this is unlikely to be the case with some 
business units having more attractive new product opportunities than other units. This will 
result in some high-value new product ideas not receiving sufficient complementary 
resources in decentralized firms as compared to centralized firms. Thus as the level of 
complementary resources increases this inefficient allocation of resources will eventually 
overcome the benefits of the increased effectiveness of incentives enabling more 
centralized firm to increase their proportion of sales of new products compared to more 
decentralized firms. This argumentation is best illustrated through a basic example. 
Consider two firms, one is centralized and the other is decentralized and has two 
business units. Across both firms they have the same set of ten new product opportunities 
with identical estimated pay-offs. However, in the decentralized firm, unit 1 has five of the 
better pay-off opportunities and unit 2 has five of the lower pay-off opportunities. These 
pay-off schedules are illustrated in the top of Figure 9. Most business units are likely to 
have one or two promising new product opportunities but there may be a much steeper 
decline in the quality of new product opportunities for decentralized business units as 
compared to centralized firms which have a much deeper set of potential new product 
opportunities due to pooling across the entire firm. 
Managers in decentralized units should be able to exploit their new product 
opportunities more effectively than managers in centralized firms due to the greater 
effectiveness of incentives. This suggests that decentralized firms can capture a greater 
proportion of the pay-off associated with each new product opportunity than centralized 
firms. By combining these pay-off schedules in the top of Figure 9 and the fact that 
decentralized firms can capture a greater proportion of these pay-offs, the pay-offs 
associated with different levels of funding can be estimated. For illustrative purposes, it is 
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assumed that centralized firms are able to capture 90 % of the pay-offs that decentralized 
firms are able to.  
In this example, based on the quantity of complementary resources, firms can fund 
two, four or six new products. In the decentralized firm case, the best one, two or three 
projects in terms of pay-offs are supported in each business unit. In the centralized case, 
the best two, four and six products for the firm as a whole are supported. The allocation of 
complementary resources to more promising new products in centralized firms will start to 
overcome the impact of reduced incentives as the quantity of complementary resources 
increases and more new products are funded. This results in more centralized firms 
increasing their pay-offs of new products relative to the pay-offs of more decentralized 
firms as the level of complementary resources increases. This can be seen in the bottom of 
Figure 9 with the percentages representing the differences in pay-offs between the firms. 
 
Figure 9: Illustrative example of centralized and decentralized firms new product 
pay-off schedules and pay-offs based on different resourcing levels 
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New products are more dependent on the quantity of complementary resources as 
they are not already established in the market place. Thus, the proportion of sales from new 
products for more centralized firms will increase relative to the proportion of sales from 
new products for more decentralized firms as the quantity of supporting resources 
increases. Thus, this line of argumentation suggests that: 
H1: The quantity of complementary resources negatively moderates the 
relationship between corporate decentralization and the proportion of sales from 
new products such that firms with higher quantities of complementary resources 
will be associated with an increased proportion of sales from new products for 
more centralized firms compared to more decentralized firms. 
 
Moderating impact of concentration of sales of existing product base 
So far I have been largely silent with respect to firms’ portfolios of existing 
products. I will now specifically focus upon the concentration of sales of a firm’s existing 
product portfolio. Namely, is a firm dependent on the sale of a few high ticket items or 
does it have its sales more equally dispersed across a wide variety of products? I examine 
this parameter as it is likely to influence both the allocation of resources to new products 
as well as managerial incentives which in turn will influence the balance of the benefits 
and costs associated with more or less decentralization. 
For more decentralized firms that have a higher concentration of sales from their 
highest selling products, those business units with the highest selling products will tend to 
yield greater influence (e.g., Watson & Wooldridge, 2005). This will result in a greater 
proportion of complementary resources shifting to units that have the more prominent 
products which will limit access to complementary resources by other units with new 
products. Further, within a specific business unit with a smaller portfolio of products for 
which there are a small number of existing products driving sales, managers will tend to 
allocate more supporting resources to those prominent existing products to limit the risk of 
diminishing sales at the business unit level. This will again potentially limit access to 
suitable quantities of complementary resources for the units’ new products. 
Although centralized firms may be reliant on the sales of a few products, managing 
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a single portfolio of new and existing products means that managers have more scope to 
divert resources to new products even if the firm is reliant on the sale of a small number of 
existing products. This is because of the risk mitigation effect of pooling all products into 
one portfolio such that if sales of an existing product are impacted by reduced resourcing, 
other products are there to make up for this shortfall.  
Thus, as the concentration of firms’ portfolios of existing products increases, new 
offers in decentralized firms are likely to receive increasingly lower levels of supporting 
resources compared to the equivalent new products in centralized firms. This is because 
managers in decentralized units will tend to focus complementary resources on existing 
rather than new products as they are less able to afford failures from more uncertain new 
product offerings. Thus, although managers in decentralized units may face higher powered 
incentives thereby engendering more effort, they may be also incentivized to allocate fewer 
complementary resources to these new products thereby limiting the impact of these 
additional efforts. Ultimately, as a result of the decreasing level of complementary 
resources allocated to new products for more decentralized firms as compared to more 
centralized firms, I argue that the proportion of sales of new products will decrease for 
more decentralized firms as compared to more centralized firms. Thus I hypothesize: 
H2: The concentration of sales of a firm’s existing product portfolio negatively 
moderates the relationship between corporate decentralization and the proportion 
of sales from new products such that firms whose sales are more concentrated on 
a few products will be associated with an increased proportion of sales from new 
products for more centralized firms compared to more decentralized firms. 
 
Methods 
Research Context 
The context for this study is the pharmaceutical industry over the 20-year period 
1995 to 2015. This industry has a well-established product development process consisting 
of a sequence of in-vitro discovery activities and in-vitro as well as in-vivo development 
tasks that involve multiple phases of clinical trials (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Petrova, 
2014). During the development process drug-candidates are both tested for safety and 
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efficacy and further developed through, for example, evaluation of their mechanisms of 
action and optimizing their delivery to target areas of patients’ bodies. Drug-candidates are 
largely patented (e.g., Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004) and 
represent a potential new offering. In this study new drugs launched into the market place 
following approval by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) represent the new 
products created by firms. 
This context provides a rich domain for testing the hypotheses described above for 
three key reasons. First, the conversion of drug-candidates into final marketed products 
forms the lifeblood of large global pharmaceutical companies ensuring that senior 
managers pay close attention to their innovation pipelines. This focus on new product 
development is illustrated by the large proportion of revenues that are dedicated to funding 
research and development compared to other industries (Strategy &, 2016). Second, firms 
vary in their organization design driven by factors such as geographical location, history 
of mergers, acquisitions and divestments as well as managerial changes (e.g., Pisano, 
2006). These variations in design within firms and over time facilitate an evaluation of how 
such design elements are associated with the ability of firms to refresh their product 
portfolios. Third, with only a limited period of exclusivity afforded by patent protection, 
these firms are looking to capture as much value from their inventions as possible in the 
limited period of time they have before competitors can replicate their technology in the 
form of generic products. Thus, effective commercialization of inventions is critical for 
firms’ on-going viability as the large investment made in R&D needs to be recovered as 
well as generating a return for shareholders.  
 
Data and Sample 
The sample consists of 48 leading pharmaceutical firms over the period 1995 to 
2015. The sample is developed using 2004-6 annual prescription drug sales as defined by 
the Pharmaceutical Executive magazine’s Top 50 Pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Klueter 
et al., 2017). Over this period, 64 firms appear in the Top 50 list. The 16 excluded firms 
are either private firms or do not provide sufficient information on key variables in their 
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public filings. These excluded firms are in the lower half (26-50 ranking in terms of 
pharmaceutical sales) in one or more of the three years in the 2004-6 period. Using the 
mid-point of the sample enables the examination of firms that have at least 10 years of 
history within the sample time-frame prior to any significant M&A event. 33 out of the 48 
sample firms are still in the top 50 pharmaceutical firms in 2015, 12 firms had been 
acquired by other firms in the sample and 3 firms had divested their pharmaceutical 
businesses. Upon acquisition or divestment of their pharmaceutical business these 15 firms 
dropped out of the sample.   
The primary dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 396 firm-year observations 
with an average of 8 observations per firm ranging from 1 to 18 observations over the 20 
year period. This heterogeneity in coverage is driven by the dependent variable (proportion 
of sales from products launched in the focal year) which is sourced from the Evaluate 
Pharma database. Data on firms’ portfolio of inventions under development is sourced from 
the Pharmaprojects clinical trial database (e.g., Chandy et al., 2006; Kapoor & Klueter, 
2015). This data is supplemented with patent data from the European Patent Office Patstat 
database (e.g., Conti et al., 2013), company annual reports/financial filings and financial 
data from Compustat. I supplement this archival, quantitative data with 61 interviews with 
managers from 28 of the sample firms. This enables me to validate my organization design 
measures. See Appendix 3 for further details on interviews. 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable:  The dependent variable pertaining to each of the two 
hypotheses is measured using the proportion of sales from new products launched in the 
current year (1-yr New Sales Proportion). Various scholars have highlighted that the initial 
sales level is indicative of the success of firms’ commercialization of their inventions as 
value needs to be captured rapidly in order to recoup sunk investments in, for example, 
R&D (Gatignon, Weitz, & Bansal, 1990; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). This data is obtained 
from the EvaluatePharma database. Due to the difficulty in collecting such specific 
information on firms’ portfolio of new products the coverage is better for larger US firms 
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over more recent years in my sample and more sporadic for smaller and non-US firms as 
well as earlier years in the sample. Comparing the mean values for key co-variates between 
the sample of 396 firm-years and the overall number of firm year for which other co-variate 
data is available (n = 803) indicates that the sample firm years are larger in terms of the 
firm size variables, such as annual revenues, SGA, patent stock, development portfolio 
size, number of drugs progressing through development portfolio, the number of new drug 
applications and diversity of portfolio. However, the samples are not statistically different 
in terms of key design variables (e.g. corporate decentralization), performance, R&D 
intensity, slack or number of reporting segments. This is consistent with the fact that 
EvaluatePharma has poorer coverage of annual drug sales for smaller firms. Thus, in 
interpreting the results presented below with respect to external validity it is important to 
recognize that the findings pertain to larger pharmaceutical firms.  
 
 Independent Variables: To test the hypotheses, three key independent variables 
are used. First, in order to develop a measure of the degree of corporate decentralization 
top management team data available from company 10-K/20-F/DEF 14A SEC filings and 
Annual Reports is utilized. The use of top management team data to develop high-level 
organizational structural measures is well-established in the strategic management 
literature (e.g., Albert, 2018; Girod & Whittington, 2015; Guadalupe et al., 2014). A 
database of 15,129 executive and extended executive team roles for the sample of firms 
over the period 1995-2015 is developed using these sources. This results in a total of 898 
firm-years of data and an average of 16.8 executive and extended executive roles per firm-
year (standard deviation = 11.1).  
Coding of roles and various facets of organizational decentralization and 
differentiation are undertaken through careful review of the management roles in each 
organization and further validated through review of organizational descriptions from 
companies’ various filings (e.g. as described in the CEO’s letter to shareholders). For those 
firms where top management team (TMT) roles come from multiple sources (e.g. 10-K and 
Annual report) all roles are captured and then allocated to the executive team or extended 
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team based on designations provided in either document. For 28 out of the 48 firms, 
interviews with strategy and R&D managers were conducted to confirm whether the 
measures provided an accurate reflection of their firms’ structures. Due to the limitations 
of access to detailed structural data, the focus is on higher level measures of 
decentralization. The managers within the sample firms interviewed confirmed that the 
structure of the top management team (TMT) provides an accurate reflection of their firms’ 
structures. See Appendix 2 for further details and Figure 10 for an example. 
Figure 10: Illustration of Corporate Decentralization measure 
 
 
In order to develop a measure of Corporate Decentralization, TMT members are 
categorized as general managers, functional administrative managers or product 
administrative managers using the approach developed by Guadalupe et al. (2014). The 
independent variable Corporate Decentralization is therefore determined as a proportion, 
namely the number of general manager (or business unit) roles in a top management team 
divided by the total size of the TMT excluding the CEO (Albert, 2018). These roles relate 
to managers who are responsible for the performance of a defined sub-section of the 
business which may be a geographical area or a specific product area and have defined 
profit & loss responsibilities. To account for firms operating in non-pharmaceutical 
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domains such as bulk chemicals, business unit leads in these areas are excluded. The higher 
the value of this variable, the more decentralized a firm is. If there are no business unit 
roles the firm is defined as having a value equal to zero. Figure 10 illustrates how this 
approach is used to measure Corporate Decentralization for two different firms in the 
sample. This variable is lagged one year relative to the dependent variable as prior 
decisions shaped by firms’ design choices will often take time to shape external market 
outcomes. 
 In order to measure firms’ level of spend on complementary resources, the natural 
log of firms’ selling, general and administrative expenses is utilized to create the variable 
SG&A (e.g., Shin, Kraemer, & Dedrick, 2009). These expenses represent both the direct 
and indirect costs associated with the sale of firms’ existing and new products (Lévesque, 
Joglekar, & Davies, 2012). This variable is lagged one year relative to the dependent 
variable to reflect that investments in supporting resources precede value capture from 
firms’ new products. In using SG&A to estimate the quantity of complementary resources 
for the sale of firms’ portfolio of products, the pharmaceutical industry provides a good 
context as marketing and sales of products represent more than 80 % of SG&A (IHSP, 
2016). Note that in the theoretical development I do not distinguish between resources for 
sale of new and existing products as I argue that an increased level of overall supporting 
resources will disproportionately impact the sale of new products over existing products. 
 The concentration of sales of firms’ existing products is based on the percentage of 
sales from the top 5 products (Top 5 Products). This measure is obtained from the Evaluate 
Pharma database. As a robustness check, I conduct the same analyses using the percentage 
of sales from the top product and top 3 products. 
 
Control Variables: Six sets of control variables are used in the regression analyses. 
First, additional structural design controls are used at the firm-year level such as whether 
or not R&D is centralized. Second, a variety of firm-specific controls such as R&D 
intensity and the stock of patents are utilized. Third, the degree of market competition 
firms’ face in their respective therapeutic areas of focus is also controlled for. Fourth, 
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controls are used pertaining to the degree of diversification of the firm such as the operating 
segments in which it operates. Fifth, the number of successful new drug applications prior 
to the focal year is included as more successful applications will be associated with a higher 
proportion of sales from new products as opposed to existing products. Finally, a series of 
controls are used relating to the properties of firms’ drug-candidate pipelines under 
development. These control variables are summarized in Table 21. 
 
Table 21: Summary of control variables used in this study 
Variable  Description Rationale 
1. Organizational Design controls (lagged one year) 
R&D 
Decentralization 
This variable represents whether firms’ R&D is 
centralized into a single unit or decentralized into 
multiple units covering different domains such as 
product, scientific area etc. This is developed using 
companies’ TMT composition and set to 0 if R&D is 
centralized under a single Head or 1 if it is 
decentralized into separate R&D units addressing 
different technical or product domains. It is akin to 
horizontal integration of R&D. 
 
Firms with centralized R&D units may 
develop different inventions to those with 
decentralized R&D. Further firms that 
differ in the degree of centralization of 
R&D may also differ on their 
dependency on external inventions. 
R&D 
Functional 
Differentiation 
This variable represents whether firms’ research and 
development units are integrated across both functions 
-research and development or are separated into 
individual research and development units. This is 
developed using companies’ TMT composition and 
set to 0 if R&D is functionally integrated under a 
single Head or 1 if R&D is functionally disintegrated 
into separate research and development units with 
separate heads in the top management team. It is akin 
to vertical integration of R&D. 
 
Firms with separate research and 
development units may differ in the 
speed of development of new inventions 
and the quality of inventions progressed 
thereby potentially influencing 
subsequent value capture. 
 
 
2. Firm-level controls (lagged one year) 
Performance  The annual return on assets of the firm (Richard et al., 
2009)  
Higher performing firms may potentially 
develop a higher volume of higher 
quality new products  
R&D Intensity  The annual spend on R&D by a firm as a proportion 
of annual revenues  
Firms that spend a higher proportion of 
their sales on R&D may potentially see 
higher inventive and innovative output 
(e.g., Mairesse & Mohnen, 2005).   
Sales Natural log of Annual Rx and OTC drug sales in focal 
year (not lagged) 
Controls for annual sales of drugs as 
firms that have higher sales may find it 
more challenging to sell a higher 
proportion of new products. Also controls 
for the size of the firm. 
CEO A dummy variable set to 1 if a new CEO was 
appointed in a specific firm-year 
May be the catalyst for a reorganization 
or uptick in performance through, for 
example, increased sales of new products. 
 
Patent Stock Discounted total quantity of patent families granted 
by focal firm (Arora et al., 2014). A 15 % discount 
Controls for firms’ existing knowledge 
collected over a period of time which will 
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Variable  Description Rationale 
rate is used. Similar “stock” measures of a firm’s 
experience in a specific knowledge domain have been 
used in prior studies (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 
1994; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010). Measured in 000s. 
impact whether firms decide to make or 
buy a specific invention. Also helps to 
control for firms’ internal inventive 
capability. 
 
3. Number of new products approved (lagged one year) 
New Approved Number of new molecular entities (NME) approved 
by focal firm in year prior to dependent variable 
(percentage of sales from products launched in year). 
 
More NMEs approved will result in a 
higher proportion of revenues from new 
products. 
4. Competition controls (lagged one year) 
Competition  Measure of competition firms face across their 
development portfolios. Sum of market shares (by 
drug-candidate count) of drug-candidates within all 
development phases per therapeutic class squared 
weighted by contribution to portfolio (i.e. proportion 
of firms’ portfolio a therapeutic class represents 
across all phases) subtracted from 1. Higher value 
signifies firms operate in more competitive 
therapeutic classes 
 
Controls for the degree of competition 
firms face across their portfolio of drug-
candidates. Firms in more competitive 
markets may find it more challenging to 
sell their new products. 
5. Diversification Controls 
Technical 
Diversification 
Measure of technological diversity of firms’ R&D 
efforts. This is estimated using the sum of the squared 
proportions of drug candidates in each therapeutic 
class in a firm’s development portfolio within a focal 
year and subtracted from 1. The larger the value the 
more diversified a firm’s portfolio is across 
therapeutic classes in a specific year. 
Controls for the level of technological 
diversity of a firm’s portfolio. Firms 
undertaking a broader array of 
technological activities may develop 
more novel inventions which may result 
in increased new product sales. 
Category 
Dummy Fixed 
Effects 
Series of dummy variables representing whether a 
firm has operating segments in categories beyond 
pharmaceuticals. Specifically: consumer goods, 
medical devices, animal medication, bulk chemicals, 
nutrition. Also have dummy if firm has a generics 
business. These can vary by firm-year as firm 
acquires or divests specific businesses. 
Control for diversification of firms’ 
businesses beyond pharmaceuticals. For 
example, firms in a more diverse array of 
businesses may focus less effort on the 
sales of new products in the core 
pharmaceutical business. 
6. Development Portfolio level controls (lagged one year) 
Portfolio Total number of development projects firm has from 
pre-clinical to phase 3. Numbers in 100s 
Controls for the size of the existing 
portfolio and the number of future new 
product opportunities firms’ have. Larger 
development portfolios may be 
associated with reduced investment in 
current suite of new products. 
Progress Count of drug candidates that progressed to next stage 
of clinical trials in a focal year. 
Provides an indication of the flow of 
inventions through firms’ pipelines. The 
more candidates flowing through a firm’s 
pipeline the more potential future 
opportunities potentially reducing 
investment in current products. 
External Proportion of externally-sourced drugs in portfolio 
across development portfolio 
Externally-sourced drug-candidates may 
be more difficult to commercialize due to 
issues such as not invented here 
syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
NCE Proportion of portfolio at specific stage of clinical 
development that are new chemical entities (NCE) 
Indication of degree of novelty of 
portfolio. NCEs include no component 
that has been previously approved by the 
FDA. NCE designation from the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
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Variable  Description Rationale 
provides firms with five years of 
marketing exclusivity.23 
Bio Proportion of firms’ portfolio that are biotechnology 
candidates. 
Firms focusing on biotechnology 
products may allocate more resources to 
R&D as opposed to current products. 
 
Portfolio 
Novelty 
The average novelty of a firm’s portfolio of drug 
candidates under development in a specific year based 
on a 0 to 2 scale based on whether, in a specific 
therapeutic class, the mechanism of action and source 
of material are new to the focal firm.  
 
Firms with more novel portfolios of 
products may dedicate more investment 
to R&D rather than capturing value from 
newly launched products. 
7. Other Controls 
Year fixed 
effects 
Series of dummies for each year in sample  
Firm fixed 
effects 
Series of dummies for each firm in sample  
 
 
Methodology  
As the dependent variable is a proportion and bounded between 0 and 1, the 
fractional logit analytical approach is used to test both hypotheses (Papke & Wooldridge, 
1996; Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). The majority of co-variates are lagged one-year with 
respect to the dependent variable. To control for unobserved heterogeneity a variety of 
fixed effects are used such as business category, therapeutic category year, and firm-fixed 
effects.  
To further control for omitted variable bias, propensity score matching models 
(PSM) are used (e.g., Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In order to undertake this matching 
analysis the variable Corporate Decentralization is dichotomized around the median, with 
the value being set to 0 for highly centralized firms and 1 for decentralized firms. All 
covariates in Table 21 are used to match firms that are more or less decentralized. A variety 
of cut-points for Corporate Decentralization are used in creating the dichotomous variable 
and similar results are obtained. Appendix 5 provides further details on the propensity score 
matching process that I utilize in this dissertation chapter and includes details of the first 
stage regression model used in the matching process. 
                                                 
23 https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm386685.pdf 
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Regression analyses are then conducted using matched observations. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level (Petersen, 2009). This helps to reduce the possibility 
that the results are driven by the inherent differences between less and more decentralized 
firms as regular regressions are estimated only on observably equivalent groups.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 22 illustrates the key summary statistics for the sample used in this study. On 
average 2.2 % of revenues come from new products launched in the past year. As illustrated 
in Figure 11 there has been a decline in the proportion of revenues generated by new 
products over the period 1995 to 2015. This is consistent with previous work indicating 
declining productivity in pharmaceutical R&D (e.g., Scannell, Blanckley, Boldon, & 
Warrington, 2012).  
Across the sample of firm-years 28 % of top management team roles (excluding 
CEO) within the pharmaceutical business of each firm are business unit roles. 1-yr New 
Sales Proportion is strongly correlated (>0.4) with R&D intensity and negatively 
correlated with annual drug sales. These results are not entirely surprising as greater R&D 
investment is likely to lead in the creation of more new products and firms that have greater 
sales of drugs will find it more challenging to have a higher proportion of sales of new 
products as the sales threshold for new products increases.  
Further details on the variation of Corporate Decentralization over time are also 
provided in Appendix 4, alongside details on how the other (control) structural variables 
change over time.  
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics for variables used in this study (n = 396 firm-years) 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. 1-yr New Sales Proportion 0.022 0.061 1.00                    
2. Corporate Decentralization 0.283 0.239 -0.07 1.00                   
3. SG&A 8.177 1.338 -0.32 0.08 1.00                  
4. Top 5 products 0.529 0.221 0.06 -0.26 -0.17 1.00                 
5. R&D Decentralization 0.134 0.341 0.16 0.06 0.10 -0.06 1.00                
6. R&D Functional Differentiation 0.205 0.404 -0.08 -0.14 -0.01 0.06 -0.10 1.00               
7. Performance  0.086 0.086 -0.28 -0.01 0.22 0.11 0.02 0.04 1.00              
8. R&D Intensity 0.169 0.169 0.49 -0.12 -0.08 0.33 0.05 0.03 -0.53 1.00             
9. Sales 8.754 1.405 -0.49 0.13 0.92 -0.25 0.05 -0.00 0.34 -0.28 1.00            
10. CEO 0.106 0.308 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 1.00           
11. Patent Stock 1.458 1.429 -0.20 0.09 0.76 -0.29 0.08 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.72 0.05 1.00          
12. New Approved 1.611 1.860 -0.08 0.12 0.45 -0.14 0.08 -0.04 0.19 -0.01 0.45 0.01 0.44 1.00         
13. Competition 0.954 0.030 0.18 -0.11 -0.65 0.19 -0.11 0.05 -0.17 0.02 -0.61 -0.02 -0.67 -0.51 1.00        
14. Technical Diversification 0.783 0.155 -0.23 0.18 0.45 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.40 0.01 0.38 0.31 -0.41 1.00       
15. Portfolio 0.807 0.684 -0.20 0.16 0.75 -0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.72 0.07 0.77 0.59 -0.83 0.46 1.00      
16. Progress 11.513 10.811 -0.19 0.17 0.67 -0.20 0.05 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.64 0.07 0.70 0.52 -0.69 0.42 0.88 1.00     
17. External 0.514 0.192 0.10 -0.03 -0.28 0.06 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.22 -0.06 -0.28 -0.24 0.30 -0.30 -0.32 -0.26 1.00    
18. NCE 0.540 0.192 -0.19 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.18 -0.22 0.55 0.27 0.25 -0.27 1.00   
19. Bio  0.227 0.162 -0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.17 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.26 -0.04 -0.07 0.15 -0.60 1.00  
20. Portfolio Novelty 0.978 0.240 0.19 -0.09 -0.74 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.69 -0.04 -0.63 -0.41 0.63 -0.50 -0.66 -0.57 0.34 -0.23 -0.06 1.00 
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Figure 11: Variation in proportion of revenues generated from new products 
launched in the past year  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main analysis 
 Table 23 and Table 24 illustrate the results of the key analyses used to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Models 1-5 (Table 23) are for unmatched firm-year observations with 
respect to corporate decentralization and Models 6-10 (Table 24) illustrate the same 
analyses using propensity score matched samples (the co-variate balance table is illustrated 
in Table 25). I also tested for multicollinearity between variables. Variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for each of the key variables were below 6.3, with the overall VIF of 2.7, which is 
substantially below the guideline threshold of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
Across the majority of models, as would be expected a higher number of newly approved 
drug candidates in the prior year is associated with a higher proportion of revenues from 
new products in the following year as illustrated by the statistically significant positive 
coefficient for New Approved.  
Interestingly in all models (1 – 10) the coefficient for Corporate Decentralization 
is positive and statistically significant (at the 95 % confidence level or above). It appears 
that firms which are more decentralized tend to be associated with a higher proportion of 
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revenues from new products. A one standard deviation increase (0.28) in corporate 
decentralization (using Model 5) is associated with a 0.7 percentage point higher proportion 
of sales from new products launched in the current year (note sample mean is 2.2 %). As 
highlighted in the theory section of this paper, due to arguments in both directions the 
relationship between Corporate Decentralization and the proportion of sales of new 
products is an empirical question. It appears that, on average, greater corporate 
decentralization is associated with more effective commercialization of products’ 
inventions suggesting that the greater effectiveness of higher powered incentives and 
greater local market knowledge overcome less effective resource allocation and decreased 
functional expertise. 
 Hypothesis 1 is supported in models 3 and 5 (non-matched sample) as well as 8 and 
10 (matched sample) through the statistically significant (at the 90 % confidence level or 
above) negative interaction term between SG&A and Corporate Decentralization. Thus, 
the difference between more centralized and less decentralized firms in terms of the 
proportion of sales that they are able to capture from their recently launched products 
declines at higher levels of SG&A. In terms of the magnitude of the impact, for firms at the 
10th percentile of SG&A a one standard deviation increase in Corporate Decentralization 
is associated with a 0.7 % point higher proportion of sales from new products. However, 
at the 90th percentile of SG&A a one standard deviation increase in Corporate 
Decentralization has no statistically significant association with the proportion of sales 
from new products. Namely, at higher levels of SG&A the proportion of sales from new 
products for more centralized firms increases relative to that for more decentralized firms 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Figure 12a graphically illustrates the interaction between 
Corporate Decentralization and SG&A. 
  Hypothesis 2 is supported in models 4 and 5 (non-matched sample) as well as 9 
and 10 (matched sample) through the statistically significant (at the 90 % confidence level 
or above) negative interaction term between Corporate Decentralization and Top 5 
Products. Thus, the difference between more centralized and less decentralized firms in 
terms of the proportion of sales that they are able to capture from their recently launched 
products declines at higher product concentration levels. In terms of the magnitude of the 
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impact, for firms at the 10th percentile of Top 5 Products a one standard deviation increase 
in Corporate Decentralization is associated with a 1.1 % point higher proportion of sales 
from new products. However, at the 90th percentile of Top 5 Products a one standard 
deviation increase in Corporate Decentralization has no statistically significant association 
with the proportion of sales from new products. Namely, at higher levels of Top 5 Products 
the proportion of sales from new products for more centralized firms increases relative to 
that for more decentralized firms consistent with Hypothesis 2. Figure 12b graphically 
illustrates the interaction between Corporate Decentralization and Top 5 Products. 
 
Figure 12: Chart illustrating the interaction between Corporate Decentralization and 
(a) SG&A (mean centered) (b) Top 5 Products. Corporate decentralization is set to 
25th percentile for Centralized and 75th percentile for Decentralized. 
 
        (a)       (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Similar results are obtained for the propensity score matching models using 
different values of Corporate Decentralization to dichotomize this variable (0.08 – 0.40) 
as well as different caliper matching radii. This provides some additional confidence in the 
validity of the results presented in this section. 
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Table 23: Main analysis. Fractional logit unmatched models 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Corporate Decentralization  1.398** 0.981** 2.468** 2.099** 
  (0.325) (0.363) (0.618) (0.659) 
H1: Corporate Decentralization x SG&A   -0.497*  -0.507* 
   (0.238)  (0.242) 
H2: Corporate Decentralization x Top 5 Products    -2.044* -2.149+ 
    (1.035) (1.119) 
SG&A 0.425+ 0.451* 0.452* 0.495* 0.498* 
 (0.242) (0.225) (0.207) (0.223) (0.206) 
Top 5 Products -1.078 -1.550* -1.314+ -1.467* -1.215+ 
 (0.781) (0.712) (0.708) (0.695) (0.699) 
R&D Decentralization -0.078 -0.047 -0.169 -0.038 -0.164 
 (0.234) (0.246) (0.225) (0.245) (0.221) 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.423 0.550 0.584+ 0.571 0.608+ 
 (0.347) (0.342) (0.347) (0.348) (0.353) 
Performance -0.328 -0.320 -0.221 -0.374 -0.265 
 (0.976) (1.012) (0.945) (0.990) (0.932) 
R&D Intensity -0.470 -0.511 -0.421 -0.585 -0.488 
 (0.651) (0.649) (0.655) (0.629) (0.636) 
Sales -0.77** -0.76** -0.76** -0.75** -0.75** 
 (0.246) (0.253) (0.245) (0.244) (0.235) 
CEO 0.177 0.287 0.290 0.290 0.293 
 (0.244) (0.226) (0.214) (0.215) (0.202) 
Patent Stock -0.52** -0.47** -0.49** -0.46* -0.48** 
 (0.188) (0.176) (0.183) (0.177) (0.182) 
New Approved 0.130* 0.131* 0.136** 0.129* 0.134** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) 
Competition 0.0254 -1.073 -1.710 -0.595 -1.186 
 (4.200) (4.151) (4.402) (4.299) (4.579) 
Technical Diversification 0.0367 0.190 0.144 0.298 0.258 
 (0.497) (0.463) (0.463) (0.459) (0.463) 
Portfolio -0.020 0.069 -0.035 0.135 0.0329 
 (0.384) (0.442) (0.454) (0.443) (0.454) 
Progress 0.038* 0.040* 0.040* 0.040* 0.041* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
External 0.092 -0.008 -0.126 -0.016 -0.130 
 (0.674) (0.622) (0.566) (0.626) (0.572) 
NCE 0.621 0.306 0.255 0.159 0.105 
 (0.686) (0.643) (0.622) (0.675) (0.668) 
Bio -0.512 -0.501 -0.413 -0.632 -0.551 
 (0.674) (0.651) (0.595) (0.686) (0.645) 
Portfolio Novelty 1.326 1.671 1.853 1.649 1.831 
 (1.241) (1.244) (1.217) (1.223) (1.189) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Matching N N N N N 
N 396 396 396 396 396 
Log Likelihood -32.38 -32.26 -32.23 -32.25 -32.22 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
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Table 24: Main Analysis. Fractional logit propensity score matched (PSM) samples 
(caliper=0.00085). Corporate Decentralization is dichotomized around median for 
matching 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion Model 6 Model 6 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Corporate Decentralization  0.581* 0.505* 2.641** 2.268* 
  (0.284) (0.247) (1.025) (1.028) 
H1: Corporate Decentralization    -0.392+  -0.330+ 
x SG&A   (0.201)  (0.198) 
H2: Corporate Decentralization     -4.628* -3.925+ 
x Top 5 Products    (2.186) (2.221) 
SG&A 0.997 0.364 0.334 1.175 0.987 
 (0.694) (0.805) (0.806) (0.904) (0.892) 
Top 5 Products 0.840 0.697 0.907 5.957 5.407 
 (1.781) (2.160) (1.991) (3.710) (3.421) 
R&D Decentralization -2.25** -2.03** -2.00** -1.74* -1.76* 
 (0.853) (0.780) (0.743) (0.800) (0.769) 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.419 0.357 0.700 1.227+ 1.375* 
 (0.608) (0.605) (0.607) (0.700) (0.634) 
Performance -4.22 -6.06* -7.75** -5.95* -7.44** 
 (3.325) (2.498) (2.223) (2.338) (2.235) 
R&D Intensity -7.84** -8.75** -9.77** -7.81** -8.78** 
 (2.066) (1.819) (2.131) (1.866) (2.217) 
Sales -0.478 0.215 0.262 -0.575 -0.380 
 (0.596) (0.717) (0.724) (0.811) (0.812) 
CEO 0.255 0.463 0.239 0.205 0.0562 
 (0.457) (0.445) (0.337) (0.382) (0.297) 
Patent Stock 0.127 0.171 0.0646 0.204 0.124 
 (0.322) (0.346) (0.341) (0.356) (0.344) 
New Approved 0.223** 0.170** 0.133* 0.118+ 0.0939 
 (0.075) (0.058) (0.052) (0.068) (0.063) 
Competition -13.38 -16.25+ -15.40+ -21.64* -20.17* 
 (9.561) (9.047) (8.596) (8.837) (7.884) 
Technical Diversification 0.127 -0.017 0.122 1.234 1.171 
 (0.991) (1.065) (1.020) (1.446) (1.425) 
Portfolio 1.720** 1.895** 1.651* 1.531** 1.385* 
 (0.661) (0.588) (0.687) (0.558) (0.620) 
Progress -0.036 -0.033 -0.009 -0.012 0.005 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) 
External 7.197** 7.174** 7.868** 7.522** 8.014** 
 (1.793) (1.702) (2.292) (1.589) (2.093) 
NCE 4.754 3.768 3.989+ 5.833* 5.733* 
 (2.951) (2.716) (2.360) (2.686) (2.662) 
Bio 6.221* 5.156* 5.000* 6.508* 6.177* 
 (2.561) (2.485) (2.328) (2.614) (2.631) 
Portfolio Novelty 8.629** 10.52** 10.15** 9.746** 9.572** 
 (1.944) (1.994) (1.950) (2.039) (2.022) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Matching PSM PSM PSM PSM PSM 
N 129 129 129 129 129 
Log Likelihood -10.00 -9.992 -9.982 -9.982 -9.975 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
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Table 25: H1-2 balance tests for propensity score matching model 
(Caliper=0.00085). The variable Corporate Decentralization is dichotomized around 
the mean value. Year grouping variable is used as another covariate with 
observation years being grouped into four 5-year periods. 
 
 Mean  
p>|t| Variable Corporate 
Decentralization   
Mean Value 
Corporate 
Decentralization < 
Mean Value 
SG&A 8.39 8.25 0.543 
Top 5 Products 0.47 0.46 0.55 
R&D Decentralization 0.06 0.11 0.231 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.22 0.29 0.344 
Performance  0.09 0.07 0.051 
R&D Intensity 0.16 0.14 0.232 
Sales 8.98 8.77 0.339 
CEO 0.11 0.07 0.387 
Patent Stock 1.67 1.71 0.871 
New Approved 1.44 1.14 0.238 
Competition 0.95 0.95 0.77 
Technical Diversification 0.80 0.80 0.867 
Portfolio 0.86 0.79 0.483 
Progress 11.8 10.5 0.41 
External 0.53 0.53 0.954 
NCE 0.55 0.53 0.436 
Bio  0.25 0.22 0.298 
Portfolio Novelty 0.97 0.97 0.854 
Year  2.67 2.65 0.938 
 
 
Supplemental analyses 
Three supplemental analyses are conducted (also see Appendix 6 and 7). Two of 
these supplemental analyses are focused on testing the robustness of the main results. The 
other analysis examines the mechanisms outlined in the theory section of this paper through 
evaluating how product functional units (Guadalupe et al., 2014) that have the impact of 
centralizing more decentralized firms influence my main results. 
First, in the main analyses a lag of one year is used between the measure of 
Corporate Decentralization and New Sales Proportion. However, the degree of Corporate 
Decentralization both prior and concurrent with the first year of sales of a new product 
may be linked to the outcome of the proportion of sales from new products launched in the 
focal year. Namely, effort undertaken prior to the launch of the product and concurrently 
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with the first year of sales of the new product could drive the proportion of sales from new 
products. As a result, two and three year rolling averages of Corporate Decentralization, 
SG&A and Top 5 Products are developed based on the values of these variables in the same 
year as the first year of sales of new products and the prior one or two years. Models 11 
and 12 use the 2-year and 3-year rolling averages for these variables (Table 26). It can be 
seen that all three hypotheses continue to be supported, though for the 2-year rolling 
averages Hypothesis 3 is only directionally supported (p=0.25). Thus it appears that my 
theoretical arguments also apply for firms’ structures, levels of supporting resources and 
product concentrations averaged over multiple observation windows. 
 
Table 26: Supplemental analyses. Models 11 and 12 examine 2- and 3-year rolling 
averages of Corporate Decentralization, SG&A and Top 5 Products. Models 13 and 14 
focus on different measures for product portfolio concentration i.e. percentage of 
sales from Top 1 or 3 products. 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 2-year  
roll avg. 
3-yr  
roll avg. 
Top 
1 Product  
Top 
3 Products  
     
Corporate Decentralization 7.736** 10.01** 1.579** 1.552** 
 (2.598) (3.343) (0.477) (0.591) 
Corporate Decentralization x SG&A -0.719** -0.906** -0.508* -0.437* 
 (0.274) (0.326) (0.246) (0.220) 
Corporate Decentralization  -2.138 -4.390+ -2.949+ -1.177 
x Top 5  (Models 11/12), 3 (13) or 1 (14) Products (1.862) (2.618) (1.750) (1.200) 
Controls (Table 21) Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 386 367 396 396 
Log Likelihood -30.09 -27.23 -32.23 -32.20 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
 
 
 Second, I examine how the main results are dependent on the measure of 
concentration of firms’ product portfolios beyond the percentage of sales associated with 
the top 5 products. I evaluate how the main results change with the proportion of sales from 
the top selling one and three products. These results are outlined in Models 13 and 14 
(Table 26). The main results are broadly supported, however the coefficient for Corporate 
Decentralization x Top 3 Products is negative but not statistically significant. Thus, I 
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continue to broadly find support for my hypotheses.  
Finally, as described by Guadalupe et al. (2014), top management team roles can 
fall into three categories, product functional (e.g. sales and marketing, R&D), 
administrative functional (e.g. finance, IT) and business unit roles. While the measure used 
to capture decentralization examines the proportion of business unit roles it assumes 
product and administrative functional roles play a similar role (e.g., Albert, 2018). 
However, product functional units can have the impact of more strongly centralizing 
certain elements of business units’ activities associated with the commercialization of their 
new products. For example, firms may have a corporate sales and marketing group that 
support the activities of business units. However, this takes away some of the discretion 
that business units have in undertaking their commercialization strategies. As a result of 
this reduced business unit discretion, the impact of corporate decentralization on the 
proportion of sales from new products launched in the focal year is likely to decrease. Thus, 
based on the empirical observation above the negative relationship between Corporate 
Decentralization and the proportion of sales of new products should become weaker with 
a higher number of product functional roles/units. 
In order to evaluate the impact of an increased proportion of product functional 
units, I examine Model 2 in Table 23 for the bottom 20 % of firm-years with respect to the 
proportion of functional roles with the remaining sample (other 80 % of observations) as 
illustrated in Models 15 and 16 in Table 27. The coefficient for R&D Decentralization is 
higher in the low product administrative role sample than in the remaining sub-sample. 
Comparing the coefficients for Corporate Decentralization across Models 15 and 16 using 
a Wald test, the coefficient for Corporate Decentralization in Model 15 is significantly 
greater than that in Model 16 at the 90 % confidence level consistent with the line of 
argumentation above. Namely, it appears that for a lower proportion of product functional 
roles/units that business units have greater discretion as to the actions that they can take to 
commercialize their inventions and as a result we see a stronger impact of decentralization 
on the proportion of sales from new products. Effectively, a higher proportion of more 
product functional roles reduces the differences between firms that are more or less 
decentralized. 
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Table 27: Supplemental analyses. Models 15 and 16 represent sub-samples of firm-
years. The analysis compares those observations with the lowest proportion of 
product functional roles (top 20 %) with the remainder of the sample.  
 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion Model 15 
Bottom 20 % 
Model 16 
Remainder 
Corporate Decentralization 0.0432** 0.0228+ 
 (0.00481) (0.0123) 
   
SG&A 0.0805** 0.0487** 
 (0.00524) (0.0160) 
Top 5 Products -0.265** -0.0443 
 (0.0172) (0.0271) 
R&D Decentralization 0.0139* 0.00902 
 (0.00604) (0.00834) 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.0391** 0.00422 
 (0.00535) (0.00933) 
Performance 0.226** 0.0935+ 
 (0.0362) (0.0472) 
R&D Intensity 0.216** 0.103* 
 (0.0483) (0.0458) 
Sales -0.0168 -0.0577** 
 (0.00999) (0.0167) 
CEO 0.0168** 0.00363 
 (0.00567) (0.00524) 
Patent Stock 0.00415 -0.00279 
 (0.00393) (0.00665) 
New Approved 0.00102 0.00177 
 (0.00134) (0.00148) 
Competition 1.890** 0.0855 
 (0.275) (0.139) 
Technical Diversification -0.00367 0.0160 
 (0.0171) (0.0221) 
Portfolio 0.0816** 0.00882 
 (0.00987) (0.00793) 
Progress 0.000140 0.000268 
 (0.000322) (0.000336) 
External -0.112** -0.0417 
 (0.0107) (0.0333) 
NCE -0.148** -0.0159 
 (0.0332) (0.0298) 
Bio -0.368** -0.0310 
 (0.0770) (0.0336) 
Portfolio Novelty -0.0141 0.0707 
 (0.0150) (0.0451) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y 
N 79 317 
R2 0.992 0.594 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level.  
OLS fixed-effects regression 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 Scholars have illustrated how firms’ organization designs can influence their 
innovation outcomes (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 2014; Tushman et al., 
2010). However, these prior studies have tended to examine innovation as an outcome 
rather than a process not highlighting the differences in activities associated with the 
various stages of the innovation process (e.g., Keum & See, 2017). With respect to the 
latter stages of the innovation process, scholars have highlighted the benefits of stand-alone 
units for nurturing new inventions (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman et al., 
2010). However, these studies have focused on inventions that represent a significant 
departure from firms’ existing businesses. In contrast firms often manage a pipeline of 
inventions that enables them to deliver a steady stream of new products to market (e.g., 
Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014).  
 In this study, I argue that firms face a challenging balancing act with respect to the 
relationship between their organization design and their innovation outcomes. On the one 
hand, greater decentralization (more divisonalized as opposed to functionally aligned) is 
associated with the more effective use of incentives and greater local market knowledge 
but comes at the cost of the less effective allocation of complementary resources and 
reduced functional expertise. Empirically, I find that firms that are more decentralized are 
associated with the sale of a higher proportion of new products launched in the current 
year. I theoretically argue that this primary relationship between decentralization and the 
proportion of sales from new products is moderated by two factors that can influence the 
allocation of complementary resources (SG&A) that facilitates the sales of new and 
existing products as well as managerial incentives.  
First, SG&A moderates the primary relationship because as the level of supporting 
resources increases, business units increasingly compete for more available resources. This 
results in less effective allocation of resources to the sales of new and existing products 
with a greater impact on new products which are more dependent on these resources. Thus 
the balance shifts towards decentralization being less advantageous. Second, the 
concentration of sales of products moderates the primary relationship. In this case, business 
units with the more prominent products may starve units with new products of sufficient 
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resources impacting the proportion of sales from new products, again making 
decentralization less advantageous. Thus, both factors in turn reduce the difference 
between more and less decentralized firms in terms of their proportion of sales from new 
products.   
 This paper makes three key contributions. First, this study contributes theoretically 
to the re-emergent organization design literature (e.g., Greenwood & Miller, 2010; 
Puranam et al., 2014) by illustrating a key trade-off firms face when organizing to innovate. 
Namely, greater decentralization is associated with the more effective use of incentives and 
greater local market knowledge but comes at the cost of reduced functional scale and units 
competing for resources which can lead to inefficient resource allocation. This balance can 
be shifted under circumstances under which resource allocation is likely to be less effective 
or incentives are more prominent. Such circumstances include when greater levels of 
resources are available or there is a power imbalance between business units. Under these 
circumstances, business units may hoard resources that they do not need or units which 
have the products that are responsible for the majority of sales may capture the majority of 
resources. Further, the presence of corporate product functional roles such as Sales and 
Marketing, tend to have a centralizing impact on more decentralized firms lowering the 
effectiveness of incentives and relevance of local knowledge. These insights suggest that 
counter to the prevailing wisdom of the “ambidextrous” firm, creating dedicated units for 
new products may involve significant risk as bigger existing units may compete resources 
away from them limiting the ability of a firm to sell its new products.   
 Second, this study helps to extend our understanding of internal capital allocation 
within large, incumbent firms. I highlight that increasing competition between business 
units may have unintended consequences in that although these highly incentivized units 
may exert more effort to sell their new products they are likely to compete intensively with 
other units for resources to facilitate the sales of new products. This can lead to empire-
building and resource accumulation in units that do not have the best use for these 
resources. In contrast, in more centralized organizations in which resources are allocated 
at an individual product level, resources can be allocated based on the merits of each 
product rather than the business unit. This does not rule out that even in more centralized 
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firms that managers associated with individual products may lobby for more 
complementary resources than they actually can use effectively but the impact is likely to 
be lower. Thus this study helps to illustrate that beyond inventing and developing 
inventions, successful innovation, which involves firms capturing value from new offers, 
requires effective allocation of complementary resources. However, managers face a 
challenging environment within firms. They have to meet the needs of various parties such 
as managers within business units or balancing the needs of existing and new products. 
Finally, this study provides an interesting insight into the existing debate regarding 
organizational slack and firms’ innovation efforts (e.g., Marlin & Geiger, 2015; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996). Namely, organization design can strongly influence how resources are 
allocated and some units within a firm which have greater bargaining power (i.e. those that 
are responsible for a greater proportion of revenues or profitability) may sequester greater 
levels of resources than smaller, less powerful units. Hence different units within the same 
firm may vary as to the level of slack that they face. Thus the relationship between 
resourcing and innovation performance appears to be moderated by organization design. 
Namely how firms are designed can influence how effectively resources are allocated 
thereby impacting subsequent performance. Further, these results suggest that the most 
effective organization structure is contingent on the level of resources available (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967). Namely, greater decentralization may be more effective at lower 
resourcing levels as the more effective use of higher-powered incentives enables firms to 
get a “bigger bang” for their buck from their limited resources but this advantage 
diminishes as the level of resources available increases. 
 This study has a number of limitations that can provide avenues for future research. 
First, this study is conducted in a single industry context which raises external validity 
concerns. Comparing the results of this study with those in other industries will provide 
keen insights into the boundary conditions of the findings associated with this study. 
Second, despite multiple approaches used to control for the endogeneity of a firm’s 
organization design such as the use of multiple control variables and various matching 
strategies, there is still the concern of omitted variable bias. Ideally some form of natural 
experiment can be conducted such that organization design is varied through an exogenous 
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shock such as an external legislative change. Third, the dependent variable used in this 
study, which pertains to the proportion of sales from new products, may not fully capture 
firms’ success in commercializing their new products. New product sales may come at a 
significant cost meaning that the focal firm may be capturing little value from their new 
products and all their surplus is being captured by, for example, suppliers, vendors or end 
customers. Future studies could examine measures of profitability associated with sale of 
firms’ new products. 
 Despite these and other limitations, this study can help to further our understanding 
of the relationship between organization design and the commercialization of firms’ 
inventions. Ultimately, firms face a key trade-off when organizing to effectively 
commercialize their inventions. On the one hand, greater decentralization facilitates the 
more effective use of incentives and is associated with more intimate local market 
knowledge. On the other hand, greater centralization enables greater functional scale and 
expertise and can result in the more effective allocation of resources as they are allocated 
at the product rather than business unit level. My analysis suggests that the benefits of 
decentralization outweigh its disadvantages resulting in an increased proportion of sales 
from new products. However, as the level of investment in supporting resources increases 
or for firms who are more dependent on the sales of a small number of products, the benefits 
of decentralization decrease as resources may not be effectively allocated to new products.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
“The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions grow 
where only one grew before,” Thomas Veblen (US Social Scientist 1857-1929) 
 
What we have Learned from the Work in this Dissertation 
 Innovation is a key driver of a firm’s overall performance. Within an organization, 
innovation involves multiple actors transforming a firm’s knowledge into a final market 
offering. How an organization is designed can shape this transformation by influencing 
actors’ behaviors and interactions. As a result, understanding the relationship between 
organization design and innovation is an area of significant concern to both managers and 
scholars. However, despite its importance the study of organization design waned between 
the late 1980s and 2000s (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). Recently scholars have shifted their 
attention back to this important topic. Yet, despite this resurgence our understanding of the 
relationship between organization design and innovation is somewhat limited. 
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding and examines the relationship 
between various facets of organization design and both how firms innovate as well as their 
innovation outcomes. Ultimately, I sought to answer the following research question: 
How are different facets of organizational decentralization (e.g. R&D, overall 
organization) associated with how firms innovate as well as their innovation 
outcomes across the innovation process spanning invention to ultimate 
commercialization? 
 
The key findings with respect to firms’ innovation outcomes are highlighted in 
Figure 13. I suggest that the commercialization of knowledge occurs through a three stage 
process. This process may not necessarily be linear and firms may iterate between steps or 
even skip steps such as selling raw inventions for commercial gain rather than going to the 
effort of their commercialization as in the case of small, biotech firms or universities. 
Rather, the objective of this framework is to provide a systematic way of unpacking the 
creation and commercialization of firms’ knowledge as encapsulated in their inventions.  
I find that decentralization of R&D into multiple separate units with different 
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reporting lines to the CEO is associated with less original inventions on average but more 
of them, with fewer progressing through the early stages of the development process. 
Decentralization of R&D has a limited impact in the later stages of development and 
commercialization. The result that R&D decentralization is associated with less original 
inventions is consistent with the findings of Argyres and Silverman (2004). However in 
this dissertation I argue that this is as a result of greater knowledge flows in more 
centralized organizations rather than reduced transaction costs. The knowledge flows 
mechanism is supported by supplementary analyses that highlight the benefits of 
centralization are enhanced for firms with a broader array of knowledge. The observation 
that R&D decentralization has a limited impact on firms’ innovation outcomes later in 
development and during commercialization is unsurprising as the role of R&D diminishes 
through the development process as more technical issues get addressed and the focus is 
on manufacturing the product at scale and getting the product to market effectively.  
 
Figure 13: Summary of key findings relating to my first research question 
 
 
The degree of corporate decentralization does not have an impact on invention and 
Invention Development
R&D Decentralization
Corporate Decentralization
Increased Quantity
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Sales from New Products
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early development outcomes. Again, certainly within the empirical context investigated, 
more commercial functions do not tend to get involved in these earlier stages of the 
innovation process so this result is not surprising. However, greater organizational 
decentralization is associated with the progression of more inventions through the later 
stages of development and a greater proportion of sales from new products launched in the 
current year. I argue that these outcomes result from the more effective usage of incentives 
as business units are responsible for their own sub-portfolios of inventions and there is a 
clearer linkage between managerial effort and individual product success. For the later 
stages of development this will translate into more managerial effort enabling more 
products to progress through the later stages of development. With respect to 
commercialization, the impact of organization design on incentives and knowledge flows 
can also influence internal resource allocation. Decentralized designs are associated with 
resources being allocated at the unit level as opposed to the individual innovation project 
level. This can result in less effective resource allocation which is accentuated at higher 
resource levels as increasingly vocal business units receive more resources starving 
resources from more promising projects in other business units. Resource allocation is 
important and can influence firms’ innovation outcomes. As a result, at higher resourcing 
levels, the difference in new product commercial performance between more and less 
decentralized firms declines. 
These results are consistent with those of the ambidexterity and disruptive 
innovation literatures (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman et al., 2010). Namely, 
autonomous business units appear to be more able to translate new technologies into the 
market place. The theoretical rationale in both literatures is similar to an incentives-based 
argumentation in that resource dependency on existing customers can limit the core 
business from innovating new offers that may differ significantly from their existing offers. 
However, the work in this dissertation makes no assumptions about the type of technology 
being developed and commercialized. This work illustrates that more decentralized firms 
will have units that are dependent on their own sub-portfolio of inventions to ensure their 
on-going success as compared to more centralized firms that can pool risk across their 
entire portfolio of inventions under development or on the market. Due to this form of 
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“resource dependency”, I argue that managers in decentralized units will be more 
incentivized to ensure the success of individual inventions as compared to managers that 
are responsible for the entire portfolio of products where failures in one area can be 
countered by successes elsewhere. Further, with a clearer linkage between managerial 
effort and outcomes, decentralization can engender even greater effort through the more 
effective usage of higher powered incentives. As a result of this greater effort, greater 
decentralization is associated with stronger outcomes related to the latter stages of the 
innovation process where effort plays a greater role as compared to invention and early 
development. 
These results highlight two major trade-offs firms face at different stages of the 
innovation process outlined in Figure 13. First, during the invention and development 
stages firms face a knowledge-incentive trade-off. Namely, greater decentralization is 
associated with reduced knowledge flows but the more effective usage of incentives. This 
means centralization can facilitate the creation and early development of more novel 
inventions, whereas decentralization facilitates the creation of more inventions as well as 
their later development. Second, in the commercialization stage firms face a resource 
allocation-incentive trade-off. Namely, greater decentralization is associated with less 
effective resource allocation across new products but enables the more effective usage of 
incentives. This means that at low resource levels, decentralization enables the greater sale 
of new products but at higher resourcing levels, centralization may be more effective. 
With respect to how firms innovate, I find that decentralization of R&D is 
associated with sourcing a greater proportion of inventions externally that are subsequently 
developed internally. I argue that this is because decentralized R&D units are more 
incentivized to progress inventions through to fruition rather than build internal capabilities 
to create inventions internally. Decentralized R&D units will suffer from reduced intra-
organizational knowledge flows such that less original inventions will be created 
necessitating them to rely more on external sources for such inventions. I also find that this 
greater proportion of externally sourced inventions primarily comes from licensing which 
is generally under the control of individual business units as a mode of sourcing inventions 
externally as it is relatively low cost and risk. In contrast sourcing via alliances or 
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acquisitions generally incurs greater additional cost (this can be in terms of time and 
money) and is higher risk thereby generally requiring approval at levels above the business 
unit at a more corporate level.  
Further, consistent with the fact that decentralized R&D units are less able to create 
more original inventions internally, the difference in the proportion of externally sourced 
inventions is primarily driven by more novel inventions. However, for highly novel 
inventions there is no difference in the proportion of inventions sourced externally between 
firms with centralized and decentralized R&D. This suggests that even firms with 
centralized R&D and more effective access to a firm’s broader knowledge base may not 
have access to the relevant knowledge internally to create highly novel inventions meaning 
that they have to be sourced externally. Thus, internal R&D design through its influence 
on incentives and knowledge flows can shape whether invention resources are allocated 
within the focal firm or externally. This serves to illustrate that internal design and firm 
boundary choices are closely related and cannot be seen as being independent strategic 
choices that managers make. 
 
Primary Contributions to the Extant Literature 
 The work in this dissertation makes five primary contributions to the strategic 
management literature. First, by breaking down the innovation process into more granular 
stages (e.g., Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Keum & See, 2017) this dissertation helps to 
integrate the organization design and innovation literatures more closely. Much prior work 
in the innovation domain has tended to conflate the various stages of the innovation process 
(e.g., Garud et al., 2013). Using this approach helps to highlight that the same organization 
design choice (i.e. increased decentralization) may have different outcomes depending on 
whether it pertains to firms’ invention or development activities. This has broader 
implications for future studies relating to organization design in that the relevant design 
choice must be closely mapped to the specific activities being undertaken. Broad measures 
of design may not be able to capture how such choices can impact a targeted set of 
organizational outcomes, leading to misleading or null inferences. This dissertation 
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therefore highlights an important additional contingency beyond, for example, the type of 
innovation, when investigating the relationship between firms’ design parameters and their 
innovation outcomes, namely the innovation process stage. Thus, it is important to 
understand where (in organization e.g. R&D) and when (in the relevant process e.g. 
invention stage) design choices are made. This may help to reconcile the varied findings 
within the extant literature pertaining to how firms’ design elements can impact their 
innovation outcomes as these studies focus on different aspects of “where” and “when”.  
 Second, this dissertation provides a theoretical contribution in that it extends recent 
work combining both knowledge-based and organizational economics-based theories (e.g., 
Argyres, 2011; Argyres et al., 2012; Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). 
Whereas previous studies combining both theoretical lenses have focused on the 
boundaries of the firm, this dissertation uses their integration to examine how internal 
design parameters can impact various organizational outcomes.  
Third, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on the capability-based view 
of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991). I argue that firms’ design features, such as the extent to 
which they decentralize certain parts of their organization, can strongly influence firms’ 
access to their broader knowledge base. Thus, internal design parameters can shape firms’ 
innovation capabilities and influence whether firms undertake these activities in-house or 
externally. This dissertation can therefore provide some insight into the foundations of 
firms’ capabilities (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2007).  
 Fourth, this dissertation extends recent work investigating how firms’ internal 
design elements can shape their decision to innovate internally or externally (e.g., Arora et 
al., 2014; Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017). This work has primarily examined the sourcing 
of knowledge in the form of patents as opposed to more fully refined inventions which 
forms the focus of this dissertation. Further, this work has not examined the type of 
knowledge sourced or the sourcing mode. Such an analysis provides insights into what 
shapes firms’ integration of external inventions addressing a key gap in the open innovation 
literature as there has been  “a relative dearth of research related to integrating [External 
Inventions]” (West & Bogers, 2014).  
Finally, this dissertation highlights the important relationship between firms’ 
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organization design, resource allocation and commercialization of their inventions. 
Consistent with prior studies, greater decentralization can adversely impact how firms 
allocate their resources (e.g., Bardolet et al., 2011; Bardolet et al., 2010; Stein, 1997). It 
appears that greater decentralization and its associated higher powered incentives can result 
in business units competing intensively for resources to support the sales of their new 
products. This, in turn, can result in the less effective allocation of resources for more 
decentralized firms which can lead to reduced sales of new products. This suggests that 
there is a “dark side” associated with the creation of autonomous units to facilitate the sale 
of new offers (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman et al., 2010). Namely, despite 
their creation they may not garner sufficient resources to aid effective commercialization 
of new products. Sometimes keeping new products closer to the core business may be a 
good strategy. 
 
Limitations 
 As with any research effort, the work described in this dissertation proposal suffers 
from multiple limitations that can form the focus of future research endeavors. First, a 
common issue that plagues any research involving firms’ endogenous, strategic choices is 
that of omitted variable bias and concerns with effective identification. This issue affects 
all three of my dissertation chapters. The presence of natural experiments in which an 
exogenous shock results in firms altering some aspect of their organization design or a 
specific strategic choice appear to be limited and difficult to come by. A more promising 
route is to instrument for key strategic choices and undertake two-stage least squares 
regression analyses (e.g., Angrist & Pischke, 2008). However my several attempts at 
finding a suitable instrument for the design parameters on which I focus were unsuccessful 
and fell prey to violating one or both of the key assumptions required for the identification 
of a suitable instrument i.e. relevance and exclusion. A potential alternative avenue is to 
examine some form of laboratory experiment where more or less decentralized teams that 
are randomly allocated are tasked to perform specific innovation tasks. This experimental 
approach is starting to gain some traction within the organization design domain (e.g., 
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Keum & See, 2017). 
Second, these studies have been conducted in a single industry context which 
potentially limits the external validity of my findings. Further I have focused on a product 
based industry that is highly regulated and firms live or die through their innovation 
pipelines. My findings may be very different in more service-focused or asset light 
industries with faster commercialization lifecycles and no hard line between research and 
development. For example, the development of phone apps is likely to follow a different 
innovation pathway to pharmaceuticals meaning that the impact of various organization 
design features could be very different in this industry to the observations I make in this 
dissertation. Studying similar phenomena in very different industries may provide some 
unique insights. 
Third, the internal organization design measures I use in this dissertation are still 
relatively crude.  There is some merit to undertaking single company studies in which more 
granular and specific organization design measures can be developed and their impact on 
innovation outcomes evaluated. Focusing on a single company and undertaking an in-depth 
study of their organization design attributes opens the exciting opportunity of undertaking 
field experiments in which specific design features are randomly allocated to different parts 
of their organization and their impact on particular innovation outcomes evaluated.   
Fourth, although I examine the mechanisms which I argue link organization design 
to firms’ innovation outcomes, there is an opportunity to more precisely understand how 
design can impact these innovation outcomes. For example, there is an opportunity to 
understand how knowledge flows through organizations at a more micro-level through 
individual interactions between scientists. Through then examining how different design 
features impact these individual level interactions a richer picture of how design can impact 
innovation can be delivered. It may be the case that highly incentivized managers of 
scientists in more decentralized units frown upon interactions with scientists in other units 
and encourage them to focus on their own research projects thereby limiting knowledge 
flows. Similarly, examining how greater incentives can engender greater managerial efforts 
at different stages in the innovation process would further help to better our understanding 
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of how design can impact innovation. For example, do managers in decentralized units 
seek ways to streamline the later stages of development to ensure a speedier progression? 
 
Future Research Opportunities 
 Future research associated with this dissertation falls into three categories, short 
term enhancement of the three papers in this dissertation in preparation for submission to 
leading management journals (1 year time-frame), medium term projects building on the 
work in this dissertation (3 year time frame) and longer term research themes that will help 
shape my ultimate research identity (greater than 3 years).  
 
Short-term (<1 year) focus 
In the short-term my focus will be on Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I can further 
control for the portfolio of firms’ innovation projects and existing products by including 
controls for the demography of firms’ exiting product patent portfolio. It may be the case 
that firms with a larger proportion of products whose patents are about to expire may place 
a greater emphasis on the sourcing of new inventions externally. Potentially, the industry 
level of external sourcing of inventions could be used to instrument external sourcing of 
individual firms.  
 In Chapter 4, additional work will be focused on two primary areas. First, I will 
explore the potential to measure the distribution of new products across different business 
units within decentralized firms. This will help to provide greater confidence as to the 
theoretical arguments provided in this chapter. I will be able to observe if new and existing 
products are uniformly or unevenly present across a firm’s business units. This can help to 
provide some evidence to suggest that larger business units divert resources from smaller 
business units with new product opportunities. Second, I will conduct additional interviews 
with managers within select centralized and more decentralized firms in my sample to 
garner more qualitative insights into the resource allocation process.  
 156 
 
 
Medium-term (1-3 year) opportunities 
In the medium term, there are two primary areas which are likely to form the focus 
of my on-going research program. First, the work that I describe in this dissertation is 
focused on understanding the relationship between various elements of organization design 
and firms’ innovation outcomes, however firms will often change their structures which 
can have an impact on their innovation outcomes (e.g., Karim & Kaul, 2015). One 
corporate strategy that firms may undertake that changes their internal organization design 
involves the divestiture of business units. However, few studies have examined the impact 
of divestitures of elements of firms’ businesses on the innovation performance of firms 
(e.g., Datta, 2003; Moschieri & Mair, 2011).  
 When examining how a divestiture could impact the innovation output of a firm it 
is unclear whether the impact will be harmful or beneficial. A common rationale for firms 
divesting businesses is that it enables them to focus on their core business. For example, 
Merck & Co. divested its consumer business in 2014 based on the rationale: 
“the Company [Merck & Co.] divested its Consumer Care (“MCC”) business to Bayer, 
which provided capital to the Company to better resource its core areas of focus”, 
2014 10-K Merck & Co. 
 
This greater focus can manifest itself in multiple ways such as channeling more 
resources into the core business (e.g., Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004), increased managerial 
attention (e.g., Ocasio, 1997) or the ability to manage a smaller portfolio of activities more 
effectively (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014). Ultimately, with increased managerial attention 
and greater resources at hand, firms should be more able to innovate more successfully. 
 However, divestitures can result in the loss of important knowledge and capabilities 
that were of importance to the business in its innovation efforts. This knowledge may be 
highly tacit (e.g., Grant, 1996) making it more challenging to access it through the open 
market potentially limiting the innovative capacity of a firm to address more challenging 
problems (e.g., Macher & Boerner, 2012). Further, organizational routines may be 
disrupted that could impact innovation activities in the core business especially if the 
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divested business is in a related industry (e.g., Feldman, 2013). Such factors may result in 
divestitures of businesses adversely affecting the innovation outcomes of the focal firm. 
 This balance of reallocation of resources and knowledge loss will be dependent 
upon whether the business divested is a core or non-core business. In contrast to the case 
of a core business, a non-core business unit divestiture will be associated with a limited 
loss of key tacit knowledge but enables the reallocation of resources to the core business. 
In undertaking this work it is important to make this distinction between core and non-core 
businesses as the knowledge-loss/resource reallocation balance will shift significantly.  
The impact of these mechanisms (reduced firm knowledge and resource 
reallocation) on firms’ invention outcomes is also influenced by firms’ internal 
organization designs. Work in this dissertation and prior studies have highlighted that 
organization design can shape how resources are allocated (e.g., Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 
2005; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Rajan et al., 2000). For example, resources may be 
allocated at the business unit or individual project level depending on design (Bardolet et 
al., 2010). Further, design can shape how knowledge is accessed and recombined within 
an organization through, for example, influencing knowledge flows or internal transaction 
costs (e.g., Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Thus, organization design can shape the impact 
of divestiture on invention through influencing the relative benefits of resource reallocation 
and costs of lost knowledge. 
I will utilize the pharmaceutical industry dataset developed in this dissertation to 
examine this phenomenon, supplementing it with a set of divestitures of core and non-core 
businesses obtained from the SDC Platinum dataset. This work will enable me to further 
integrate the corporate strategy and organization design literatures as I will evaluate how 
internal design can shape the performance consequences of firms’ divestitures. 
 Second, in the classic Chandlerian sense strategy and structure are intricately 
related (Chandler, 1962). Firms undertake a variety of very different strategies which 
implies that very different structures will be utilized. However, scholars have highlighted 
that it is challenging to fully define a firm’s strategy as there is no defined lexicon to 
describe a firm’s specific strategy (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007). In a parallel stream of 
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work with Mike Mannor, we have developed a text analysis tool that enables the 
quantification of the degree to which firms focus their attention on different strategies. The 
tool consists of 13 strategy categories ranging from areas such as new product development 
to mergers and acquisitions. Through examining the regular communications of 
organizations such as their quarterly analyst calls or letters to shareholders, this tool will 
enable me to start to quantify the strategies to which managers in different firms pay 
attention. I can then examine the structures that firms utilize through evaluating the 
composition of the top management teams akin to the approach that I used in this 
dissertation. 
 Such an analysis of both firms’ articulated strategies and their expressed structures 
can enable me to evaluate how different strategies tend to be associated with specific 
structures. For example, firms that over-emphasize new product development may tend to 
have centralized R&D in which the Head of R&D has a greater relative power within the 
top management team as compared to other parts of the organization such as marketing or 
manufacturing. Alternatively, for low cost and efficiency strategies firms may tend to 
centralize and limit the power of individual business units so that greater economies of 
scale can be realized. The challenge in this form of analysis will be illustrating causality 
but even illustrating the association of different unique strategies with specific organization 
designs could provide some distinctive insights. Theoretically this work could enhance our 
understanding of how structure can enable firms to develop unique capabilities that can 
provide sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
Longer term (>3 years) research agenda 
 As my research progresses, I see my research agenda falling into three key themes 
all focused around different facets of organization design. These three themes are 
illustrated in Figure 14. 
The first theme extends the work in this dissertation and focuses around 
understanding the relationship between organization design and innovation. Chapters 2 and 
4 of this dissertation and other recent work (Eklund & Kapoor, 2019) fall squarely in this 
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stream of work. There are two major questions that I encountered in my management 
interviews that the extant literature does not appear to address adequately. 
 
Figure 14: Long-term research agenda. Example existing and future projects under 
each theme. 
 
First, the popular belief within the extant literature is that inventors free of 
significant hierarchical control are able to create more novel inventions (e.g., Kay, 1988). 
However, as described in this dissertation, innovation is a process and needs to be managed 
to ensure ultimate offerings can be launched into the market place. This tension poses an 
interesting organization-design question: how can organization design facilitate sufficient 
autonomy for inventors to create novel inventions but ensure such inventors are held 
accountable such that they provide tangible outputs for the business? Organization design 
can play a major role in shaping this tension as it influences allocation of decision rights 
and incentives to conform to organizational goals. Recent studies have highlighted the 
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concept of micro-divisionalization which managers perceive helps to address this issue 
(Meyer, Lu, Peng, & Tsui, 2017). However, simply splitting the organization into highly 
autonomous units with decision rights pushed down to more junior managers that are 
highly incentivized may apply to the sales of existing products but is not likely to do so for 
the complex process of innovation that pulls on resources from across an organization. 
Second, organization redesign has been illustrated to impact firms’ innovation 
outcomes (Karim & Kaul, 2015). However, this prior work has tended to focus upon 
recombination of business units that facilitates increased intra-organizational knowledge 
flows that, in turn, enables unique pieces of knowledge to be recombined to create new 
inventions. However, often firms go beyond simply repackaging units but undertake more 
radical or more nuanced redesigns. More radically, firms may move from a technology 
discipline division of labor to a product-based division of labor or vice-versa. A good 
example of this is the move of Microsoft from a divisional organization to a function one 
under Steve Ballmer. At a more nuanced level, firms may maintain existing units but 
allocate greater responsibility across more stages of the innovation process to these units. 
For example, pharmaceutical firms have experimented with the concept of innovation 
centers that are generally quite autonomous and have responsibility for broad swathes of 
the innovation process. Thus, there is an opportunity to examine a broader variety of 
reorganizations upon firms’ innovation outcomes. 
In examining the autonomy-control balance and different forms of organizational 
redesign, multiple empirical methods will need to be employed. Beyond archival analysis, 
alternative methods could include detailed qualitative analysis or laboratory experiments. 
Through, for example, detailed case studies and further managerial interviews I may be 
able to start to identify different forms of organizational redesign firms have utilized in the 
past. Laboratory experiments provide a greater degree of control with respect to internal 
validity as treatment can be randomly allocated. For example, I may be able to exert 
different levels of autonomy and control using varying team designs and see their impact 
on innovation outputs in a laboratory setting. 
The second theme focuses upon how firms’ organization designs can impact 
managerial decision making. For example, a highly decentralized structure with high 
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powered incentives may result in managers making very different decisions to those in 
highly centralized firms where the adverse consequences of ineffective decisions are much 
lower. Chapter 3 falls into this domain as I examine how firms’ internal organization 
designs can influence firms’ capabilities and the key managerial decision of whether to 
create new inventions internally or source them externally. I have also undertaken some 
recent related work that examines how organizations’ capabilities can shape managerial 
decisions (Eklund, 2017).  
The extant literature on managerial decision-making has tended to focus on the 
biases that managers may have (e.g., Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Kahneman & Klein, 
2009), managerial characteristics (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984) or managerial self-
interest (Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, managers operate in a highly complex 
organizational environment and this is likely to shape their specific decisions. One such 
organizational factor is how the organization is structured. As indicated in the work in this 
dissertation, different structures can be associated with access to different organizational 
information and incentives schemes. This sets up some interesting tensions managers may 
face when making decisions that are shaped by firms’ organization designs. For example, 
highly decentralized firms with strongly incentivized managers may be designed with the 
intent for autonomous managers to make riskier decisions free from the glare of the parent 
organization. However, such managers may play it safe to avoid downsides and capture 
some of the value associated with their higher powered incentives. In contrast, managers 
in centralized units with lower powered incentives may have less to lose and take on greater 
risks. This is consistent with the concept of “loss aversion” highlighted by scholars such as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
In a similar vein, certain organizational units may provide managers access to new 
information that may not be accessible through alternative designs thereby differentially 
shaping managerial decisions. For example, how does having a corporate development 
group shape managerial decisions with respect to the scope of the firm? Do such units 
encourage managers to expand the scope of the firm by illustrating attractive opportunities 
for inorganic growth, or do they hold back managerial decisions with respect to scope 
through highlighting the potential downsides of specific scope expansion opportunities? 
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Further, business development units may facilitate managers in business units to make 
more considered decisions with respect to acquisitions or alliances. This can be achieved 
through providing additional information or insight that can facilitate more considered 
decision-making. This is akin to a shift from Type 1 to Type 2 decision-making (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). 
The third theme pertains to the antecedents of organization design. Although 
scholars have developed a good understanding of the different forms of organization design 
that can be selected by firms (Burton et al., 2011), it is less apparent how firms’ designs 
emerge over time starting from their founding. Why do start-ups select the structures that 
they ultimately utilize? Similar firms may follow very different paths in terms of how they 
structure themselves, yet we are unclear as to what these trajectories look like and what 
drives them. As highlighted by Dierickx and Cool (1989), there is a strong path dependency 
that shapes ultimate firm performance, it is likely to be the case that part of what drives 
this is the selections of structures that firms make as they grow into large, incumbent firms. 
Such evaluation of firms’ structures from their inception is challenging to undertake as 
limited data is available. Recently, scholars have highlighted that firms may be strongly 
influenced in their designs by their origins or can radically shift as they grow (DeSantola 
& Gulati, 2017). However, we have little understanding of the contingencies shaping 
whether firms “stick or twist” with respect to their designs. 
One route would be to either undertake survey-based analyses of a random sample 
of firms that have grown and been founded in the past 10-years (to ensure founders still 
can recollect why certain structures were selected) or in depth case-study analyses of firms 
that have grown. Such approaches would enable me to develop a richness of understanding 
pertaining to how firms’ structures evolve over time. Is it a case that initial focus is on 
functional division of responsibilities and units, which then shifts to a divisional focus and 
then progresses into a more complex matrix form? Through the comparison of the different 
structural paths that firms pursue we may also be able to start to understand another route 
which leads to the heterogeneity in performance of firms – a central strategic management 
question. 
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Further, large incumbent firms restructure on a regular basis. It is often challenging 
to determine what the main rationale for these changes is. CEOs often highlight reasons 
such as changes in strategy or poor performance. It would be of value to understand what 
can influence managerial attention upon organization redesign activities in the first place 
as often there is a significant gap between a structural change and when managers decide 
that a restructure is required. Using text-based analysis tools to examine the different 
strategies to which managers within firms pay attention can enable me to evaluate what 
can shape management attention to an organizational restructuring (Eklund & Mannor, 
2018). In this approach I could analyze the text of firms’ quarterly analyst calls and look 
for signs of managers describing issues pertaining to organization design that they are 
considering. Then I can examine what is strongly associated with this attention. Is it 
primarily driven by firm characteristics such as organizational performance, industry 
characteristics such as munificence, or managerial characteristics such as tenure? This 
could enable me to develop a rich theoretical and empirical analysis of the antecedents of 
the changes in large, incumbent firms’ organization designs. Thus, by investigating how 
firms develop their structures in the first place and what shapes how these structures 
change, this can help me to provide a more joined-up perspective of the antecedents of 
firms’ organization designs. 
 
In conclusion, my future research agenda will revolve around the important topic 
of organization design. I hope to contribute to the re-emerging scholastic discussion on 
organization design through building our understanding of the antecedents of organization 
designs and the impact of design on firms’ innovation activities and their broader 
managerial decision making.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
The eight hypotheses outlined and tested in this dissertation are: 
Chapter 2: Invention 
 H1: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the generation of 
inventions that are less original than those of firms with centralized R&D. 
H2: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the generation of more 
inventions than firms with centralized R&D. 
 
Chapter 2: Development 
H3: Firms with decentralized R&D are associated with the progression of fewer 
inventions through the earlier stages of development than firms with centralized 
R&D. 
H4: Greater corporate decentralization is associated with the progression of more 
inventions through the later stages of development. 
 
Chapter 3: Development 
H1: Firms with decentralized R&D will source a higher proportion of inventions 
externally than firms with centralized R&D.  
H2: The difference in the proportion of inventions sourced externally between firms 
with decentralized R&D and centralized R&D will be greater for licensing as 
compared to acquisitions or alliances.  
 
Chapter 4: Commercialization 
H1: The quantity of complementary resources negatively moderates the 
relationship between corporate decentralization and the proportion of sales from 
new products such that firms with higher quantities of complementary resources 
will be associated with an increased proportion of sales from new products for 
more centralized firms compared to more decentralized firms. 
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H2: The concentration of sales of a firm’s existing product portfolio negatively 
moderates the relationship between corporate decentralization and the proportion 
of sales from new products such that firms whose sales are more concentrated on 
a few products will be associated with an increased proportion of sales from new 
products for more centralized firms compared to more decentralized firms. 
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Appendix 2: Additional Methodological Details 
Determining patent assignees for patent-based measures 
Two separate approaches are used to define the assignees of patents pertaining to 
firms in the study sample. First, the limited number of firms in the sample enables the 
manual matching of patent assignees (as defined by DOC_STD_NAME in the Patstat 
parent database) to sample firms. Using the Bureau van Dijk “Orbis” database, a list of 
subsidiaries for each sample firm is developed. Any Patstat assignee that contains a focal 
firm’s subsidiary or parent name text string (and multiple variants of this text string) is 
captured. This subset of patent assignments per focal firm is then manually checked for 
each of the 49 firms in the sample to arrive at an intermediate set of Patstat assignees. As 
the Orbis database provides a snapshot of ownership at a specific point in time (2015), 
assignees that were subsidiaries of parent companies had to be checked to ensure whether 
they should be allocated to the parent company or whether when the patent was filed, the 
subsidiary was an independent company. Using the Zephyr database from Bureau Van 
Dijk, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the industry is controlled for by ensuring 
assignees represent the original corporate entity filing a patent rather than the parent owner 
in 2015 provided by the Orbis database. As a result, prior to the specific M&A event, 
patents are retrospectively assigned to the acquired firm from the acquiring firm. 
Second, following the process of Arora et al. (2014) patent assignees were matched 
against firm and subsidiary names obtained from Bureau Van Djik’s “Icarus” database 
following cleaning of names using a standardized name-cleaning algorithm. This was an 
iterative process involving the adjustment of matching rules and manual checking. Again, 
using a similar process to that described above, the Zephyr database was used to control 
for M&A activity and retrospectively reassign patents to acquired firms from the acquiring 
firm prior to the M&A event. 
Both approaches used to develop standardized names provided similar results with 
99.7 % of assignees being the same for each sample patent. Those patents that did not have 
the same assignees from both methods were manually checked and reassigned 
appropriately.  
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Development based measures - allocating drug candidates to parent firms 
To ensure that a drug candidate in the clinical development process is allocated to 
the appropriate firm using Pharmaprojects data, two key steps are followed. First, 
transactions are examined using the Recap database and the “Overview” section of the 
Pharmaprojects database to ensure that the firm assigned to a drug in the Pharmaprojects 
database is the actual firm managing the development of that drug candidate. These 
transactions include deals in which a selection of drug-candidates are sold from one 
company to another, a complete firm is acquired or merges with another and strategic 
alliances between firms in which an invention may be created through an alliance and then 
subsequently pursued through clinical trials by another firm. If a transaction is observed in 
Recap, the firm managing the development of that drug is adjusted accordingly in the 
second step. 
Second, prior to 2012 Pharmaprojects retrospectively assigns a drug candidate to 
an acquiring firm following acquisition of another firm. As a result even prior to the 
acquisition year that drug candidate will be assigned to the acquiring firm rather than the 
acquired firm which was at that time an independent entity. Adjustment of these 
assignments requires a careful assessment of the “Overview” section of the Pharmaprojects 
record of a drug which indicates which firm was initially responsible for a drug-candidate 
prior to the respective deal. For M&A activity post 2012, Pharmaprojects correctly 
allocates the firm responsible for the original development of a drug candidate. For M&A 
activity post 2012, drug-candidates were reassigned to the acquiring firm the year after the 
acquisition. Merger and acquisition data from Recap and the Zephyr database from Bureau 
Van Dijk were used to reassign drug candidates following post-2012 M&A activity. 
Further, it is noted whether a drug-candidate was developed internally, acquired via an 
M&A deal, acquired from another firm or was originally created through an alliance. 
In the absence of any transaction in Recap or additional information on a drug-
candidate provided in the Pharmaprojects “Overview” section, the original firm assignment 
in the Pharmaprojects database is utilized.  
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Organization design measures 
Obtaining data on a commercial firms’ internal organization structures has been 
highlighted as a significant challenge for the management scholar (e.g., Greenwood & 
Miller, 2010; Sathe, 1978; Walton, 1981). A review of the management literature 
highlights three methods by which internal organization structures are inferred.  
First, scholars use publicly available firm administrative records such as high level 
organizational charts and company annual reports to directly infer organization structures 
(e.g., Albert, 2018; Girod & Whittington, 2015; Guadalupe et al., 2014). Although this data 
is readily accessible it is limited in its coverage and can result in an incomplete picture of 
a firm’s organization structure being derived. For example, public administrative record 
information is often limited to the senior most levels of the organization and focuses on 
direct reports to the CEO – the executive team. As a result, it is challenging to accurately 
infer organization structure lower down the organization.  
Second, indirect proxies are used to determine structure using publicly available 
information. For example, Arora et al. (2014) use patent assignee data to define the level 
of centralization of a firm’s R&D function based on whether patents are assigned to the 
parent company or a subsidiary. Other studies also focusing on the R&D function examine 
the number of employees in corporate and divisional laboratories (Argyres & Silverman, 
2004). Using the ratio of employees in both types of laboratory a degree of centralization 
percentage can be estimated. This approach requires careful consideration of construct 
validity as the indirect measure may not correlate perfectly with organization structure. 
Finally, the most common tool used in organization structure research is survey 
analysis in which firms are questioned directly about their organization structure in a 
standardized manner (e.g., Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Markides & Williamson, 1996; 
Turner & Makhija, 2012). This enables scholars to tailor questions to better capture the 
information that they need, and helps them to observe organization structure at a greater 
level of depth. Survey studies generally use multiple questions to measure a variety of 
specific organizational constructs. For example, Russell and Russell (1992) use surveys to 
measure structural components such as the degree of centralization, integration and breadth 
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of control. Turner and Makhija (2012) measure whether firms are organic (more 
decentralized and less bureaucratic) or mechanistic (more centralized and process focused). 
The survey approach is limited by the usual factors associated with any form of survey 
research e.g. accessing the right survey respondents, and the extended period of time 
required to conduct survey. 
 In this dissertation a combination of the first and third methods are used to develop 
three organization structural measures: R&D Decentralization, R&D Functional 
Differentiation and Corporate Decentralization. First, company administrative records 
such as annual reports can be used to identify the executive level of management of each 
pharmaceutical firm. Each executive level management team role corresponds to a 
structural element (e.g. R&D, manufacturing) and these can be coded systematically to 
enable an estimate of the structural parameters described above. Second, survey-type 
interviews are conducted with sample firms to validate and expand upon the measures 
captured from archival sources. 
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Appendix 3: Managerial Interviews 
Methodological description 
To enrich the archival data analysis multiple managers within 28 firms from the 
sample of 49 firms (see Table 28 for further details of firms interviewed) and five industry 
experts were interviewed. In total 61 interviews were conducted. The managers 
interviewed were senior level R&D and strategy managers who had a good understanding 
of the structure of both R&D and their organization as a whole. The interviews were 
conducted between 2015 and 2018. The interviews were undertaken via teleconference and 
each interview typically lasted between 30 and 90 minutes with outline questions 
distributed to the respondent in advance to enable suitable preparation and follow-up 
clarification questions being conducted post-interview through email. Detailed notes were 
collected during each interview. Notes from all 61 interviews were reviewed to determine 
key issues pertaining to three areas.   
First, interviews were used to validate the relevant structural measures that were 
developed through coding of firms’ top management team structures using publicly 
available data sources (R&D Decentralization, Corporate Decentralization and R&D 
Functional Differentiation). Second, the mechanisms through which managers perceive 
firms’ organization design choices impact their innovation outcomes were also examined. 
The focus of these interview questions related to the incentives- and knowledge-based 
mechanisms through which decentralization could impact innovation. Third, a sequence of 
questions was asked relating to the product development decision-making process in these 
pharmaceutical companies and which parts of the organization are involved at different 
stages of the drug development process. 
I supplement the data collected from these interviews through review of the more 
qualitative aspects of firms’ annual reports and 10-K filings. A research assistant (RA) 
reviewed the letter to shareholders, business description, operational review and R&D 
overview of firms’ annual financial filings for each year in the period 1995-2015. The text 
extraction was focused on descriptions of organization design and references to incentives 
and knowledge-flows.  
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Table 28: Study sample firms and firms interviewed in this study 
 
# 
Firm GVKEY Interviewed 
1 Abbott Laboratories 001078 Yes 
2 Actavis  027845 Yes 
3 Akzo Nobel 015334  
4 Allergan 015708 Yes 
5 Altana 100004  
6 Amgen 001602 Yes 
7 Ares-Serono 102045  
8 Astra Zeneca 028272 Yes 
9 Aventis 013467  
10 Baxter International 002086 Yes 
11 Bayer 100080 Yes 
12 Biogen Idec 024468 Yes 
13 Bristol-Myers Squibb 002403 Yes 
14 Cephalon 023945  
15 Chugai Pharma. 100441  
16 CSL 223003 Yes 
17 Daiichi Sankyo 100336 Yes 
18 Eisai 100418 Yes 
19 Eli Lilly 006730 Yes 
20 Forest Labs 004843  
21 Genentech 005020  
22 Genzyme 012233  
23 Gilead Sciences 024856 Yes 
24 GlaxoSmithKline 005180 Yes 
25 Johnson & Johnson 006266 Yes 
26 King 112033  
27 Kyowa Hakko Kirin 100516  
28 Lundbeck 232106  
29 Medlmmune 024008  
30 Merck & Co 007257 Yes 
31 Merck KGaA 220301  
32 Mylan 007637 Yes 
33 Novartis 101310 Yes 
34 Novo Nordisk 008020 Yes 
35 Pfizer 008530 Yes 
36 Roche 025648 Yes 
37 Sanofi 101204 Yes 
38 Schering AG 101076  
39 Schering-Plough 009459  
40 Schwarz Pharma 108182  
41 Shire 212340 Yes 
42 Solvay 101394  
43 STADA Arz. 214700  
44 Takeda 100718 Yes 
45 Tanabe 100021  
46 Teva 014538 Yes 
47 UCB 100751 Yes 
48 Valeant Pharma. Int. 009340 Yes 
49 Wyeth 001478  
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I follow a two-step process to validate the structural measures using companies’ 
financial filings. First, any evidence pertaining to the R&D or the overall organization 
structure of each firm was captured. This data was again used to validate the various 
organization design measures developed. Further, any evidence in the managerial 
discussion pertaining to how organization design choices could impact incentives and 
knowledge flows was also captured.  
In the second phase of work these data extracts were further examined and 
common, major themes that are used to inform the qualitative commentary were captured. 
These insights were complemented with relevant findings from the interviews with strategy 
and R&D managers. It should be emphasized that this analysis is not intended to be a 
rigorous case-based form of qualitative analysis (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989b). It is simply 
designed to add greater insight into and confidence in the main quantitative archival 
analysis. 
 
Supporting interview results  
Table 29 illustrates the key descriptive statistics for the 28 firms interviewed. 
Although questions were asked about how the firms’ structure changed over time, the data 
in this table pertains to their structures in the final year of the sample period (2015). It can 
be seen that, consistent with the overall sample, approximately 11 % of firms had 
decentralized R&D structures. Interestingly, the key way in which R&D was sub-divided 
was by functional area (68 % of firms interviewed had some form of functional sub-
division in R&D). In a centralized R&D structure this will facilitate knowledge flows 
across therapeutic areas potentially facilitating invention and development outcomes. For 
those firms which had business units and were not functionally aligned, these business 
units were primarily organized along therapeutic area lines as opposed to geographies (83 
% versus 17 %). Interestingly, these results highlight that R&D tends to be sub-divided by 
function (e.g. science area or stage of R&D) whereas the more commercial aspects tend to 
be more therapeutic area aligned.  
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Table 29: Key descriptive statistics for sample firms interviewed (n=28 firms and 61 
interviews) 
Interview Item N % 
Decentralized R&D   
 Centralized R&D 25 89 
 Decentralized R&D 3 11 
 Total 28 100 
R&D Sub-division   
 Functional 14 50 
 Mixed 5 18 
 Therapeutic 9 32 
 Total 28 100 
Corporate Decentralization   
 Divisional 18 64 
 Functional 10 36 
 Total 28 100 
Business unit categories   
 Therapeutic Area 15 83 
 Geography 3 17 
 Total 18 100 
Respondents mentioning specific mechanism 
(unprompted) 
  
 Knowledge Flows 18 64 
 Incentives 12 43 
 
The majority of managers interviewed outlined in some form or other the 
importance of ensuring good cross-organizational knowledge flows to aid effective 
innovation (64 % as illustrated in Table 29). Greater organizational integration such as the 
creation of a more centralized R&D unit was one way of achieving this, but managers 
described other routes this could be achieved such as cross-organizational research forums 
and the use of various online knowledge management tools. Ensuring good knowledge 
flows was seen as especially important for ensuring the development of novel inventions 
and for facilitating their development into final products.  
“Organizing to ensure greater integration across therapeutic areas is important as 
an idea in one area may be able to be translated into another therapeutic area. 
Quite often an indication may be unsuccessful in one therapeutic domain but have 
legs in another, however with the wrong structure scientists may not be able to take 
advantage of this”  
“It is important to get the viewpoint of multiple functions during clinical 
development and even earlier in the discovery phase” 
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Managers frequently referred to the creation of organizational siloes with more 
decentralized structures that can result in poor knowledge flows and potential repetition of 
effort.  
“Avoiding silos is an issue – we need to force people to collaborate with each other. 
Ultimately some technology will be replicated across the organization and this is 
ok if the cost of transporting a molecule is prohibitive, but the firm could improve 
in not replicating activities across labs in our more decentralized R&D 
organization”  
“It can always be difficult to get different teams collaborating as people fixate on 
the specific unit of the organization in which they are located”  
 
These poorer knowledge flows between business units could ultimately lead to 
inferior innovation outcomes. 
“Drugs make great business units but business units do not make great drugs”  
 
Less attention was paid to incentives in firms’ annual reports but interviews with 
R&D managers highlight that incentives could influence innovation outcomes and are 
related to a firm’s organization design attributes. 43 % of managers interviewed mentioned 
the importance of incentives and how these could shape R&D behavior (Table 29). The 
key theme that emerged was that R&D managers tended to be incentivized by the volume 
of inventions and ensuring that they progress through the innovation process rather than by 
the quality of the inventions being progressed. Greater centralization was seen as being 
associated with lower powered incentives which some managers perceived could hinder 
innovation performance: 
“The issue with incentives in a corporate (more centralized) setting is they are 
generally quite poor and under-reward good performance and over-reward poor 
performance i.e. people don’t get fired”  
 
However, managers did highlight using higher powered incentives are not a 
panacea and could come at a cost: 
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“Ultimately there is a trade-off of getting ambitious performance and ensuring a 
good work environment and collaborative atmosphere”  
“Incentivizing people by counting compounds is not a way of incentivizing good 
science”  
 
Finally, many managers highlighted the organizational challenge firms’ face in 
deciding the degree of organizational decentralization: 
 “You need to put in swing lanes to provide some discipline, the problem is that you 
make the swing lanes too narrow and people focus too narrowly and can be 
restricted in what they can do and may not collaborate effectively with individuals 
in other swing lanes”  
“Balance between being smaller more decentralized units and being agile like a 
biotech and being able to leverage scale of a larger organization”  
  
In summary, it appears that organization design attributes can impact innovation 
outcomes through both knowledge flows and provision of incentives. Managers in 
pharmaceutical firms do discuss both mechanisms and how design can emphasize one over 
the other and some even highlight the trade-offs firms’ face when deciding to integrate 
more tightly or decentralize. However, no real mention was made as to the boundary 
conditions in which greater decentralization may be more appropriate. 
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Appendix 4: Additional Descriptive Results 
Structural variables 
 Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17 illustrate the sample mean variation across 
firms of each of the three key structural variables in this study over the period 1995-2015. 
From Figure 15, it can be seen that R&D Decentralization increases from 1998 to 2001 as 
more firms decentralized their R&D units. Then it drops in 2002 and remains relatively flat 
to 2008. R&D decentralization increases from 2009 to 2012 and then remains flat. Figure 
16 illustrates that R&D Functional Differentiation fluctuates over time peaking in 2004 
and then dropping to a relatively steady value between 2005 and 2015. In contrast, 
Corporate Decentralization has been relatively steady over the study period (Figure 17). 
These results illustrate that design choices can be cyclical influenced by events such as 
merger and acquisition activity or, potentially, firms attempting to replicate the structures 
of other firms. This viewpoint was referred to multiple times in managerial interviews: 
“Organizational design changes seem to go in waves across the industry, at one 
stage centralization is in, then it is all about being decentralized and nimble”24 
 
Interestingly, firms with decentralized R&D tend to be more geographically 
dispersed than firms with centralized R&D as measured by the average number of countries 
from which inventors on a firm’s patents are originated. Firms with decentralized R&D on 
average have inventors in 19.1 countries versus 15.7 countries for firms with centralized 
R&D. This difference is statistically significant (p=0.004). There is a risk that this variable 
of the number of countries in which firms invent is a “bad control” (Angrist & Pischke, 
2008) as R&D decentralization could result in greater geographic spread and is thus only 
used in robustness tests and not the main analyses. However, this difference in the number 
of geographies from which firms’ inventors originate provides some confidence in the 
measure of R&D decentralization used in this study. 
 
                                                 
24 Due to confidentiality associated with the study interviews, I cannot ascribe the comments to any specific firm or individual 
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Figure 15: Sample variation of R&D Decentralization over time. Each point is mean 
across firms in sample in that year 
 
 
Figure 16: Sample variation of R&D Functional Differentiation over time. Each point 
is mean across firms in sample in that year 
 
Figure 17: Sample variation of Corporate Decentralization over time. Each point is 
mean across firms in sample in that year 
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Dependent variables 
 In chapter 2, for the two invention hypotheses I examine the variables Quantity and 
Originality. Figure 18 illustrates the variation of these two variables at a firm-year level 
averaged across all firms in the sample. Interestingly, Quantity appears to rise over the 
study time period and Originality declines over the same time period. The two development 
variables prog0 and prog2 that represent the progression of drug-candidates from phase 0 
to 1 and phase 2 to 3 respectively are the outcomes associated with the two development 
hypotheses in Chapter 2. From Figure 19 it appears that prog0 peaks in 2008 whereas prog2 
remains relatively flat over the study time period.  
 In chapter 3, in Hypothesis 1 I examine the proportion of externally sourced 
inventions. For the study sample the temporal variation of this variable (external) is 
illustrated in Figure 7 in chapter 3. It can be seen that the proportion of externally sourced 
inventions has increased over the period 1995 to 2015. 
For Hypothesis 2, I examine the proportion of inventions sourced via different 
modes: licensing, acquisitions and alliances. Figure 20 illustrates how the proportion of 
drug-candidates sourced via each of these different modes varies over time. It can be seen 
that the proportion of drug-candidates sourced via alliances has declined over the study 
period, in contrast the proportion of drug-candidates sourced via licenses has increased. 
The proportion of drug-candidates sourced via acquisitions has remained relatively flat.  
In supplementary analyses, I examine how the proportion of low, medium and high 
novelty inventions is associated with R&D Decentralization. Figure 21 illustrates the 
variation of these proportions over time. It appears to be that these proportions remain 
relatively flat across the sample of firms over the study time-period, with a greater 
proportion of highly novel inventions sourced externally consistent with the findings of 
Chapter 3. 
 In Chapter 4, the key dependent variable is the proportion of new drug sales from 
drugs launched in the focal year. It can be seen from Figure 11 in Chapter 4 that this 
proportion has declined over the study time-period consistent with prior observations of 
Scannell et al. (2012). 
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Figure 18: Sample variation of (a) Quantity and (b) Originality (Chapter 2) over time. 
Each point is mean across firms in sample in that year 
 
   (a)                 (b) 
  
 
 
Figure 19: Sample variation of (a) prog0 and (b) prog2 (Chapter 2) over time. Each 
point is mean across firms in sample in that year 
 
   (a)        (b) 
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Figure 20: Sample variation of proportion of drug-candidates sourced externally via 
(a) alliances, (b) licensing and (c) acquisitions over time (Chapter 3). Each point is 
mean across firms in sample in that year 
   
         (a)       (b)          (c) 
 
 
Figure 21: Sample variation of proportion of (a) low, (b) medium and (c) high novelty 
drug-candidates sourced externally over time (Chapter 3). Each point is mean across 
firms in sample in that year 
 
  (a)           (b)    (c) 
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Appendix 5: Additional Main Analysis Results 
Propensity score matching - first stage regression & balance checks 
 Propensity score matching (PSM) models are used to generate matched samples of 
more decentralized and less decentralized firms in all three chapters of this dissertation. In 
the first step, a logit regression is used to predict the likelihood that a firm will have the 
relevant decentralization dimension based on a set of observable variables. Second, a 
standard regression of the pertinent innovation outcome against the appropriate structural 
variables using controls and fixed effects is undertaken for the matched sample identified 
using the first-stage logit regression. Matching is undertaken either using nearest neighbor 
(i.e. matching untreated and treated observations that have closest propensity scores) or 
caliper (i.e. setting a maximum propensity score difference between observations that are 
treated and untreated) methods (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Similar results are obtained 
using either approach. The focus of this analysis is to limit the possibility that firms’ 
innovation outcomes result from inherent differences between firms which are more or less 
decentralized. This may result in regular regression analyses on the full sample being 
extrapolated to areas where there is no data on firms which are either centralized or 
decentralized limiting the effectiveness of any comparison. 
 In Chapter 2, for H1 and H2, the relationship between R&D Decentralization and 
two different invention outcomes (originality of inventions, quantity of inventions) are 
examined. The first stage logit regression is highlighted in Table 30 and Table 31 presents 
the balance test across all the covariates in the first-stage regression.  
For H3, the relationship between R&D Decentralization and progression of 
inventions through the early development process is investigated and the match is based 
on the dichotomous variable R&D Decentralization. For H4, the variable corporate 
decentralization is related to the progression of inventions through the later stages of the 
development process. As corporate decentralization is a continuous variable, this variable 
is dichotomized around the median and matching is undertaken using this variable. Several 
cut-points between 0.2 and 0.6 are used to dichotomize corporate decentralization, similar 
results are obtained for each cut-point. In the analysis of mechanisms, the variable R&D 
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functional differentiation is related to the progression of inventions through the earlier 
stages of the development process and the match is based around this dichotomous 
variable.  
 
Table 30: Chapter 2: Hypothesis 1-2 propensity score matching analyses. First stage 
logit regression 
Dependent Variable R&D 
Decentralization 
R&D Functional Differentiation -1.530** 
 (0.410) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.523 
 (0.487) 
performance -1.435 
 (1.711) 
R&D Intensity 2.051** 
 (0.773) 
SG&A -0.493+ 
 (0.287) 
Size 0.752** 
 (0.291) 
slack 0.0968 
 (0.0847) 
CEO -0.307 
 (0.378) 
SBU -0.164 
 (0.108) 
tech. diversity  -1.238 
 (1.119) 
patent stock 0.0710 
 (0.133) 
competition -0.900 
 (4.730) 
Year grouping Y 
N 803 
Pseudo-R2 0.0652 
Log Likelihood -280.3 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level 
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Table 31: Chapter 2: Hypothesis 1-2 balance tests for propensity score matching 
model (Caliper=0.00035) 
 
 Mean  
p>|t| Variable R&D 
Decentralization 
=1 
R&D 
Decentralization 
=0 
R&D Functional 
Differentiation 0.093 0.093 1.000 
Corporate 
Decentralization  0.296 0.309 0.735 
performance 0.074 0.093 0.115 
R&D Intensity 0.156 0.144 0.454 
SG&A 7.865 7.990 0.578 
Size 8.782 8.904 0.575 
Slack 2.472 2.330 0.608 
CEO 0.107 0.107 1.000 
SBU 2.467 2.467 1.000 
tech. diversity  0.771 0.763 0.633 
patent stock 1.085 1.171 0.689 
competition 0.961 0.957 0.455 
Year grouping variable 2.693 2.560 0.448 
 
 
Table 32 illustrates the first stage logit regression results and Table 33 highlights 
the accompanying balance tests of the resulting matched samples which are used for 
subsequent analyses to test H3 and H4 as well as to examine the mechanistic analyses 
associated with the variable R&D Functional Differentiation.  
As can be seen from Table 31 and Table 33, the balance tests indicate that for the 
majority of covariates the samples achieve balance. However, for H3, the decentralized 
sample is moderately smaller and has a smaller patent stock. For H4, the decentralized 
sample faces a moderately more competitive environment. 
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Table 32: Chapter 2: Hypothesis 3-4 Propensity score matching analyses. First stage 
logit regressions 
Hypothesis 3 4 Mechanism  
Dependent Variable R&D 
Decentralization  
Corporate 
Decentralization 
(dichotomized) 
R&D Functional 
Differentiation 
Table/Model Table 6 
Model 3 
Table 7 
Model 4/5 
Table 6 
Model 6 
Phase Phase 0 to 1 Phase 2 to 3 Phase 1 to 2 
R&D Decentralization  0.485+ -1.215** 
  (0.253) (0.399) 
R&D fnl. differentiation -1.195** -0.350+  
 (0.391) (0.200)  
Corporate Decentralizn. 0.574  -0.872* 
 (0.499)  (0.437) 
performance -0.540 -1.109 0.705 
 (1.711) (1.299) (1.376) 
R&D Intensity 2.224** -3.192** 1.377* 
 (0.803) (1.132) (0.662) 
SG&A -0.394 0.191 -0.339 
 (0.325) (0.213) (0.261) 
size 0.695* -0.378+ 0.257 
 (0.323) (0.215) (0.257) 
slack 0.0467 -0.0865 0.240** 
 (0.0886) (0.0682) (0.0694) 
CEO -0.426 -0.238 -0.141 
 (0.399) (0.244) (0.307) 
SBU -0.129 0.366** -0.130 
 (0.111) (0.0752) (0.0884) 
patent stock -0.0318 -0.0974 0.327** 
 (0.135) (0.111) (0.124) 
portfolio 0.00435 0.0112 -0.0527** 
 (0.00642) (0.0108) (0.0158) 
external 0.852 -0.375 -0.410 
 (0.564) (0.353) (0.375) 
NCE -0.301 0.774+ 2.156** 
 (0.674) (0.443) (0.562) 
bio -1.340+ 0.962+ 3.067** 
 (0.766) (0.520) (0.652) 
tech. diversity 0.0846 1.749** 2.006** 
 (0.705) (0.477) (0.548) 
competition 1.768 -6.932+ 0.298 
 (5.755) (4.205) (5.700) 
Year grouping variable Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects N N N 
Bus. Seg. Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 787 762 764 
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.119 0.137 
Log Likelihood -273.1 -464.7 -357.8 
Standard errors in parentheses:+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
  
 
1
8
5
 
Table 33: Chapter 2: Hypothesis 3-4 balance tests for propensity score matching model 
Hypothesis H3: Means Post Balance H4: Means Post Balance Mechanism: Means Post Balance 
PSM Model Table 6 Model 3 
Nearest Neighbor (3) 
Table 7 Models 4/5 
Caliper (0.0002) 
Table 6 Model 6 
Caliper (0.008) 
Treatment Variable R&D 
Decent.=1 
R&D 
Decent.=0 
p>|t| Corporate 
Decent. =0 
Corporate 
Decent.=1 
p>|t| R&D 
FD=1 
R&D 
FD=0 
p>|t| 
R&D Decentralization    0.113 0.081 0.547 0.052 0.065 0.733 
R&D functional 
differentiation 0.085 0.099 0.738 0.242 0.210 0.671    
Corporate 
Decentralization 0.303 0.312 0.802    0.204 0.206 0.949 
performance 0.089 0.073 0.224 0.092 0.088 0.783 0.081 0.077 0.612 
size 9.177 8.746 0.042 9.228 9.175 0.805 8.756 8.544 0.153 
SG&A 8.256 7.887 0.068 8.402 8.298 0.645 7.940 7.723 0.121 
slack 2.223 2.538 0.188 2.098 1.907 0.260 2.532 2.822 0.105 
R&D Intensity 0.151 0.199 0.134 0.164 0.140 0.189 0.183 0.195 0.622 
patent stock 1.450 1.103 0.068 1.440 1.355 0.720 1.264 1.135 0.364 
CEO 0.085 0.099 0.738 0.097 0.145 0.413 0.103 0.071 0.315 
competition 0.952 0.957 0.230 0.950 0.959 0.053 0.960 0.965 0.104 
SBU 2.404 2.323 0.629 2.403 2.645 0.225 2.368 2.348 0.894 
portfolio 36.89 30.74 0.202 20.27 18.82 0.624 11.31 9.284 0.057 
external 0.504 0.516 0.745 0.514 0.560 0.200 0.479 0.476 0.912 
NCE 0.554 0.534 0.583 0.554 0.528 0.531 0.542 0.563 0.545 
bio 0.215 0.201 0.640 0.244 0.268 0.485 0.305 0.247 0.060 
tech diversity 0.726 0.678 0.186 0.762 0.724 0.159 0.618 0.606 0.648 
Year grouping 
variable 2.585 2.447 0.412 2.565 2.452 0.545 2.477 2.452 0.825 
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Table 34: Chapter 3: Hypothesis 1-3 propensity score matching analyses. First stage 
logit regression 
Dependent Variable R&D 
Decentralization 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.994* 
 (0.388) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.631 
 (0.561) 
Business Development Role 0.682** 
 (0.259) 
Performance 0.357 
 (1.827) 
R&D Intensity 2.555** 
 (0.898) 
SG&A -0.293 
 (0.330) 
Size 0.786* 
 (0.340) 
Slack 0.0972 
 (0.0891) 
New CEO -0.319 
 (0.401) 
Total Patent Stock -0.596** 
 (0.200) 
Patent Family Count 2.542** 
 (0.944) 
Competition 5.285 
 (7.724) 
SBU -0.0739 
 (0.117) 
Technical Differentiation -1.495 
 (1.047) 
Clinical Experience 3.333* 
 (1.347) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00447 
 (0.00716) 
External Overall Portfolio -0.0177+ 
 (0.00975) 
Portfolio Novelty -0.459 
 (0.866) 
Bio -4.775** 
 (1.025) 
Year grouping Y 
N 769 
Pseudo-R2 0.143 
Log Likelihood -251.44 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm-level 
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 In Chapter 3, for both hypotheses the key independent variable is R&D 
Decentralization. Thus, the propensity score matching is undertaken for firms that have 
centralized and decentralized R&D. The first stage model is illustrated in Table 34. Again 
balance in key co-variates is obtained for firms that have centralized and decentralized 
R&D as illustrated in Table 31. 
 
Table 35: Chapter 3: Hypothesis 1-2 balance tests for propensity score matching 
model (Caliper=0.008) 
 Mean  
p>|t| Variable R&D 
Decentralization 
=1 
R&D 
Decentralization 
=0 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.086 0.151 0.175 
Corporate Decentralization 0.305 0.267 0.266 
Business Development Role 0.409 0.344 0.367 
Performance 0.089 0.080 0.524 
R&D Intensity 0.152 0.199 0.047 
SG&A 8.279 8.248 0.872 
Size 9.190 9.087 0.599 
Slack 2.250 2.272 0.913 
New CEO 0.086 0.075 0.789 
Total Patent Stock 1.847 1.850 0.989 
Patent Family Count 0.313 0.319 0.886 
Competition 0.952 0.956 0.257 
SBU 2.398 2.290 0.528 
Technical Differentiation 0.780 0.763 0.487 
Clinical Experience 0.433 0.406 0.607 
Internal Overall Portfolio 44.473 39.301 0.370 
External Overall Portfolio 38.473 37.172 0.783 
Portfolio Novelty 0.955 0.957 0.931 
Bio 0.206 0.214 0.748 
Year grouping variable 2.581 2.763 0.237 
 
In Chapter 4, for both hypotheses a key independent variable is Corporate 
Decentralization. As in Chapter 2, this variable is dichotomized around the median and 
matching is undertaken using this variable. Several cut-points were used to dichotomize 
corporate decentralization, similar results were obtained for each cut-point. The first stage 
matching model is illustrated in Table 36 and the table illustrating the balance in co-variate 
values between centralized and decentralized firms is illustrated in Chapter 4, Table 25. 
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Table 36: Chapter 4: Hypothesis 1-2 propensity score matching analyses. First stage 
logit regression 
Dependent Variable R&D 
Decentralization 
SGA -0.626* 
 (0.290) 
R&D Decentralization 0.400 
 (0.336) 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.215 
 (0.271) 
Performance  -4.725** 
 (1.718) 
R&D Intensity -3.617** 
 (1.272) 
Sales 0.469 
 (0.293) 
CEO -0.334 
 (0.358) 
Patent Stock -0.0935 
 (0.136) 
New Approved 0.0777 
 (0.0787) 
Competition -1.408 
 (6.649) 
Technical Diversification 2.315* 
 (1.095) 
Portfolio -0.218 
 (0.499) 
Progress 0.0503* 
 (0.0230) 
External -0.352 
 (0.674) 
NCE -0.163 
 (0.900) 
Bio  1.103 
 (0.986) 
Portfolio Novelty -0.340 
 (0.811) 
Year grouping Y 
N 390 
Pseudo-R2 0.076 
Log Likelihood -249.5 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. ; Standard Errors clustered at firm level 
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Appendix 6: Additional Robustness Test Results 
Chapter 2 robustness tests 
 The robustness tests undertaken in Chapter 2 are outlined fully in Table 37 (H1/H2), 
Table 38 (H3/4) and Table 39 (alternative patent quality measures for Hypothesis 1). With 
respect to the alternative measures for originality (Table 39) as described in footnote 13 in 
the Chapter 2, I find that R&D decentralization is associated with less radical patents. 
“Radicalness of a patent is measured as a time invariant count of the number of IPC 
technology classes in which the patents cited by the given patent are, but in which the 
patent itself is not classified.” (Squicciarini et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, radicalness is 
strongly correlated with originality (pairwise correlation > 0.6). Consistent with Argyres 
and Silverman (2004) I observe that R&D decentralization is associated with less general 
patents. However, the effect size is lower than for originality as R&D decentralization is 
associated with patents that are 0.02 lower (0.13 standard deviations) in generality. Further, 
I observe that R&D decentralization is not associated with fewer breakthrough patents (i.e. 
top 1 % of highly cited patents 5 years after publication). These results are consistent with 
the theoretical argumentation provided in the main paper that R&D decentralization is 
associated with reduced intra-organizational knowledge flows which results in inventions 
drawing on a narrower knowledge base (i.e. less original and radical patents).  
Further, for a small sub-sample of drug-candidates for which patent data can be 
matched, I conduct discrete-time event model analyses using logit regression models with 
a linear time function (Allison, 1982). The dependent variable in these models is a binary 
variable indicating whether a drug-candidate moves from one phase to the next in a specific 
year. Controlling for drug-level attributes such as therapeutic class, standard firm, and 
portfolio- level attributes and year fixed-effects, I find that drug-candidates associated with 
more radical patents are less likely to progress from pre-clinical to phase 1. However I see 
no impact of patent radicalness for progression through the later stages of development. 
This suggests that the impact of drug radicalness making development most challenging 
tends to occur in the earlier stages of development. This is consistent with the importance 
of knowledge flows being greater in the earlier stages of development in order to address 
the more complex technical problems associated with more radical drug-candidates. 
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Table 37: Chapter 2: summary of additional robustness tests – Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 1. Coarsened Exact 
Matching 
(CEM) 
2. Alternate Specification 5. Geographic Control 
Using PSM  
6a. Lagged IV 6b. Rolling Average IV 
DV Originality Quantity Originality 
(OLS) 
Log 
(Quantity) 
Originality Quantity Originality Quantity Originality Quantity 
R&D Decentralization -0.190
* 0.279** -0.0372** 0.246+ -0.208* 0.184* -0.162* 0.186 -0.161* 0.224 
 (0.0753) (0.0686) (0.0132) (0.147) (0.0824) (0.0929) (0.0716) (0.136) (0.0705) (0.158) 
R&D Func. Differentiation -0.0450 0.132
+ 0.00868 0.164 0.00354 0.267 0.0374 0.0934 0.0121 0.125 
 (0.0835) (0.0742) (0.0141) (0.103) (0.279) (0.192) (0.0605) (0.0971) (0.0603) (0.0975) 
Corporate Decentralization -0.118 0.0863 0.0271 -0.0137 0.0344 0.0757 0.126 -0.0457 0.107 -0.0363 
 (0.165) (0.133) (0.0270) (0.189) (0.201) (0.256) (0.121) (0.153) (0.123) (0.180) 
           
performance -1.614
* -0.737 -0.0895 0.256 -2.127* 0.817 -0.460 0.268 -0.423 0.197 
 (0.743) (0.571) (0.0769) (0.668) (0.940) (0.787) (0.352) (0.638) (0.346) (0.620) 
R&D Intensity -0.138 0.0796 0.00248 0.346 0.157 0.113 -0.0154 0.199 0.0169 0.175 
 (0.139) (0.161) (0.0293) (0.288) (0.492) (0.291) (0.185) (0.309) (0.138) (0.270) 
size 0.0836 0.348
** 0.000748 0.346** 0.0480 0.0975 0.000568 0.287** 0.00144 0.313** 
 (0.0588) (0.0572) (0.0102) (0.0649) (0.125) (0.0843) (0.0478) (0.0634) (0.0452) (0.0610) 
slack 0.0657
* -0.0477* 0.00144 -0.0118 -0.0256 -0.0183 0.00639 -0.00562 0.00767 -0.00391 
 (0.0316) (0.0222) (0.00452) (0.0332) (0.0770) (0.0445) (0.0224) (0.0333) (0.0196) (0.0299) 
CEO -0.120 -0.0292 -0.0149 0.0162 -0.446
** -0.0463 -0.0739 0.0346 -0.0744 0.0306 
 (0.0863) (0.0886) (0.0125) (0.0708) (0.139) (0.0959) (0.0563) (0.0600) (0.0543) (0.0595) 
tech. diversity  -0.0876 1.571
* 0.202* 2.893** 1.826* 2.095+ 0.946** 2.051** 0.878** 1.842** 
 (0.816) (0.615) (0.0769) (0.561) (0.894) (1.147) (0.351) (0.646) (0.341) (0.646) 
patent stock -0.00867 0.499
** -0.00230 0.481** -0.152 0.314** -0.0131 0.478** -0.0116 0.461** 
 (0.0562) (0.0503) (0.00908) (0.0675) (0.123) (0.0788) (0.0418) (0.0673) (0.0398) (0.0664) 
competition -1.140 -3.627
+ -0.534* -3.210 -3.613 -2.654 -2.447+ -2.988+ -2.484* -3.238+ 
 (1.638) (1.945) (0.251) (2.026) (3.233) (1.633) (1.249) (1.766) (1.162) (1.696) 
R&D Geographical Cover     0.0168
+ 0.0488**     
     (0.00868) (0.0102)     
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bus. Seg. Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Matching CEM CEM N N PSM PSM N N N N 
N 329 329 803 803 176 186 773 773 803 803 
R2 0.0639 0.161 0.541 0.620 0.0990 0.167 0.061 0.134 0.0631 0.132 
Log Likelihood -208.2 -1815.9 487.8 -758.6 -115.3 -1018.4 -496.7 -4319.0 -513.0 -4480.0 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 Standard errors clustered at firm level. Originality regressions are Fractional Logit 
Regressions; Quantity regressions are Negative Binomial Regressions; PSM = Propensity Score Matching; CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching  
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Table 38: Chapter 2: summary of additional robustness tests – Hypotheses 3 and 4 
Dependent variable Number of inventions progressing to next phase (prog) Invention progress 
in focal year 
Number of inventions progressing to next phase (prog) 
Unit of analysis Firm-year Invention-year Firm-year 
Robustness test 1. CEM 2. Alternate Spec. 3. Individual Inv. 4. Novelty Measure 6a. Lagged IV 6b. Rolling Avg. IV 
Hypothesis H3 H4 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 
R&D Decentralization -0.216* -0.0826 -0.214 -0.150* -0.201+ -0.263** -0.158 -0.213* -0.171 -0.133 -0.282** -0.237* -0.283* 
 (0.0919) (0.145) (0.174) (0.0707) (0.105) (0.0965) (0.117) (0.103) (0.104) (0.0984) (0.100) (0.114) (0.114) 
R&D Functional Decentralization 0.304** 0.0394 -0.159 -0.125+ -0.0864 -0.0103 -0.179+ -0.0435 -0.0653 -0.112 -0.152+ -0.124 0.00547 
 (0.109) (0.124) (0.156) (0.0665) (0.0907) (0.0746) (0.101) (0.0792) (0.0872) (0.0770) (0.0883) (0.0888) (0.0893) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.209 0.216* 0.223+ 0.0790 0.328* 0.144 0.259+ 0.0886 0.299+ 0.0617 0.144 0.124 0.0732 
 (0.188) (0.0962) (0.129) (0.133) (0.165) (0.155) (0.150) (0.120) (0.165) (0.130) (0.186) (0.130) (0.174) 
performance -2.456** -0.278 -0.0293 -0.375 0.445 -0.441 0.709 0.00416 0.527 0.209 0.637 0.0542 0.371 
 (0.891) (0.859) (1.104) (0.407) (0.419) (0.444) (0.519) (0.343) (0.404) (0.402) (0.401) (0.409) (0.433) 
R&D Intensity -0.0991 0.829 1.366 -0.00748 0.273 -0.0577 0.816* 0.616** 0.314 0.768** 0.703** 0.613** 0.340 
 (0.933) (0.762) (0.982) (0.209) (0.328) (0.239) (0.399) (0.179) (0.309) (0.188) (0.242) (0.195) (0.244) 
size 0.338** 0.112 -0.0918 0.0208 0.0857 0.183* -0.230 0.272** 0.0779 0.281** 0.153 0.283** 0.169** 
 (0.0782) (0.0883) (0.185) (0.0875) (0.0916) (0.0920) (0.168) (0.0516) (0.0925) (0.0503) (0.0999) (0.0485) (0.0544) 
slack 0.0433 0.0210 -0.0540 0.0145 -0.0554 0.0183 -0.0610 0.0353+ -0.0506 0.0388+ -0.0234 0.0429* 0.00599 
 (0.0613) (0.0561) (0.0795) (0.0288) (0.0437) (0.0243) (0.0487) (0.0204) (0.0419) (0.0226) (0.0425) (0.0200) (0.0325) 
CEO 0.0325 -0.0433 -0.0858 0.0136 -0.0162 0.0622 0.0242 -0.00819 -0.0144 0.0324 0.00785 -0.00889 -0.0248 
 (0.112) (0.135) (0.147) (0.0617) (0.0810) (0.0819) (0.105) (0.0716) (0.0806) (0.0753) (0.0884) (0.0675) (0.0816) 
patent stock 0.0284 0.0991 -0.107 0.129* -0.00464 0.000 0.000 0.0935* 0.0146 0.0948* -0.00870 0.101* 0.0816* 
 (0.0523) (0.0730) (0.151) (0.0553) (0.0614) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0386) (0.0646) (0.0403) (0.0597) (0.0393) (0.0386) 
portfolio 0.008** 0.036** 0.046** 0.006** 0.0260** -0.006** 0.001 0.00641* 0.0245** 0.007** 0.023** 0.008** 0.0178** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
external 0.00197 0.821* 0.889* -0.591** 0.0737 -0.113 0.228 -0.396* 0.193 -0.600** 0.0235 -0.647** 0.202 
 (0.335) (0.342) (0.439) (0.223) (0.251) (0.247) (0.349) (0.183) (0.224) (0.193) (0.263) (0.183) (0.216) 
NCE -1.435** -0.327 -0.484 -0.868** -0.757* -0.888** -0.727*   -0.596** -0.736* -0.601** -0.230 
 (0.417) (0.426) (0.694) (0.246) (0.340) (0.307) (0.362)   (0.205) (0.313) (0.205) (0.257) 
bio 0.160 0.0968 -0.400 -0.126 -0.284 -1.196** -1.038*   0.509+ -0.253 0.390 0.105 
 (0.449) (0.518) (0.766) (0.273) (0.406) (0.439) (0.462)   (0.269) (0.417) (0.251) (0.312) 
tech. diversity 3.209** 1.157+ 0.896 1.503** 1.145** -1.082** -0.557 1.269** 1.097** 2.097** 1.411** 1.911** 1.340** 
 (0.650) (0.634) (1.019) (0.337) (0.389) (0.389) (0.655) (0.253) (0.341) (0.304) (0.478) (0.248) (0.363) 
competition -11.76** 7.156 4.769 -3.857+ -3.116 -4.023* -0.971 -5.183* -2.695 -6.421** -3.896 -5.756** -2.627 
 (3.392) (4.678) (6.093) (2.333) (2.387) (1.914) (4.144) (2.082) (2.546) (1.721) (2.417) (1.814) (2.060) 
novelty        -0.645** -0.0978     
        (0.231) (0.440)     
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects N N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Bus. Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N 
N 256 392 392 785 762 21915 10616 787 762 736 713 787 762 
Pseudo-R2 0.313 0.170 0.215   0.0530 0.0367 0.235 0.218 0.241 0.196 0.240 0.194 
Log Likelihood -485.7 -515.0 -486.8 -1379.8 -871.5 -8552.1 -3034.6 -1573.4 -979.9 -1480.5 -953.8 -1562.2 -1009.8 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Unless stated regressions are negative binomial regressions. Standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching. Negative Binomial Regressions 
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Table 39: Chapter 2: analyses using alternative measures to originality for Hypothesis 1 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
FL = fractional logit, OLS= ordinary least squares, PS = propensity score (use caliper of 0.00035, but observe similar results using alternative matching 
approaches).
Dependent Variable Originality Radicalness Breakthrough Generality Generality 
R&D Decentralization -0.317** -0.146* 0.756 -0.0861* -0.0159* 
 (0.102) (0.070) (0.503) (0.0365) (0.0079) 
      
Corporate Decentralization 0.352+ 0.265 -1.623 0.0952 0.0237 
 (0.206) (0.168) (1.016) (0.0841) (0.0191) 
      
Model FL FL FL FL OLS 
      
Firm-level controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Business segment fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects N N N N Y 
PS Matching Y Y Y N N 
N 144 144 144 779 779 
Log Likelihood -95.39 -80.36 -3.848 -497.1 -497.1 
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Chapter 3 robustness tests  
In chapter 3, I undertake three separate robustness tests.  
First, I evaluate whether the same results are obtained with 1-year-lagged values of 
R&D Decentralization. As can be seen in Table 40 both hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported 
using lagged values of this variable as outlined in Chapter 3.  
Second, as illustrated in Table 14, all the hypotheses are supported using firm-fixed 
effects.  
Third, Table 41 outlines analyses in which I change the unit of analysis from the 
firm-year to the individual invention or drug-candidate. Both Hypotheses 1 and 2 continue 
to be supported using this approach in which I can control for individual drug-level 
variance (e.g. therapeutic class).  
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Table 40: Chapter 3: robustness analyses – lagged R&D Decentralization 
Hypothesis  H1 H2 H2 H2   Mech. Mech. Mech. 
DV External Acq Alliance License Low  Med High 
R&D Decentralization 0.180* 0.189 -0.308+ 0.266* 0.106 0.246* 0.0601 
 (0.0802) (0.180) (0.166) (0.120) (0.142) (0.115) (0.248) 
        
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.0503 -0.120 0.0107 -0.0355 -0.0306 0.367** 0.250 
 (0.0844) (0.167) (0.136) (0.153) (0.157) (0.137) (0.271) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.210 0.0239 -0.0702 0.641** 0.490+ 0.623** 0.676 
 (0.158) (0.377) (0.272) (0.236) (0.273) (0.182) (0.517) 
Business Development Role 0.0793 -0.0112 -0.0859 0.149 -0.0314 -0.167 -0.224 
 (0.0813) (0.159) (0.135) (0.113) (0.123) (0.127) (0.230) 
        
Performance -0.327 -0.694 0.453 -0.535 -0.320 -1.053 -2.025 
 (0.614) (1.214) (0.779) (0.661) (1.203) (0.915) (1.337) 
R&D Intensity -0.123 0.0884 0.534+ -0.739+ 0.166 -0.656* -0.406 
 (0.254) (0.384) (0.319) (0.390) (0.501) (0.282) (0.685) 
SG&A -0.0608 -0.166 0.0766 -0.132 -0.217 -0.150 -0.338 
 (0.0753) (0.172) (0.120) (0.168) (0.147) (0.105) (0.274) 
Size 0.0624 0.0737 0.212+ 0.00520 0.322+ 0.0892 0.478+ 
 (0.0918) (0.214) (0.126) (0.162) (0.186) (0.110) (0.286) 
Slack 0.00487 0.0725 0.00446 -0.00637 0.0918+ 0.0381 0.0374 
 (0.0295) (0.047) (0.0575) (0.0438) (0.0492) (0.0446) (0.0737) 
New CEO -0.203* -0.494+ -0.00570 -0.0557 -0.298+ -0.357** -0.373 
 (0.0937) (0.278) (0.165) (0.103) (0.160) (0.136) (0.299) 
Total Patent Stock -0.0268 0.167* -0.108 0.0139 0.0134 0.0279 -0.150 
 (0.0489) (0.081) (0.0890) (0.0592) (0.0806) (0.0657) (0.119) 
Patent Family Count 0.0625 -0.984+ -0.153 0.616 -0.408 -0.210 0.0146 
 (0.291) (0.550) (0.397) (0.395) (0.566) (0.324) (0.714) 
        
Competition -4.881+ -14.49** 2.216 8.279* -1.349 0.236 4.750 
 (2.817) (4.037) (3.247) (3.430) (3.763) (3.918) (4.202) 
        
SBU -0.687** -1.658 0.142 -1.239** 0.562 -0.173 -0.108 
 (0.258) (1.371) (0.330) (0.282) (0.387) (0.404) (0.544) 
Technical Differentiation -1.163** -0.787 1.207 -0.408 -2.222 0.307 -0.958 
 (0.386) (0.845) (0.864) (0.650) (1.517) (0.881) (1.302) 
        
Clinical Experience -0.353 -0.907 0.588 -0.526 0.470 -0.0175 0.534 
 (0.299) (0.671) (0.710) (0.328) (0.454) (0.446) (1.200) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.0106** -0.015** -0.0067* 0.00216 -0.0114** -0.0081** -0.00270 
 (0.00236) (0.005) (0.0028) (0.00259) (0.00326) (0.00304) (0.00497) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00550 0.0157+ 0.00444 0.00317 0.00211 0.0112* 0.00140 
 (0.00351) (0.008) (0.0057) (0.00335) (0.00377) (0.00488) (0.0102) 
Portfolio Novelty -0.714* -1.853** 0.177 -0.731+ -0.311 -0.997+ -0.160 
 (0.351) (0.568) (0.598) (0.439) (0.639) (0.581) (0.789) 
Bio -0.223 -0.126 1.151* -0.0404 -0.583 0.177 -0.00513 
 (0.303) (0.560) (0.515) (0.402) (0.850) (0.525) (0.626) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 748 767 767 767 627 697 440 
Log Likelihood -473.5 -210.1 -258.1 -319.4 -393.6 -450.6 -270.4 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
Fractional Logit Regressions 
  
 195 
 
 
Table 41: Chapter 3: robustness analyses – individual drug-level analysis 
Hypothesis  H1 H2 H2 H2 
DV External Alliance License  Acquisition 
R&D Decentralization 0.185* 0.00376 0.317** 0.185+ 
 (0.0937) (0.0949) (0.0749) (0.0953) 
     
Corporate Decentralization 0.0354 0.0363 0.435** -0.391* 
 (0.173) (0.151) (0.129) (0.167) 
Business Development Role 0.00823 -0.151* 0.0925 0.0156 
 (0.0732) (0.0732) (0.0616) (0.0747) 
Performance -0.511 -0.775 0.305 -1.239* 
 (0.701) (0.558) (0.512) (0.619) 
R&D Intensity -0.309 -0.197 0.0454 -0.849+ 
 (0.399) (0.345) (0.331) (0.435) 
SG&A 0.107 0.388** -0.155 0.273* 
 (0.120) (0.116) (0.106) (0.131) 
Size -0.0501 -0.163 0.0861 -0.183 
 (0.121) (0.112) (0.104) (0.130) 
Slack 0.00043 -0.0443 0.0238 0.00693 
 (0.0505) (0.0377) (0.0322) (0.0390) 
New CEO -0.174* 0.0139 -0.0708 -0.513** 
 (0.0847) (0.0949) (0.0855) (0.118) 
Total Patent Stock -0.0000 -0.000306** 0.000153* 0.00000014 
 (0.0001) (0.0000791) (0.0000684) (0.0000840) 
Patent stock therapeutic class 0.000473 0.000767+ 0.000385 0.000110 
 (0.00051) (0.000451) (0.000377) (0.000494) 
Competition -6.027* -3.383 8.186** -21.10** 
 (2.567) (2.343) (2.326) (1.961) 
SBU -0.0469 -0.0865** -0.0299 -0.0806* 
 (0.0323) (0.0312) (0.0260) (0.0344) 
Technical Differentiation -0.349 -1.209** -0.228 0.606 
 (0.392) (0.334) (0.325) (0.387) 
Clinical Experience -0.0028 -0.00272+ -0.00494** 0.000701 
 (0.0021) (0.00157) (0.00128) (0.00165) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.0049** -0.00612** 0.00156 -0.0159** 
 (0.00174) (0.00180) (0.00148) (0.00199) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00422 0.0104** 0.00755** -0.00173 
 (0.00348) (0.00215) (0.00186) (0.00223) 
Internal Portfolio Ther class -0.0229+ -0.0266** -0.000549 -0.0485** 
 (0.0135) (0.00988) (0.00770) (0.0115) 
External Portfolio Ther class 0.00422 -0.000478 0.00755** 0.0118 
 (0.00348) (0.00907) (0.00186) (0.0100) 
NCE -0.584** -0.424** -0.776** -0.403** 
 (0.129) (0.0996) (0.0804) (0.107) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Clinical Phase Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Progression Controls N Y Y Y 
N 12016 12016 12016 12016 
Log Likelihood -7039.5 -11670.4 -11670.4 -11670.4 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
Fractional logit regressions 
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Chapter 4 robustness tests 
 In Chapter 4, as for chapters 2 and 3, I examine the impact of using lagged versions 
of Corporate Decentralization as opposed to the unlagged values. For a two- and three-
year rolling averages (current and past one or two years average) of Corporate 
Decentralization, SG&A and Top 5 Products I obtain similar results for Hypotheses 1. In 
contrast for Hypothesis 2, although I see directional support in the form of negative 
coefficients for R&D Decentralization x Top 5 Products, the result for the 2-year rolling 
average is statistically insignificant. The results are illustrated in Table 42 and further 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Second, I examine whether the main results are robust to changes in the product 
concentration measure (Hypothesis 2). Namely instead of the Top 5 products, I examine 
the Top 1 and 3 products. I find broadly similar results to the main analyses as illustrated 
in Table 43. 
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Table 42: Chapter 4: robustness analyses – lagged structural variables 
 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion 2-year rolling average 3-year rolling average 
Corporate Decentralization 7.736** 10.01** 
 (2.598) (3.343) 
H1: Corporate Decentralization x SG&A -0.719** -0.906** 
 (0.274) (0.326) 
H2: Corporate Decentralization x Top 5 Products -2.138 -4.390+ 
 (1.862) (2.618) 
SG&A -0.0219 -0.270 
 (0.206) (0.245) 
Top 5 Products 0.438 2.520+ 
 (1.071) (1.423) 
R&D Decentralization -0.470* -0.553+ 
 (0.238) (0.283) 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.479 0.414 
 (0.339) (0.375) 
Performance -1.811 -2.063+ 
 (1.163) (1.209) 
R&D Intensity -1.957* -2.387** 
 (0.875) (0.822) 
Sales 0.0513 0.0391 
 (0.264) (0.234) 
CEO 0.313+ 0.287 
 (0.183) (0.178) 
Patent Stock -0.492** -0.432* 
 (0.188) (0.199) 
New Approved 0.128* 0.179** 
 (0.0504) (0.0487) 
Competition -1.953 -0.777 
 (5.237) (6.752) 
Technical Diversification 0.230 0.309 
 (0.402) (0.537) 
Portfolio 0.0229 0.203 
 (0.474) (0.536) 
Progress 0.0373* 0.0279 
 (0.0165) (0.0172) 
External 0.0608 0.152 
 (0.657) (0.566) 
NCE -0.0459 0.177 
 (0.654) (0.778) 
Bio -0.461 -0.113 
 (0.570) (0.624) 
Portfolio Novelty 1.811 1.109 
 (1.236) (1.124) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y 
Matching N N 
N 386 367 
Log Likelihood -30.09 -27.23 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
Fractional Logit Regressions 
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Table 43: Chapter 4: robustness analyses – different product concentration variables 
DV= 1-yr New Sales Proportion Top 1 Products Top 3 Products 
H1: Corporate Decentralization 1.579** 1.552** 
 (0.477) (0.591) 
H2: Corporate Decentralization x SG&A -0.508* -0.437* 
 (0.246) (0.220) 
H3: Corporate Decentralization  -2.949+ -1.177 
x Top 1 or 3 Products (1.750) (1.200) 
SG&A 0.468* 0.483* 
 (0.214) (0.206) 
Top 1 or 3 Products -0.717 -1.913** 
 (0.576) (0.646) 
R&D Decentralization -0.184 -0.212 
 (0.228) (0.225) 
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.638+ 0.607+ 
 (0.339) (0.328) 
Performance -0.470 -0.157 
 (0.985) (0.911) 
R&D Intensity -0.530 -0.384 
 (0.636) (0.641) 
Sales -0.713** -0.771** 
 (0.239) (0.245) 
CEO 0.285 0.305 
 (0.203) (0.214) 
Patent Stock -0.439* -0.498** 
 (0.185) (0.186) 
New Approved 0.136** 0.129** 
 (0.0512) (0.0500) 
Competition -2.072 -1.343 
 (4.670) (4.433) 
Technical Diversification 0.190 0.209 
 (0.463) (0.458) 
Portfolio -0.0559 0.0259 
 (0.448) (0.451) 
Progress 0.0419* 0.0423* 
 (0.0171) (0.0168) 
External -0.205 -0.0426 
 (0.614) (0.579) 
NCE 0.180 0.261 
 (0.678) (0.650) 
Bio -0.477 -0.351 
 (0.664) (0.577) 
Portfolio Novelty 1.893 2.043+ 
 (1.214) (1.221) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Category Fixed Effects Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y 
Matching N N 
N 396 396 
Log Likelihood -32.23 -32.20 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Errors clustered at firm level 
Fractional Logit Regressions 
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Appendix 7: Additional Mechanistic Analyses 
Chapter 2 mechanistic analyses  
The full regression tables for these analyses are illustrated in Table 44 to Table 50. 
In Table 44 the variable Tech. Diversity measures the degree of diversity of firms’ 
development portfolios and is operationalized through the breadth of therapeutic classes of 
a firm’s current development portfolio. This variable is measured using a Herfindahl index 
(subtracted from 1 to ensure higher values represent more diverse portfolios) and is 
estimated using a similar approach to other studies in the pharmaceutical industry empirical 
context (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). The key assumption in this analysis is that a more 
diverse development portfolio is associated with a broader array of knowledge within a 
focal firm. This assumption was validated through the managerial interviews that 
highlighted that the therapeutic classes associated with firms’ portfolios provided a 
reflection of the internal knowledge base within a focal firm. For example: 
“We dropped oncology from our portfolio and eventually lost our capability in the 
area meaning it will be difficult to pick up new candidates in this domain in the 
future”  
Consistent with my theoretical argumentation the interaction term Tech. Diversity 
x R&D Decentralization is statistically significant and negative for the pre-clinical to phase 
1 transition examined in Hypothesis 3. This suggests that the benefits of rich intra-
organizational knowledge flows, which are limited in the case of firms with a narrower 
array of technical knowledge, are outweighed by the stronger incentives associated with 
R&D decentralization. At high Tech. Diversity, the opposite occurs. 
In my theoretical argumentation I suggest that the importance of rich intra-
organizational knowledge flows decreases as inventions progress through the various 
stages of development. I observe that the coefficients for R&D decentralization is 
significantly lower for the pre-clinical to phase 1 transition than the phase 1 to 2 and phase 
3 to pre-registration transitions (p-values for Wald Tests comparing coefficients across 
regressions are 0.01 and 0.00 respectively). This is consistent with the importance of 
knowledge flows declining through development as R&D centralization appears to 
facilitate invention progression less through the later stages of development implying that 
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access to a firm’s broader knowledge base is less important. However, for the critical phase 
2 to 3 transition the coefficient for R&D Decentralization is not significantly different from 
that for the pre-clinical to phase 1 transition (p-value for Wald Test comparing coefficients 
is 0.79). This suggests that knowledge flows may still play an important role for the phase 
2 to 3 transition as firms may require additional technical due diligence to ensure that they 
can commit the resources to progress a drug candidate into phase 3 clinical trials. 
 
Table 44:  Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining how breadth of firms’ 
knowledge can impact role of R&D Decentralization in early development  
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
Negative binomial regressions 
 
Dependent Variable Number of inventions progressing to next phase 
Phase Transition PC-1 1-2 2-3 3-PR 
R&D Decentralization 0.714* -0.0239 0.831** 0.596+ 
 (0.306) (0.614) (0.310) (0.350) 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.0725 0.141+ 0.0697 -0.0433 
 (0.0775) (0.0773) (0.0778) (0.0793) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.168 0.113 0.0797 0.0126 
 (0.129) (0.179) (0.136) (0.138) 
R&D Decentralization x Tech. Diversity -1.150** -0.157 -1.279** -0.800+ 
 (0.393) (0.769) (0.398) (0.457) 
Tech. Diversity 2.032** 1.908** 1.655** 1.399** 
 (0.268) (0.256) (0.343) (0.225) 
Performance -0.00447 0.620+ 0.302 0.673+ 
 (0.412) (0.358) (0.419) (0.398) 
R&D Intensity 0.586** 0.295 0.241 0.595** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.266) (0.186) 
Size 0.287** 0.0892+ 0.153** 0.105* 
 (0.0498) (0.0472) (0.0508) (0.0494) 
Slack 0.0403* -0.0112 0.00407 0.0480* 
 (0.0205) (0.0268) (0.0319) (0.0212) 
CEO -0.00382 0.00654 -0.00970 -0.183* 
 (0.0696) (0.0733) (0.0801) (0.0793) 
Patent Stock 0.101** 0.0135 0.0819* 0.0132 
 (0.0385) (0.0363) (0.0401) (0.0316) 
Portfolio 0.00723** 0.0286** 0.0178** 0.0545** 
 (0.00250) (0.00590) (0.00345) (0.00517) 
External -0.690** 0.114 0.217 0.0949 
 (0.190) (0.166) (0.216) (0.131) 
NCE -0.600** 0.299 -0.172 -0.652** 
 (0.207) (0.192) (0.231) (0.189) 
Bio 0.410 0.887** 0.220 -0.166 
 (0.252) (0.266) (0.265) (0.201) 
Competition -6.109** -1.593 -2.574 3.214* 
 (1.871) (2.292) (2.109) (1.360) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 787 764 762 785 
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.227 0.195 0.216 
Log Likelihood -1559.3 -1195.6 -1008.6 -1032.6 
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Two alternative measures of the novelty of a firm’s portfolio are NCE and Novelty. 
NCE represents the proportion of drug-candidates within a firm’s portfolio that are new 
chemical entities. New chemical entities represent new drug candidates for which no 
component has been previously approved by the Federal Drug Administration. Novelty 
represents the mean novelty of firms’ portfolios on a 0-2 scale (Klueter, 2013). Drug 
candidates whose mechanism of action and origin of material are new to the focal firm in 
a specific therapeutic class have a Novelty value of 2, drug-candidates where one of the 
mechanism of action or origin of material are new have a Novelty value of 1 and if neither 
the mechanism of action nor the origin of material within a specific therapeutic class are 
new to the focal firm then the Novelty value is 0. Drug candidates that represent a new 
mechanism in a specific therapeutic class for a firm entail greater challenges as scientists 
need to develop an understanding of both the mechanism and how to apply that mechanism 
in a drug candidate i.e. suitable pharmo-kinetics profile, appropriate delivery mechanism, 
understanding how the drug candidate impacts target receptors in the body. This increases 
the technical complexity in developing a drug candidate. Similar considerations apply if 
the origin of material is new to a specific therapeutic class e.g. if a firm has never used 
antibodies in oncology this provides a greater technical challenge. However, the firm may 
have experience of this mechanism or have used a material in the same class in in a different 
therapeutic class and be able to access this valuable information through cross-
organizational knowledge flows.  
R&D centralization should facilitate access to a firm’s broader organizational 
knowledge thereby enabling more novel inventions to progress through the early stages of 
development. Empirically if this is the case the interaction terms R&D Decentralization x 
Novelty and R&D Decentralization x NCE should be negative and statistically significant. 
Table 45 illustrates support for this argumentation. Also, consistent with the hypothesis 
development in the main paper, the interaction term is only significant for early 
development i.e. pre-clinical to phase 1 transition. This suggests that the importance of 
cross-organizational knowledge flows diminishes as an invention progresses through the 
development process. 
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Table 45: Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining how complexity of firms’ 
development portfolio can impact role of R&D Decentralization in early 
development  
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
Negative binomial regressions 
 
Table 46 illustrates the regression analysis examining how the mean patent grant-
lag for a firm’s set of patent families filed in a focal year is associated with R&D 
Decentralization. Consistent with an incentives based argumentation, R&D 
decentralization is associated with shorter lags between the filing and granting of patents. 
Dependent Variable Number of inventions progressing to next phase 
Phase Transition PC-1 1-2 2-3 3-PR PC-1 1-2 2-3 3-PR 
R&D Decentralization 0.651** -0.339 0.281 0.301 0.381 -0.392 -0.578 0.104 
 (0.220) (0.284) (0.329) (0.238) (0.405) (0.344) (0.466) (0.455) 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.0728 0.148+ 0.0570 -0.0480 -0.0460 0.187* 0.0753 -0.0674 
 (0.0786) (0.0772) (0.0803) (0.0784) (0.0786) (0.0781) (0.0785) (0.0765) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.172 0.121 0.0695 0.0179 0.0830 0.0719 0.0531 -0.0345 
 (0.131) (0.182) (0.135) (0.138) (0.120) (0.179) (0.139) (0.130) 
R&D Decentralization x NCE -1.474** 0.336 -0.775 -0.605     
 (0.363) (0.458) (0.539) (0.511)     
NCE -0.495* 0.250 -0.128 -0.586**     
 (0.199) (0.207) (0.235) (0.191)     
R&D Decentralization x Novelty     -0.669+ 0.266 0.495 -0.140 
     (0.403) (0.415) (0.525) (0.527) 
Novelty     -0.619** -0.349 -0.332 -0.428+ 
     (0.227) (0.315) (0.344) (0.252) 
Performance -0.0257 0.616+ 0.317 0.745+ 0.0429 0.427 0.290 0.782* 
 (0.410) (0.360) (0.420) (0.393) (0.341) (0.346) (0.394) (0.368) 
R&D Intensity 0.580** 0.301 0.241 0.652** 0.683** 0.255 0.244 0.669** 
 (0.204) (0.200) (0.261) (0.178) (0.167) (0.231) (0.254) (0.206) 
Size 0.284** 0.0916+ 0.159** 0.106* 0.274** 0.112+ 0.154** 0.101+ 
 (0.0492) (0.0473) (0.0531) (0.0503) (0.0525) (0.0653) (0.0581) (0.0516) 
Slack 0.0435* -0.0113 0.00643 0.0471* 0.0369+ -0.0116 0.00185 0.0399* 
 (0.0205) (0.0264) (0.0329) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0270) (0.0332) (0.0185) 
CEO 0.0000474 0.00739 -0.0131 -0.183* -0.0068 -0.0008 -0.0141 -0.166+ 
 (0.0689) (0.0733) (0.0793) (0.0791) (0.0717) (0.0731) (0.0787) (0.0848) 
Patent Stock 0.109** 0.00917 0.0845* 0.0150 0.0904* 0.0198 0.0771+ 0.00151 
 (0.0397) (0.0365) (0.0397) (0.0296) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0430) (0.0297) 
Portfolio 0.00717** 0.0286** 0.0182** 0.0542** 0.0064* 0.0308** 0.0191** 0.0557** 
 (0.00254) (0.00595) (0.00338) (0.00511) (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0035) (0.0053) 
External -0.682** 0.107 0.209 0.0946 -0.401* 0.174 0.293 0.159 
 (0.191) (0.163) (0.219) (0.132) (0.184) (0.165) (0.200) (0.134) 
Bio  0.402 0.850** 0.176 -0.169     
 (0.251) (0.264) (0.268) (0.201)     
Tech. Diversity 1.961** 1.895** 1.423** 1.317** 1.285** 1.510** 1.121** 0.939** 
 (0.249) (0.251) (0.330) (0.227) (0.256) (0.319) (0.291) (0.202) 
Competition -6.000** -1.616 -2.290 3.433* -4.929* 0.114 -1.376 3.750* 
 (1.887) (2.313) (2.034) (1.438) (2.051) (2.227) (2.085) (1.470) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 787 764 762 785 787 764 762 785 
Pseudo-R2 0.244 0.227 0.194 0.216 0.236 0.222 0.192 0.212 
Log Likelihood -1555.7 -1195.3 -1010.4 -1033.2 -1572.1 -1203.0 -1011.9 -1038.9 
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This is because greater efforts are undertaken by managers in firms with decentralized 
R&D to get patents granted. This is still after controlling for factors such as the originality 
and number of claims associated with firms’ patents which may also influence the time 
taken for patents to proceed from filing to grant. 
 
Table 46: Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining how patent grant lag is 
associated with firms’ structural measures 
Dependent Variable Grant Lag (Days) Grant Lag (Days) 
R&D Decentralization -81.65** -50.20* 
 (28.72) (20.03) 
R&D functional differentiation 63.20+ 15.69 
 (33.63) (29.00) 
Corporate Decentralization  61.68 70.18 
 (63.94) (63.00) 
originality -200.3* -134.8 
 (96.97) (91.80) 
claims -3.116 1.470 
 (3.073) (3.013) 
Non-patent cites 5.528** 1.643 
 (1.762) (1.753) 
performance -334.1+ -214.7 
 (169.0) (139.4) 
R&D Intensity -91.11 4.625 
 (68.25) (45.67) 
size 3.232 -36.07 
 (22.44) (24.66) 
slack 0.478 -0.0646 
 (8.024) (9.731) 
CEO 18.39 19.71 
 (16.60) (17.48) 
tech. diversity -170.3 -164.8 
 (205.8) (214.5) 
patent stock 13.03 32.50 
 (15.12) (26.77) 
competition 1585.9+ -157.4 
 (795.5) (530.2) 
Year FE Y Y 
Firm FE N Y 
Business Segment FE Y Y 
N 782 782 
R2 0.618 0.644 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
Ordinary least squares regressions as Grant Lag is normally distributed. 
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Table 47: Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining whether firms simply progress inferior drug-candidates. Drug candidates 
entering phase 2, likelihood and hazard of progressing into phase 3 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Model Type Logit - linear time function Cox Proportional Hazards model 
R&D Functional Differentiation12 0.0737 0.0828 0.0926 0.0949 0.0916 0.0586 0.0580 0.0868 
 (0.234) (0.238) (0.249) (0.251) (0.255) (0.166) (0.169) (0.175) 
Firm-year level controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Drug-level controls N N N Y Y N Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects (Drug 
level) 
N N N N Y N N Y 
N 5216 5216 5216 5216 5168 4473 4473 4473 
Pseudo R2 0.0142 0.0181 0.0346 0.0347 0.0590 0.0203 0.0206 0.0360 
Log Likelihood -1354.4 -1349.0 -1326.3 -1326.2 -1289.2 -2096.8 -2096.2 -2063.2 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
Table 48: Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining whether firms simply progress inferior drug-candidates.  Drug candidates 
entering phase 3, likelihood and hazard of progressing into pre-registration 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Model Type Logit - linear time function Cox Proportional Hazards model 
Corporate Decentralization23 0.131 0.180 0.126 0.0551 0.107 -0.0178 -0.109 -0.0747 
 (0.330) (0.318) (0.336) (0.340) (0.379) (0.308) (0.326) (0.320) 
Firm-year level controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Drug-level controls N N N Y Y N Y Y 
Therapeutic Area Fixed Effects 
(Drug level) 
N N N N Y N N Y 
N 3578 3578 3578 3578 3578 2712 2712 2712 
Pseudo R2 0.00536 0.00898 0.0249 0.0281 0.0474 0.0156 0.0208 0.0287 
Log Likelihood -1393.6 -1388.5 -1366.3 -1361.7 -1334.8 -2083.3 -2072.3 -2055.5 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level. 
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Table 47 and Table 48 illustrate a series of tests undertaken to evaluate whether 
greater overall decentralization and R&D functional differentiation are associated with the 
progression of inferior drug-candidates through development thereby explaining why more 
candidates progress for firms with these structures. To test whether this is the case, the 
likelihood of a drug that has progressed from Phase 1 to 2 progressing into Phase 3 is 
examined for firms with and without functionally differentiated R&D (i.e. separate 
research and separate development units) and the likelihood of a drug candidate that has 
been progressed from Phase 2 to 3 progressing into Pre-Registration (PR) Status is 
evaluated for firms that are more or less decentralized at a corporate level. Two 
econometric approaches are used to examine the likelihood of a drug progressing from one 
phase to the next. First, using a maximum likelihood approach that accounts for the discrete 
nature of the time-element of the data set (i.e. clinical trial phase is only available per year), 
logit analyses are undertaken in which the unit of analysis is the drug-candidate-year and 
the dependent variable indicates whether the drug candidate moves from one phase to the 
next (Allison, 1982). A linear time function is used as one of the dependent variables, which 
is set to 1 when a firm enters the focal phase (phase 2 in the case of R&D Functional 
Differentiation and phase 3 in the case of Corporate Decentralization) and increases by 1 
for each subsequent year. In the case of R&D Functional Differentiation, the focus is only 
on drugs in phase 2 and the progression focus is movement from phase 2 to 3. For 
Corporate Decentralization, the focus is on drugs in phase 3 and the progression focus is 
from phase 3 to PR. Second, Cox proportional hazards model are used to examine the 
relative hazard of a drug moving from one phase to the next. The advantage of this 
approach is that that it is unconstrained in its underlying time function assumptions unlike 
the first approach. Again, the analysis is at the drug candidate-year level and the dependent 
variable and phase focus is the same as for the logit model used in the first approach.  
In both approaches the same full set of controls and independent variables that are 
used to test Hypotheses 3-4 are utilized as well as including individual drug controls (if 
drug is NCE and if it is externally sourced), year, business segment and drug therapeutic 
class controls. If greater decentralization/ differentiation is associated with the progression 
of inventions that are less likely to progress through the later stages of the innovation 
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process then the coefficient for R&D functional Differentiation12 (i.e. R&D functional 
differentiation of the firm when a drug candidate moves from phase 1 to 2) and Corporate 
Decentralization23 (i.e. the degree of corporate decentralization when a drug candidate 
moves from phase 2 to 3) should both be negative and statistically significant. Using this 
analysis no evidence is observed to suggest that functional differentiation of R&D and 
increased corporate decentralization are associated with the progression of inferior 
inventions that fail to progress through the later stages of the development process as the 
coefficients for R&D functional Differentiation12 and Corporate Decentralization23 are 
not statistically significant (see Table 47 and Table 48). 
In Table 49 the average time taken for a drug candidate to move from Phase 2 to 3 
across all firms in the sample is the focal dependent variable, with the unit of analysis being 
the firm. The negative coefficients for Corporate Decentralization indicate that greater 
corporate decentralization is associated with shorter times for progression from phase 2 to 
3. This is consistent with an incentives-based argumentation as managers exert more effort 
to progress inventions when the firm is more decentralized.  
 In Table 50 the average compensation of executives (as defined as reporting to the 
CEO) is examined using Execucomp data. Consistent with the main incentives-based 
argumentation, I observe that firms with functionally differentiated R&D have higher total 
compensation on average (Table 50 Model 2) for R&D executives, after controlling for a 
variety of firm-specific factors. This may partly explain why more drug-candidates 
progress from Phase 1 to 2 and consistent with the interview-based evidence outlined 
earlier in this appendix. I also observe that greater corporate decentralization is associated 
with lower salaries but is unrelated to total compensation (Table 50 Models 3 and 4), after 
controlling for a variety of firm-specific factors. This implies that greater corporate 
decentralization is associated with a higher variable component of compensation. This is 
again consistent with the argumentation that decentralization is associated with the usage 
of higher-powered incentives. This analysis is limited in that I do not have access to 
compensation data for my complete sample of firm-years (e.g. lack of access of 
compensation data of Japanese-listed firms). However, this analysis is consistent with 
greater decentralization being associated with the use of higher powered incentives. 
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Table 49: Chapter 2 mechanistic analysis examining average time it takes for drug-
candidates to move from Phase 2 to 3  
 
OLS model using average values per firm over period 1995-2015 
DV= Average time progress P2-3 (Years) Model 1 Model 2 
R&D Decentralization  -0.495 
  (0.744) 
R&D Functional Differentiation  0.284 
  (0.456) 
Corporate Decentralization -1.898* -1.741+ 
 (0.899) (0.937) 
Size -0.0355 -0.00840 
 (0.168) (0.172) 
R&D Intensity 0.257 0.346 
 (0.540) (0.642) 
Slack -0.161 -0.163 
 (0.157) (0.170) 
External 0.200 0.366 
 (0.968) (1.042) 
NCE 0.241 -0.321 
 (1.298) (1.575) 
Bio -0.0663 -0.661 
 (1.247) (1.625) 
Tech. Diversity 1.621 1.841 
 (1.430) (1.436) 
Performance 0.151 -0.116 
 (2.615) (2.896) 
SBU 0.189+ 0.163 
 (0.108) (0.115) 
Patent Family count -0.000452 -0.000461 
 (0.000646) (0.000686) 
Number of Firms 47 47 
R2 0.277 0.294 
Log-Likelihood -40.46 -39.87 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level. 
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Table 50: Chapter 2 mechanistic analyses examining how executive compensation 
and organization design elements are associated 
Function R&D Executives All Executives including CEO 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable Log (Salary) Log (Total 
Compensation) 
Log (Salary) Log (Total 
Compensation) 
R&D Decentralization -0.0293 0.139 -0.00833 -0.307 
 (0.0496) (0.286) (0.0226) (0.187) 
     
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.0388 0.579* 0.0527 0.234 
 (0.0341) (0.255) (0.0398) (0.163) 
     
Corporate Decentralization -0.0711 0.205 -0.0847* -0.0871 
 (0.112) (0.654) (0.0390) (0.318) 
     
Firm level controls  
(Main Paper Table 4) 
Y Y Y Y 
Business Segment Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 326 279 555 390 
R2 0.782 0.373 0.738 0.484 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level. 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions 
 
 
Chapter 3 supplemental analyses  
I conduct three supplemental analyses to further investigate the mechanisms 
associated with my two hypotheses in Chapter 3. First, I examine how the impact of 
organization design on the proportion of inventions sourced externally varies with the 
degree of novelty of the relevant inventions. Chapter 3 outlines the main analyses using 
the variable Novelty. I also use an alternative measure of novelty of a firm’s portfolio based 
on New Chemical Entity (NCE) status. I thus examine the proportion of NCE and non-
NCE drug-candidates that are sourced externally. These results are illustrated in Table 51. 
The non-matched model only provides directional support but both the PSM and CEM 
models continue to support the argumentation I outline in Chapter 3, in that firms that have 
decentralized R&D will tend to source more novel inventions externally than firms with 
centralized R&D. However, for less novel inventions there is no difference in the 
proportion of external sourcing of inventions between centralized and decentralized firms. 
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Table 51: Chapter 3: robustness analysis – alternative novelty measure (NCE) 
DV External non-NCE External NCE 
Type of Model FL FL PSM OLS 
CEM 
FL FL 
PSM 
OLS 
CEM 
R&D Decentralization 0.0680 0.0419 0.0549 0.187 0.438* 0.0733* 
 (0.138) (0.199) (0.0523) (0.142) (0.189) (0.0357) 
       
R&D Functional Differentiation 0.104 0.264 0.00584 0.0636 -0.235 -0.0759 
 (0.114) (0.256) (0.0609) (0.148) (0.268) (0.0509) 
Corporate Decentralization 0.466* -0.182 0.0605 0.514* 0.540 0.191+ 
 (0.210) (0.433) (0.102) (0.262) (0.479) (0.106) 
Business Development Role -0.106 -0.0994 -0.0525 0.142 -0.411* -0.0187 
 (0.115) (0.188) (0.0422) (0.120) (0.202) (0.0460) 
       
Performance -0.326 0.547 -0.560 -1.614+ 1.896 -0.264 
 (1.037) (1.447) (0.517) (0.827) (1.375) (0.409) 
R&D Intensity -0.321 0.373 -0.00900 0.390 0.913+ -0.160 
 (0.375) (0.626) (0.261) (0.355) (0.551) (0.207) 
SG&A -0.163 -0.574* 0.0194 -0.528** -0.615+ -0.0837 
 (0.100) (0.232) (0.0374) (0.205) (0.322) (0.0637) 
Size 0.215+ 0.740* 0.0417 0.591** 0.255 0.0197 
 (0.111) (0.289) (0.0468) (0.213) (0.325) (0.0518) 
Slack 0.00666 0.0418 -0.0192 0.0608 -0.140 -0.00721 
 (0.0410) (0.121) (0.0117) (0.0672) (0.0977) (0.0215) 
New CEO -0.168 -0.0565 0.0191 -0.313* -0.199 0.00506 
 (0.137) (0.207) (0.0589) (0.150) (0.254) (0.0480) 
Total Patent Stock 0.0506 0.0150 -0.0678+ -0.0311 0.0672 -0.00382 
 (0.0686) (0.131) (0.0396) (0.0814) (0.103) (0.0375) 
Patent Family Count 0.302 0.331 0.269 -0.133 -0.508 0.134 
 (0.401) (0.574) (0.228) (0.393) (0.504) (0.170) 
       
Competition 0.579 -13.64+ -7.367** -1.590 10.25 1.258 
 (3.872) (7.180) (1.594) (4.853) (10.90) (2.665) 
       
SBU 0.141 193.2** -0.247+ -0.486 -0.514 -0.0982 
 (0.433) (64.70) (0.139) (0.388) (0.729) (0.163) 
Technical Differentiation -0.824 0.926 0.965** 0.456 3.162+ -0.891 
 (0.790) (1.294) (0.328) (0.996) (1.897) (0.632) 
       
Clinical Experience -0.114 0.372 0.319 -0.719 -1.948+ -0.449* 
 (0.527) (0.917) (0.280) (0.602) (1.090) (0.215) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00205 -0.0157* -0.0063** -0.0084** 0.0107+ 0.000116 
 (0.00267) (0.00639) (0.00197) (0.00318) (0.00639) (0.00162) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00350 -0.00059 -0.00262 0.0155** 0.0192+ 0.00600** 
 (0.00486) (0.00756) (0.00217) (0.00557) (0.0114) (0.00205) 
Portfolio Novelty 0.237 0.617 -0.0321 -1.203* -1.630 -0.189 
 (0.606) (1.033) (0.309) (0.593) (1.297) (0.264) 
Bio -0.397 0.334 0.146 -0.321 -1.462 -0.403 
 (0.838) (1.381) (0.312) (0.695) (1.814) (0.393) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 702 224 332 658 209 304 
Log Likelihood -455.0 -138.2  -399.8 -120.4  
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard errors clustered at firm level 
FL = Factional Logit; PSM = Propensity Score Matching; CEM = Coarsened Exact Matching 
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares  
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Second, the impact of a business development group is examined. I argue that 
business development groups are integrating units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and 
effectively could make more decentralized firms more centralized by reducing the 
autonomy of individual R&D units. I find no evidence to support this assessment when 
examining the main models used to test Hypothesis 1 (Models 1 and 2 in Table 52) as the 
interaction terms between R&D Decentralization and Business Development Role are 
statistically insignificant. However re-examining Hypothesis 2 in which the mode of 
sourcing external inventions is considered I find negative and significant interaction terms 
for the analysis examining the proportion of inventions sourced externally via acquisitions 
(Models 3 and 4 in Table 52). This suggests that for “larger ticket” items such as 
acquisitions, business development units can reduce the propensity of decentralized R&D 
units to source via this mode. This is consistent with the logic that R&D units are unable 
to make acquisitions without the buy-in of a corporate business development unit. This is 
also consistent with the findings of my interviews in which R&D and Business 
Development managers highlight that business development units often play a much bigger 
role in acquisitions as opposed to licensing deals. 
Third, I examine how the primary relationship indicated by Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 
3 changes by the stage of development or clinical phase in which an invention is sourced. 
I argue that as an invention progresses through development the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding that invention declines as more favorable information comes to light. As a 
result of this decreased risk of failure of such inventions they become more costly to source 
externally. Thus, for the later stages of development decentralized R&D units will be less 
likely to source such inventions externally as there will be an increased likelihood that such 
units have to obtain corporate buy-in. I observe that for Phases 0 to 2 there is a strong 
association between R&D Decentralization and an increased proportion of externally 
sourced drug candidates as illustrated by Models 1 to 6 in Table 53. However for sourcing 
of phase 3 drug candidates (Models 7 and 8) the relationship is much weaker consistent 
with decentralized R&D units being less able to source such costly inventions externally 
thereby eliminating the difference between centralized and decentralized R&D units with 
respect to the proportion of inventions that are externally sourced. 
 211 
 
 
Table 52: Chapter 3 supplemental analysis examining moderating impact of business 
development units on the relationships implied by Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent Variable External Acquisition Alliance License 
Type of Model FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM 
R&D Decentralization 0.212+ 0.387* 0.257 1.250* -0.197 -0.421+ 0.282* 0.246 
 (0.124) (0.186) (0.203) (0.527) (0.199) (0.244) (0.132) (0.218) 
R&D Functional Differentiation -0.0848 -0.00379 -0.250 -0.342 0.130 0.863* -0.137 -0.558+ 
 (0.0668) (0.201) (0.178) (0.641) (0.127) (0.353) (0.129) (0.311) 
Organizational Decentralization 0.290+ -0.569+ -0.170 -1.785+ 0.0419 -0.695 0.655** -0.137 
 (0.155) (0.316) (0.351) (0.931) (0.259) (0.488) (0.219) (0.532) 
Business Development Role 0.0518 0.104 0.0694 1.231** -0.0798 -0.509 0.0838 -0.294 
 (0.0814) (0.208) (0.156) (0.347) (0.137) (0.349) (0.119) (0.297) 
R&D Cent. x BD Role -0.0975 -0.316 -0.872* -2.649** 0.108 0.186 0.185 0.457 
 (0.170) (0.288) (0.407) (0.634) (0.271) (0.415) (0.222) (0.350) 
Performance -0.352 2.619** -0.673 0.934 0.265 -0.493 -0.413 4.521** 
 (0.631) (0.692) (1.206) (2.601) (0.769) (1.369) (0.671) (1.550) 
R&D Intensity -0.0945 0.602+ 0.166 0.231 0.461 -1.156 -0.724+ 2.290** 
 (0.238) (0.363) (0.358) (0.970) (0.313) (0.834) (0.380) (0.723) 
SG&A -0.0706 -0.198 -0.163 0.144 0.0975 0.0956 -0.114 -0.788** 
 (0.0855) (0.169) (0.167) (0.537) (0.122) (0.316) (0.162) (0.213) 
Size 0.117 0.211 0.0304 -0.125 0.212+ -0.0545 0.00196 0.637* 
 (0.101) (0.198) (0.202) (0.553) (0.126) (0.310) (0.162) (0.260) 
Slack 0.0292 -0.127 0.0638 -0.227 -0.00266 0.0316 0.00528 -0.0909 
 (0.0363) (0.0817) (0.0447) (0.180) (0.0571) (0.129) (0.0468) (0.0975) 
New CEO -0.195* 0.401* -0.456+ 0.588 0.0318 0.153 -0.0804 0.250 
 (0.0978) (0.177) (0.264) (0.657) (0.164) (0.299) (0.105) (0.246) 
Total Patent Stock -0.00721 -0.0384 0.133 0.0858 -0.110 -0.395* 0.0185 0.200 
 (0.0481) (0.0846) (0.0818) (0.295) (0.0885) (0.155) (0.0613) (0.137) 
Patent Family Count 0.0810 -0.846* -0.827 -0.910 -0.212 0.321 0.626 -1.052 
 (0.308) (0.401) (0.546) (1.083) (0.356) (0.833) (0.408) (0.665) 
Competition -4.890+ -11.02+ -14.17** -3.567 1.873 -17.13+ 8.261* -7.664 
 (2.804) (6.009) (4.065) (15.40) (3.089) (9.399) (3.300) (6.020) 
SBU -0.103 82.09 -1.592 321.5** 0.153 1.752 -0.949** -283.4** 
 (0.265) (63.13) (1.366) (116.3) (0.342) (61.98) (0.286) (53.13) 
Technical Differentiation -0.218 3.075** -0.500 -0.977 1.089 7.867** -0.585 4.662** 
 (0.400) (0.841) (0.837) (1.967) (0.873) (1.853) (0.684) (1.246) 
Clinical Experience -0.515 -0.194 -0.774 -1.391 0.627 3.249** -0.607+ -1.241 
 (0.355) (0.540) (0.612) (3.015) (0.675) (1.027) (0.334) (0.836) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00823** -0.00895** -0.0148** -0.00440 -0.00700** -0.0154+ 0.00281 -0.00220 
 (0.00211) (0.00327) (0.00485) (0.0106) (0.00269) (0.00809) (0.00249) (0.00482) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00832* -0.000878 0.0164* 0.0103 0.00447 -0.0217+ 0.00340 0.00258 
 (0.00354) (0.00556) (0.00776) (0.0204) (0.00597) (0.0122) (0.00337) (0.00937) 
Portfolio Novelty -1.047** -1.240* -1.822** -1.683 0.277 1.626 -0.754+ -1.637* 
 (0.373) (0.572) (0.559) (1.317) (0.599) (1.085) (0.435) (0.741) 
Bio 0.315 0.0858 -0.143 -2.725 1.108* 4.021** -0.0690 0.445 
 (0.287) (0.761) (0.555) (1.856) (0.520) (1.022) (0.396) (1.026) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Cat. Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 769 165 769 172 769 172 769 172 
R2 0.0318 0.0782 0.0904 0.197 0.0739 0.156 0.0469 0.0963 
Log Likelihood -488.9 -109.6 -211.2 -52.39 -258.2 -56.29 -320.0 -80.29 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level. 
FL = Fractional Logit; PSM = Propensity Score Matching 
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Table 53: Chapter 3 supplemental analysis examining how the relationship between 
the proportion of inventions externally sourced and R&D Decentralization varies by 
clinical development phase 
 
DV= External Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Type of Model FL FL PSM  FL FL PSM FL FL PSM FL FL PSM 
Phase 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 
R&D Decentralization 0.200* 0.298** 0.341* 0.499** 0.352+ 0.355* 0.256 0.373+ 
 (0.0800) (0.115) (0.165) (0.173) (0.185) (0.177) (0.196) (0.224) 
R&D Functional Diffn. 0.0641 -0.141 -0.108 0.736* -0.0381 -0.0441 -0.119 -0.278 
 (0.0561) (0.134) (0.133) (0.367) (0.135) (0.257) (0.134) (0.315) 
Organizational Cent. 0.455** 0.428 0.0814 0.333 0.0811 -0.856 -0.124 -0.0304 
 (0.113) (0.274) (0.275) (0.605) (0.288) (0.610) (0.264) (0.521) 
Business Dev. Role -0.0360 0.0428 0.0132 -0.0481 -0.0859 -0.290+ -0.112 0.198 
 (0.0602) (0.0995) (0.127) (0.230) (0.115) (0.167) (0.131) (0.288) 
Performance -0.0657 -0.757 -1.205 1.326 -1.225 -2.264* -0.871 1.414 
 (0.553) (0.757) (0.836) (3.545) (0.993) (1.147) (1.014) (1.689) 
R&D Intensity 0.151 0.0794 0.0855 -0.479 0.728 0.402 -0.658 0.107 
 (0.208) (0.282) (0.496) (1.298) (0.495) (0.777) (0.705) (1.030) 
SG&A 0.0258 0.154 -0.0844 -0.739 -0.327* -0.255 0.178 0.899+ 
 (0.0757) (0.144) (0.144) (0.529) (0.157) (0.415) (0.201) (0.475) 
Size 0.137+ 0.241 0.328 0.694 0.695** 0.508 0.143 -0.0786 
 (0.0802) (0.187) (0.200) (0.686) (0.220) (0.470) (0.219) (0.568) 
Slack 0.0169 0.0214 0.0389 0.477** 0.00360 0.114 -0.0335 0.0289 
 (0.0374) (0.0470) (0.0514) (0.119) (0.0518) (0.105) (0.0566) (0.0934) 
New CEO -0.130 -0.389** -0.479** -0.246 -0.177 -0.0732 0.0241 0.139 
 (0.0863) (0.144) (0.185) (0.283) (0.184) (0.364) (0.163) (0.325) 
Total Patent Stock 0.0367 -0.0256 0.138* 0.360+ -0.112+ 0.141 0.154+ 0.207 
 (0.0386) (0.0750) (0.0573) (0.186) (0.0602) (0.186) (0.0803) (0.179) 
Patent Family Count 0.208 -0.392 0.129 -0.239 0.916* 0.324 -0.477 -1.729* 
 (0.215) (0.311) (0.287) (0.876) (0.423) (0.654) (0.557) (0.676) 
Competition -1.229 -1.681 2.832 11.29 -2.325 23.15 -1.564 21.74+ 
 (1.695) (4.776) (5.117) (15.05) (3.159) (16.08) (4.217) (13.14) 
SBU 0.108* 0.196 -0.0402 -1.117+ 0.269** 0.132 0.270** 0.481** 
 (0.0460) (0.124) (0.127) (0.580) (0.0658) (0.323) (0.0857) (0.136) 
Technical Differentiation -0.905 0.125 -0.0424 2.864 -1.075 -2.118 -1.075 -0.966 
 (0.641) (0.876) (1.014) (2.005) (1.027) (1.680) (0.851) (1.366) 
Clinical Experience -0.0485 -0.108 -0.512 -1.503 0.370 -1.622 -0.704 -1.362 
 (0.252) (0.526) (0.353) (0.996) (0.502) (1.431) (0.449) (1.474) 
Internal Overall Portfolio -0.00002 0.00204 -0.00048 0.0109 0.000336 0.0186** 0.00427+ 0.0189* 
 (0.00132) (0.00392) (0.00304) (0.00801) (0.00319) (0.00609) (0.00234) (0.00749) 
External Overall Portfolio 0.00712** 0.00639+ 0.0112** 0.00163 0.00485 0.0181 -0.00237 0.00890 
 (0.00230) (0.00388) (0.00414) (0.00902) (0.00742) (0.0112) (0.00642) (0.00944) 
Portfolio Novelty -0.903** -0.815* -1.261** -1.969 0.0905 -0.326 -0.437 -0.457 
 (0.306) (0.405) (0.465) (1.468) (0.544) (1.078) (0.435) (1.232) 
Bio 0.257 0.587 0.286 0.785 -1.244* -1.491 -1.489** -0.959 
 (0.271) (0.491) (0.531) (1.631) (0.512) (1.235) (0.494) (1.347) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Business Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Therapeutic Category Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 759 231 736 171 736 228 752 235 
R2 0.184 0.227 0.153 0.329 0.114 0.174 0.107 0.165 
Log Likelihood -1654.9 -509.4 -867.1 -182.2 -939.6 -305.1 -840.6 -267.3 
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Standard Errors clustered at firm level. 
FL = Fractional Logit; PSM = Propensity Score Matching 
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Chapter 4 supplemental analyses 
 I conduct one supplemental analyses to further investigate the mechanisms 
associated with my two hypotheses in Chapter 4. I examine how the number of product 
functional roles (Guadalupe et al., 2014) within an organization can influence the impact 
of Corporate Decentralization on firms’ sales of new products. This follows a similar logic 
to the second supplemental analysis in Chapter 3 described above. Namely, product 
functional units can have the impact of more strongly centralizing certain elements of 
business units’ activities associated with the commercialization of their new products. This 
should result in the difference between more and less centralized firms in terms of 
commercialization of new products being reduced. The analysis conducted to test this 
argumentation compares a sub-sample of firms that have a high number of product 
functional roles with a sample of firms that have a lower number of product functional 
roles. Table 27 illustrates the results of this analysis and I observe that for firms with a 
smaller number of product functional roles, the coefficient for Corporate Decentralization 
is positive and statistically significant. However, for the sub-sample of firms with a higher 
number of product functional roles, I find that Corporate Decentralization is much lower 
in magnitude. This is consistent with the fact that such roles have the effect of centralizing 
a firm’s actions potentially lowering the benefits of increased incentives and local market 
knowledge. Wald tests further illustrate that there is a significant difference in the 
coefficients to Corporate Decentralization for the sub-samples of observations with higher 
and lower levels of product functional roles. 
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